The History of the Civil War (Complete Edition). James Ford Rhodes
resistance to the federal government and had been employed in the construction of a battery, they were "contraband of war." The application of this phrase, as Butler himself admitted, had no high legal sanction; nevertheless, "technical inaccuracy," as Morse wrote, "does not hurt the force of an epigram which expresses a sound principle";4 this one was promptly seized upon by the popular mind as indicating a proper attitude toward the negro. The difficulty, however, could not be solved by an epigram. "Contrabands" or fugitive slaves came continually within the lines of the Union armies, and the question how to dispose of them became a grave one for the President. Having carefully thought out a policy, he sent the following instructions to Butler to serve as a guide for his and other commands: the general should not interfere with the reclamation of fugitive slaves who had escaped from masters in the Union slave States but, in accordance with the Confiscation act,5 he should respect no claim for negroes who had been employed in the military service of the Confederacy. In spite of the murmurs of the abolitionists and some radical Republicans, a large majority of the Northern people had already acquiesced in this policy as a wise temporary expedient, when General Frémont opened the question afresh by his proclamation in Missouri.6
Frémont, the pet and protégé of the Blairs,7 as Lincoln afterwards called him, had upon the earnest solicitation of his patrons been made a major-general and been placed in command of the Western department, which included Missouri. A kind of romantic hero was he-"the brave pathfinder," who had planted the American flag on presumably the highest peak of the Rocky mountains. Winning the first nomination of the Republican party for president, he had polled a large electoral and popular vote; and Lincoln, undoubtedly impressed by the remembrance of this first campaign, so brilliant in many ways, thought well of him and had entertained the idea of nominating him for minister to France. He was supposed to have military talent, and his appointment to a command was very popular with earnest Republicans who had looked upon him five years earlier as the champion of a sacred cause. Lincoln and the Blairs were to suffer a grievous disappointment. The first month in his headquarters at St. Louis showed Frémont to be utterly unfit for a responsible command. Over-fond of display and wishing to maintain the state of a European monarch, he surrounded himself with dishonest men to whom he was always accessible, whilst high military and civil officers and worthy Union citizens were obliged to wait days in his anteroom for an interview. The reason was apparent. These last had the sole purpose in mind to defeat the Southern sympathizers and the Confederate army, who were disputing with them the possession of Missouri; but the others were interested in securing fat contracts, a kind of suit for which Frémont had a ready ear; and he was deaf to the entreaties of well-informed Union citizens for an order to reënforce a capable general, who was actively engaged in the field. Distrusted by men of worth and influence in Missouri, flattered by speculators, it is little wonder that the charge was made that the department of Missouri was managed for purpose of making private fortunes rather than for the country's weal. Such was the posture of affairs on the evening of August 29, when Frémont went to bed, with an undoubted perception of the strength of anti-slavery sentiment in the North and the need of some diversion to maintain his sway. Inspiration must have come to him in the night. At all events he decided upon a proclamation freeing the slaves. Next day he issued it, declaring the slaves of all persons in the State of Missouri, taking up arms against the United States, freemen. That it was a play to retain his power was evident to hard-headed men. "The truth is," wrote Montgomery Blair to Sumner, "with Frémont's surroundings, the set of scoundrels who alone have control of him, this proclamation setting up the higher law was like a painted woman quoting Scripture."
Lincoln learned through the newspapers of Frémont's proclamation and of his "bureau of abolition," set up for the purpose of issuing deeds of manumission to slaves. Although this major-general of two month's standing, without careful survey of the whole field, without comprehension of the important and various interests involved had, on a sudden impulse, assumed to solve a question which the President, his Cabinet and Congress were approaching only in a careful and tentative manner, Lincoln's letter to Frémont of September 2, sent by a special messenger, was as full of kindness as of wisdom. "The liberating slaves of traitorous owners," he wrote, "will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph8 so as to conform to the" Confiscation act of Congress. "This letter is written in a spirit of caution and not of censure." Frémont was unwilling to retract the provision objected to and asked that the President should openly direct him to make the correction: this Lincoln cheerfully did by public order.
Frémont's proclamation stirred the anti-slavery sentiment of the country to its utmost depths, receiving enthusiastic commendation from many States. Senator Sumner wrote, "Our President is now dictator, imperator-which you will; but how vain to have the power of a god and not use it godlike!" A large number of men in Ohio were furious and found fit expression in the words of an eminent lawyer and judge: "Our people are in a state of great consternation and wrath on account of the quarrel between Frémont and the administration, public opinion being entirely with General Frémont.… And if the election were next fall, to displace him would be to make him president." Herndon, the old law partner and later biographer of Lincoln, living in Illinois, said, "Frémont's proclamation was right. Lincoln's modification of it was wrong." Senator Grimes wrote from Iowa: "The people are all with Frémont and will uphold him 'through thick and thin.'… Everybody of every sect, party, sex and color approves his proclamation in the Northwest and it will not do for the administration to causelessly tamper with the man who had the sublime moral courage to issue it."9
These expressions in private letters represented a phase of intelligent sentiment which troubled Lincoln, as is evident from his confidential letter to Senator Browning of Illinois, who, though regarded as a conservative, had approved Frémont's proclamation. It endangers the loss of Kentucky, he wrote [September 22]. "I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital." Lincoln had such a hold upon the people that he carried with him an efficient public opinion and, after due waiting, proceeded to the next step. He never had any thought of removing Frémont on account of his proclamation; but he felt that the mismanagement and corruption in Missouri must be corrected. Proceeding with caution, he sent to St. Louis Montgomery Blair and Meigs, the Quartermaster-General of the Army, and later Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Thomas: the four made a thorough and candid investigation.
Meigs heard a rumor that Frémont had in mind a project resembling the conspiracy of Aaron Burr's. Somewhat more than two years later Lincoln, in an expansive mood, unbosomed himself to his private secretaries and two other friends, saying, Mrs. Frémont (who had brought a letter from the General justifying his proclamation) "sought an audience with me at midnight10 and taxed me so violently with many things that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarreling with her.… She more than once intimated that if General Frémont should conclude to try conclusions with me, he could set up for himself." To this, the minister of the United States to Prussia, an old Illinois friend of Lincoln's, replied: "It is pretty clearly proven that Frémont had at that time concluded that the Union was definitely destroyed, and that he should set up an independent government as soon as he took Memphis and organized his army."11 That Lincoln felt there was some basis for this report is indicated by a paper which Nicolay left in a sealed envelope endorsed: "A private paper, Conversation with the President, October 2, 1861," in which one of the headings is "Frémont ready to rebel."12 Nevertheless, it is hardly probable that