The Life of Jefferson Davis. Alfriend Frank Heath
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The Life of Jefferson Davis
PREFACE
In offering this volume to the public, the occasion is embraced to avow, with unfeigned candor, a painful sense of the inadequate manner in which the design has been executed. Emboldened rather by his own earnest convictions, than by confidence in his capacity, the author has undertaken to contribute to American History, an extended narration of the more prominent incidents in the life of Jefferson Davis. Whatever may be the decision of the reader upon the merits of the performance, the author has the satisfaction arising from a conscientious endeavor to subserve the ends of truth. In pursuit of the purpose to write facts only, to the aid of familiar acquaintance with many of the topics discussed, and to information derived from the most accurate sources, has been brought laborious investigation of numerous interesting papers, which his avocation made accessible. It is therefore claimed that no statement is to be found in this volume, which is not generally conceded to be true, or which is not a conclusion amply justified by indisputable evidence.
Nor is it to be fairly alleged that the work exhibits undue sectional bias. As a Southern man, who, in common with his countrymen of the South, was taught to believe the principles underlying the movement for Southern independence, the only possible basis of Republicanism, the author has regarded, as a worthy incentive, the desire to vindicate, as best he might, the motives and conduct of the South and its late leader.
Disclaiming the purpose of promoting sectional bitterness, or of a wholesale indictment of the Northern people, he deems it needless to dwell upon the obvious propriety of discrimination. Holding in utter abhorrence the authors of those outrages, wanton barbarities and petty persecutions, of which her people were the victims, the South yet feels the respect of an honorable enemy for those distinguished soldiers, Buell, Hancock, McClellan and others, who served efficiently the cause in which they were employed, and still illustrated the practices of Christian warfare. To fitly characterize the remorseless faction in antagonism to the sentiments of these honorable men, it is only necessary to recall the malice which assails a “lost cause” with every form of detraction, and aspires to crown a triumph of arms with the degradation and despair of a conquered people.
In his especial solicitude for a favorable appreciation of his efforts, by his Southern countrymen, the author has striven to avoid affront to those considerations of delicacy which yet affect many incidents of the late war. He has not sought to revive, unnecessarily, questions upon which Southern sentiment was divided, and has rarely assailed the motives or capacity of individuals in recognized antagonism to the policy of President Davis. Perhaps a different course would have imparted interest to his work, and have more clearly established the vindication of its subject. But besides being wholly repugnant to the tastes of the author, it would have been in marked conflict with the consistent aim of Mr. Davis’ career, which was to heal, not to aggravate, the differences of the South.
A large part of the labor, which would otherwise have devolved upon this enterprise, if adequately performed, had already been supplied by the writings of Professor Bledsoe. To the profound erudition and philosophical genius of that eminent writer, as conspicuously displayed in his work entitled, “Is Davis a Traitor?” the South may, with confidence, intrust its claims upon the esteem of posterity.
The author heartily acknowledges the intelligent aid, and generous encouragement, which he has received from his publishers.
January, 1868.
INTRODUCTION
To future generations the period in American history, of most absorbing interest and profound inquiry, will be that embracing the incipiency, progress, and termination of the revolution which had its most pronounced phase in the memorable war of 1861. Historians rarely concur in their estimates of the limits of a revolution, and usually we find quite as much divergence in their views of the scope of its operations, as in their speculations as to its origin and causes, and their statements of its incidents and results. If, however, it is difficult to assign, with minute accuracy, the exact limits and proper scope of those grand trains of consecutive events, which swerve society from the beaten track of ages, divert nations from the old path of progress into what seems to be the direction of a new destiny, and often transform the aspect of continents, it is comparatively an easy task to reach a reliable statement of their more salient and conspicuous incidents. It is in this aspect that the Titanic conflict, which had its beginning with the booming of the guns in Charleston harbor in April, 1861, and its crowning catastrophe at Appomattox Court-house in April, 1865, will be chiefly attractive to the future student. As a point of departure from the hitherto unbroken monotony of American history, the beginning of a new order of things, the extinction of important elements of previous national existence, embracing much that was consecrated in the popular affections; in short, as a complete political and social transformation, an abrupt, but thorough perversion of the government from its original purposes and previous policy, this period must take its place, with important suggestions of theory and illustration, among the most impressive lessons of history.
The profound interest which shall center upon the period that we have under consideration, must necessarily subject to a rigid investigation the lives, characters, and conduct of those to whom were allotted conspicuous parts in the great drama. It is both a natural and reasonable test that the world applies in seeking to solve, through the qualities and capacities of those who direct great measures of governmental policy, the merits of the movements themselves. The late President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, avowed his inability to escape the judgment of history, and the bare statement sufficiently describes the inevitable necessity, not only of his own situation, but of all who bore a prominent part on either side of the great controversy.
Jefferson Davis confronts posterity burdened with the disadvantage of having been the leader of an unsuccessful political movement. “Nothing succeeds like success,” was the pithy maxim of Talleyrand, to whose astute observation nothing was more obvious than the disposition of mankind to make success the touchstone of merit. It is, nevertheless, a vulgar and often an erroneous criterion. What could be more absurd than to determine by such a test the comparative valor, generalship, and military character of the two contestants in the late war? Concede its applicability, however, and we exalt the soldiership of the North above all precedent, and consign the unequaled valor of the Southern soldiery to reproach, instead of the deathless fame which shall survive them. To such a judgment every battle-field of the war gives emphatic and indignant contradiction. History abounds with evidence of the influence of accident and of extraneous circumstances, in the decision of results, which, if controlled by the question of merit, as understood by the predominant sense of mankind, would have borne a vastly different character.
But, in addition to the disparaging influence of the failure of the cause which he represented, Mr. Davis has encountered an unparalleled degree of personal hate, partizan rancor, of malignant and gratuitous misrepresentation, the result, to a great extent, of old partizan rivalries and jealousies, engendered in former periods of the history of the Union, and also of the spirit of domestic disaffection and agitation which inevitably arises against every administration of public affairs, especially at times of unusual danger and embarrassment.1 The almost fanatical hatred of the Northern masses against Mr. Davis, as the wicked leader of a causeless rebellion against the Government of his country, as a conspirator against the peace and happiness of his fellow-citizens, and as a relentless monster, who tortured and starved prisoners of war, springs from the persistent calumnies of such leaders of Northern opinion, as have an ignoble purpose of vindictive hatred to gratify by the invention of these atrocious charges. Yet this feeling of the North hardly exceeds in violence, the resentment with which it was sought to inflame the Southern people against him, at critical stages of the war, as an unworthy leader, whose incapacity, pragmatism, nepotism, and vanity were rushing them into material and political perdition. Of popular disaffection to the Confederate cause, or dislike of Mr. Davis, there was an insignificantly
A pertinent remark of Macaulay is, “It is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original principles. During many years, a generation of Whigs, whom Sydney would have spurned as slaves, continued to wage war with a generation of Tories whom Jeffries would have hanged.”