The Way of War. Chinese Strategy Manual. C. Ioutsen
Analytical categorization, so natural to Western thought, is impossible and analogy is used instead.
Compliance with the Tao is not dissimilar to the Western concept of the relation between microcosm and macrocosm – the whole reflected in parts and vice versa. The Tao is the DNA of the universe, its mode of operation. What conforms to the Tao, then, cannot but prosper and what is contrary to it cannot but perish. This harmony represents the quality of the combination at any one moment, created by correlating the available elements and cannot be discovered, that is, grasped as some eternal reality beneath the illusive appearance, but only followed, through a creative journey where the quality of the journey is itself the end. The cultivation of such a harmony is the ultimate goal, both personally and socially.
The first and foremost defining feature of a model military commander is that he must be an exemplary person and must ply his military skills from a foundation of superior character. His ability to achieve great things within the parameters of his office – his efficacy – is a function of his cultivated harmony rather than any specific competence.
On that account Chinese military theory presents a more practical side of Taoism, even if taking it beyond the prescribed ethical comfort zone. From a purist standpoint any practical use of the Tao, but especially those in statecraft, warfare and sex, is really plain abuse, as the primary guideline for perfect action is non-action, non-interference. In fact, practical Taoism is a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron. That said, the use (or abuse) of the Tao in real-life problem-solving may lead to strikingly effective results and has not gone unnoticed by many a practitioner, which makes it almost expected to see a consummate general portrayed as a traditional – and pacifist – wise man of Taoist fables.
Unlike Confucianism (also a huge influence in other respects), later adopted as a sort of official ideology for much of the Chinese history and focused chiefly on ethical side of things, Taoism regarded moral aspect as secondary at best, while Taoist strategists were not concerned about it at all. Benevolence and humanity are crucial qualities of a commander, true, but only so far as they can serve very practical purposes, namely to the end of calculated and utterly cynical exploitation of one’s fellow human beings.
One of the most fundamental concepts of Taoism, going with the flow [shun], resonates vastly differently with the Chinese and the Westerner. Taken – for argument’s sake – as a tactical or strategic device, it hardly makes any sense at all. It is incompatible, incommensurable with the very idea of struggle and sounds more like fatal non-action if not downright submission. The incongruity lies, it is needless to say, in putting a concept from one worldview within another, instead of examining it in its original environment.
For the Chinese the world was not a place filled with objects interacting with each other at the expense of some external energy, it was an ever-shifting situation filled with changes, of which objects were nothing more than mere manifestations. That being so, stability is only temporary, while change is more real than form and actually is the only permanent thing there is. It is a continuous movement between polar opposites of an endless continuum.
Although the changes that occur within any local field of conditions are always unique to it, they proceed according to a general pattern that can not only be anticipated but also utilized to one’s own advantage. It is the ever-changing configuration of these specific conditions that determines one’s place at any point of time and lends one a defining disposition.
Understanding both the uniqueness of any given event and the underlying framework binding it to the general setting is the key to a successful operation. Familiarity can be unpredictable because slight variations, when magnified through their interrelations, can have massive consequences. Minute fluctuations can amplify into dramatic metamorphosis.
Manipulation of change is a catalyst that affects the reaction without itself being spent. It makes possible to align one’s own course with the course of all things, the Tao, effortlessly yet effectively. Consequently, maximum effect through minimal expenditure of effort, utopian as it may seem, is a foremost postulate in the entire Chinese military thinking.
Note on the Text
For the first time in the English language a wide selection of relevant texts, both well-known and relatively obscure, from various periods of Chinese history spanning almost three thousand years has been sourced with a singular principal criterion in mind – to present a comprehensive, straightforward and logically consistent survey of practical military thought which could be still used today and far outside the narrow constricts of the military proper, on everyday basis and in everyday circumstances.
As mentioned above, warfare may be interpreted as virtually anything: life and business, education and career, art, science, sport, sex. The only limit is one’s imagination and, of course, pragmatic necessity. The commander can stand for a supervisor of any kind, and the troops – for a staff of subordinates. The enemy is a rival, a competitor. The ally is a friend, a colleague. A military situation does not differ much from a problem-solving situation. Victory is a solution. Customs and cultures vary from nation to nation and from period to period, but human nature remains the same in its foundations, and nowhere else it is recognizably more so than in the conduct of struggle.
Not unconventionally, such brand of commonplace wisdom might at times look quite trivial. Yet, as with many all-too-familiar concepts, they often tend to be ignored, and when they are needed most, too. Besides, they have become trivial precisely for the reason of having passed the test of time and experience – a successful experience at that. Their careful examination, or indeed contemplation, serves as a perennial guide on a path of accomplishing one’s ambitions.
Nevertheless, the present anthology is by no means supposed to supplant the authentic classical texts. On the contrary, while it is hopefully sufficient as an entrance level overview, the interested reader should not neglect to turn to the primary sources, even if for curiosity’s sake alone – the most important of those are listed at the end of this introduction.
All the maxims in this collection have been lifted directly from the sources essentially unaltered. However, two exceptions have been made.
First, in many cases the same idea, albeit phrased marginally differently, could be found in various texts. Whenever it happened, the most concise and pithy variant has been chosen, but on a rare occasion a hybrid synthetic version has been produced.
Second, despite the habitually epigrammatic style of Chinese texts it sometimes happened, that a particular idea seemed clear enough yet was not stated explicitly, being implied within a lengthy passage. A liberty has been thus taken to provide a missing dictum.
The only major adaptation involved literary rendering of the text to make it clear and unambiguous (whenever ambiguity was not pre-requisite in the first place) for the non-specialist. There is no textual commentary and every phrase is made self-explanatory while staying as close to the original as the compiler’s linguistic prowess allowed. Also, a certain unification of style and standardization of key terms have been attempted.
Naturally, a considerable amount of judgment had to be exercised in regards to selecting the maxims themselves. That is admittedly the part most open to criticism. The personal preferences were cast aside as much as possible in favor of objectivity. A modern-day average Western citizen would hardly find much use for the technique of deploying chariots on an open terrain or for a method of calculating maintenance costs for an army on a march.
The detailed descriptions of exact tactical and strategic situations, constituting a bulk of military handbooks, have been largely omitted as well, partially because they have little value outside of an actual battlefield (and an historic battlefield for that) and partially because their function is mostly illustrative anyway. Explicating them metaphorically felt presumptuous, as it was likely not the authors’ intention. Only in those instances where the proposition could undoubtedly be taken in a broader sense they have been included.
The