Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress

Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.) - United States. Congress


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our navy; and we had lately given our adversaries a supplementary broadside, which he hoped would tell well. Mr. S. stated the origin and progress of navies at some length, commencing with the Republic of Genoa. Our chief reliance as to defence must be on our militia. So little did Great Britain now rely on her navy for defence of her soil, that she had called upon every man in the country to be at his post, if danger came. Other nations might be justified in supporting a naval force, because they had colonies separated from them by the sea, with whom they were obliged to have means of intercourse, but we had not that apology for a navy. Mr. S. concluded his observations, after speaking near an hour, not, he said, that he had gone through the subject; but, as it was late in the day, he yielded the floor to some other gentleman.

      Mr. J. G. Jackson said, that gentlemen should not be influenced, in discussing the present question, by a belief that they were now discussing the propriety of raising a naval force for offensive purposes. This was not the question. It was only whether, at this crisis, the House would employ a little force for the purpose of resisting attacks made on our territory at home. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Williams) had said that an attack on the soil touched the life-blood of every man in it. Yes, Mr. J. said, it did; whether the invasion was on our jurisdiction, on land or water, it touched equally the life-blood of the nation. He would as soon resist an attack on our territorial jurisdiction on sea as on land. It made no difference with him whether a foreign frigate came up to the piles of Potomac bridge and fired over into the town, or whether its crew came on shore and assaulted us with the bayonet. The territory, he said, was equally invaded in either case. Were we not to resist Great Britain because of her 1,130 sail of armed vessels? This would amount to a declaration that we must succumb to her, because she could at any time send a squadron sufficient to destroy our naval force at a single blow. This was the tendency of the argument. Mr. J. said it would be more honorable to fight, while a single gun could be fired, notwithstanding her overwhelming force. This mode of reasoning had a tendency to destroy the spirit of the people. He would never consent to crouch before we were conquered; this was not the course of our Revolutionary patriots, and he trusted it was one which we should not follow. He would rather, like the heroic band of Leonidas, perish in the combat, although the force of the enemy was irresistible, than acknowledge that we would submit. This naval force was not, however, intended to cope with the navy of Great Britain, but to chastise the petty pirates who trespassed on our jurisdiction; pirates, he called them, because the British Government had not sanctioned their acts. It had not justified the murder of Pierce, or asserted the right of jurisdiction claimed by an officer within the length of his buoys, &c., because, if she had, it would have then been war. For this reason he wished our little pigmy force to be sent on the ocean, notwithstanding the giant navy of Great Britain. Some gentlemen had opposed this on the score of expense. Our most valuable treasure, Mr. J. said, was honor; and the House had almost unanimously declared that it could not submit without a sacrifice of that honor.

      Saturday, January 21

Extra Session

      On motion of Mr. Smilie the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to alter the time of the next meeting of Congress.

      Mr. J. G. Jackson moved to strike out the "fourth" Monday in May, and insert the "last," stating as a reason, that as the Virginia elections took place in April, the Representatives could not arrive here in time.

      Mr. Macon wished a division of the question so as first to strike out, with a view to insert "September," instead of May. The motion to strike out was negatived – 62 to 35. It was supposed that this question tried the principle of the bill.

      The committee rose and reported the bill.

      Mr. D. Williams moved to strike out May for the purpose of inserting "September."

      Mr. Milnor hoped the motion would not be agreed to. If the new Congress could commence its session on the 4th day of March next, he said he should think it extremely proper that it should do so. And, if he could think that the majority would fix an earlier day than the fourth Monday of May for the meeting, he should vote for the present motion. He agreed with gentlemen that this was a momentous crisis; that the country was in a situation of extreme difficulty and danger. It appeared to him, therefore, that Congress, who were the guardians of the public welfare; to whom were confided the destinies of the nation, so far as the nation could control them, should be constantly in session, till a more favorable state of affairs took place. It was possible, but was it probable that any event would occur to alter our situation for the better? There was no hope that the belligerents would recede from their injurious restrictions on our commerce. It was not probable that any thing would occur which would do away the necessity of an extra session. The present Congress having determined to persevere in the embargo and the present system of measures a while longer, the peace and welfare of the country required that a different system should be adopted. The present had been sufficiently tested, and would never produce those effects anticipated from it. It was proper that an early opportunity should be given to the next Congress to approve the present system, or give it up and adopt some other in its stead.

      Mr. D. R. Williams said he was opposed to Congress coming here at the time proposed. Why should they come here then? He wished some one to answer, and let him understand why they were coming. In his opinion there was every possible objection to such a procedure. On the fourth day of March, a new President comes into power. Is it not presumable that the President would choose to have some communication with our Ministers abroad before the meeting of Congress? Could any man say that it was not proper that he should have it? Mr. W. said he hoped that the President would send special messengers, unfashionable as that policy was. If you are willing to wait for a declaration of war till the fourth Monday in May, will there be any necessity of declaring it before the first Monday in June or July? You have suffered the public mind to assuage in its resentment, and I very much doubt, that before a full experiment be made of the embargo, it will be wholly allayed. It has been said through the nation, and indeed avowed on this floor, that the Administration does not wish for peace. Having failed to take hold of the affair of the Chesapeake for a declaration of war, you have nothing now to give the people that interest which I hope they always will have in a declaration of war. Suppose you were to send special Ministers, and they were to be treated as our Ministers to France were under a former Administration, would not this treatment make every man in the nation rally around you? Would it not prove beyond doubt that the Administration was sincere in its wishes for peace? Undoubtedly it would. Why are your Ministers now loitering in foreign Courts? With a hope of accommodation, sir, I would send other Ministers there, and if they failed of immediate accommodation, would order them all home. If they are compelled to return, you will have the whole nation with you, which you must have when you go to war.

      Mr. J. G. Jackson replied to Mr. Williams. The gentleman had asked emphatically why Congress should convene here in May. Occurrences of every day, said Mr. J., are presenting themselves in such a way as to render it highly important and necessary that some other ground should be taken. Are we to adhere to the embargo forever, sir? I have said, and again say, that a total abandonment of the ocean would be submission. I think, by passing this bill, we give the nation a pledge that it shall be the ne plus ultra, which shall give to foreign nations time to revise their conduct towards us, and will give them time to consider whether or not they will have war with us. The gentleman wants a special mission. Sir, are we to continue in this state any longer? Shall negotiation be spun out further? No man can doubt the capacity of our Ministers abroad, and their disposition to represent their Government correctly. The doors are shut in the face of our Minister at the Court of St. James, and worse than shut at the Court of St. Cloud – for, from the latter, contemptuous silence is all the answer we have received, if indeed silence can convey an answer. Are we to renew negotiation, then, when every circumstance manifests that it would be useless? Need I refer to what took place the other day – I allude to the publication of a letter by Mr. Canning, in a highly exceptionable manner, through Federal presses, or presses more devoted to the interests of that country than any other? One universal burst of indignation accompanied the publication of that letter in this House. And are we, under such circumstances, to renew negotiation by extra missions? I conceive that the cup of negotiation and conciliation is exhausted to the dregs, and that we should but further degrade ourselves by sending further extra missions. It has been stated to me that a proposition had actually been reduced


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