America, Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat. Tingfang Wu
corporations from embarking in new enterprises, and so incidentally limits the demand for labor. In short, the whole nation is practically hurled into a state of bustle and excitement, and the general trade of the country is seriously affected. A young man in Washington, who was engaged to be married, once told me that he was too busy to think of marriage until the election was over.
If the French system were followed, and the President were elected by a majority of the combined votes of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the inconveniences, the excitements and expense above enumerated might be avoided, but I think the people of America would rather endure these evils than be deprived of the pleasure of electing their President themselves. The alternate remedy, so far as I can see, is to extend the presidential term to, say, six or seven years, without any chance of a re-election. If this proposal were adopted, the President would be more free and independent, he would not be haunted by the bugbear of losing his position by temporarily displeasing his political friends, he could give his undivided attention, as he cannot do now, to federal affairs, and work without bias or fear, and without interruption, for the welfare of his nation. He would have more chance of really doing something for his country which was worth while. A further advantage is that the country would not be so frequently troubled with the turmoil and excitement arising from the presidential election. If I were allowed to prophecy, I should say that the young Republic of China, profiting by the experiences of France and America, will most likely adopt the French system of electing its President, or develop a system somewhat similar to it.
One of the defects in the American way of government is the spoils system, in accordance with the maxim, "To the victor belongs the spoils." The new President has the right of dismissing a large number of the holders of Federal Offices, and to appoint in their places his friends, or men of his party who have rendered it services, or who have otherwise been instrumental in getting him elected. I am told that thousands of officials are turned out in this way every four years. President Jackson introduced the practice, and almost every succeeding President has continued it. This spoils system has been adopted by almost every state and municipality; it forms indeed the corner-stone of practical politics in the United States. In every country, all over the world, there are cases where positions and places of emolument have been obtained through influential friends, but to dismiss public servants who are doing useful work, for no better reason than simply to make room for others, is very bad for the civil service, and for the country it serves. Attempts to remedy these evils have been made within recent years by the introduction of what is called "Civil Service Reform", by which a candidate is appointed to a post after an examination, and the term of his service is fixed. If this is to be strictly adhered to in all cases, the President will be, to a great extent, deprived of the means of rewarding his political friends. In that case I doubt if the professional politicians and wire pullers will be so active and arduous as they have hitherto been, as the chief aim in securing the election of the nominee will have been taken away. Great credit is due to President Taft for his courage and impartiality, in that after assuming the duties of the high office to which he was elected, he gave appointments to men according to their ability, irrespective of party claims, and even went so far as to invite one or two gentlemen of known ability, who belonged to the opposite party, to become members of his Cabinet.
In America men are not anxious for official offices. Men possessing talent and ability, with business acumen, are in great demand, and can distinguish themselves in their several professions in various ways; they can easily attain a position of wealth and influence, and so such men keep out of politics. It must not, however, be inferred from this that the government officials in America are incompetent. On the contrary I gladly testify from my personal experience that the work done by them is not only efficient, but that, taken as a whole, they compare most favorably with any other body of government officials in Europe. Still, on account of the small salaries paid, it is not to be wondered at that exceptionally good men cannot be induced to accept official positions. I have known several Cabinet Ministers who, after holding their offices for two or three years, were obliged to resign and resume their former business, and a President has been known to experience great difficulty in getting good and competent men to succeed them.
These remarks do not apply to the President, not because the President's salary is large, for compared with what European Kings and Emperors receive it is very small, but because the position is, far and above any other, the largest gift the people can bestow. No one has ever been known to refuse a presidential nomination. I believe anyone to whom it was offered would always gladly accept it. I have conversed with some in America who told me that they were heirs apparent to the White House, and so they are, for they are just as eligible candidates for the position, as is the Crown Prince to succeed to a throne in any European country. Even a lady was once nominated as a presidential candidate, although she did not obtain many votes.
One of the things which arouses my admiration is the due observance by the people of the existing laws and the Constitution. Every one obeys them, from the President to the pedler, without any exception. Sometimes, however, by a too strict and technical interpretation of the law, it works a hardship. Let me quote a case. According to Article 1, Section 6, of the Constitution, "no Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time." A certain Senator was appointed by the President to a Cabinet office, but it happened that the salary attached to that office had been raised during the time he was in the Senate, and so it was held that he could draw only the salary which was allowed before he became a Senator, and that he was not entitled to the increase which was sanctioned by Congress while he was in the Senate, although at the time he had not the slightest notion that the increase would ever affect his own pocket.
The relation of the states to the Federal Government is peculiar and unique. I will illustrate my point by correcting a mistake often made by foreigners in regard to the different provinces of China. It is generally assumed by Western writers that each province in China is self-governed, and that the provincial authorities act independently and in defiance of the injunctions of the Peking Government. The facts, however, are that until the establishment of the Republic, all the officials in the Provinces were appointed or sanctioned by the Peking Government, and that by an Imperial decree even a Viceroy or Governor could, at any moment, be changed or dismissed, and that no important matter could be transacted without the Imperial sanction. How does this compare with the states in America? Every American boasts that his state is independent of the Federal Government. All officials, from the Governor downward, are, in every state, elected by the people. Each state is provided with a Legislature consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, also elected by the popular vote. The state has very large, and almost absolute, legislative and executive powers, and is competent to deal with all matters not reserved by the Constitution for the Federal Government. Each state is also independent of every other state. The criminal and civil laws, including all matters pertaining to the transfer of and the succession to property, as well as marriage, divorce and fiscal laws, are within the scope of the state administrations. The authorities of each state naturally do their best to make their own state as populous and prosperous as possible. Thus in some states the laws concerning divorce, corporations, and landed property, are more favorable than in other states. A person, for example, unable to obtain a divorce in his own state, can, without difficulty, attain his object in another state. What is expressly prohibited by statute in one state may be perfectly legitimate in the neighboring state. It is the same with the local taxes; fees and taxes are not uniform; in one state they are heavy, while in another they are comparatively light. A stranger would naturally be surprised to find such a condition of things in a great nation like America, and would wonder how the machinery of such a government can work so well. Nevertheless he will find that everything goes on smoothly. This can be explained only by the fact that the inhabitants of one state often remove to other states, and by commercial and other dealings and social associations they mix together, so that, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of conditions in different states, the people easily adapt themselves to the local surroundings, and, so far as I can find, no friction or quarrel has ever arisen between two states. However, would it not be better for all the states to appoint an interstate committee to revise and codify their laws with a view to making them uniform?
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