The History of the Civil War (Complete Edition). James Ford Rhodes
as the English public required that their government present an ultimatum, it could not have been couched in words more considerate to the susceptibilities of the American people, nor could the instructions in the private letters have been bettered. Lyons carried out the spirit as well as the letter of his instructions; doubtless he was glad to be supported in his sympathetic consideration for the Secretary of State's difficult position. When announcing the seizure he wrote to Earl Russell, "To conceal the distress which I feel would be impossible"; and during the period of suspense his attitude of reserve was irreproachable. "I have avoided," he wrote, "the subject of the capture on board the Trent as much as possible, and have said no more than that it is an untoward event which I very much regret."86
Apparently the President submitted the question to his Secretary of State. As long as Seward could not bring himself to Sumner's, Adams's and Blair's position and advise the immediate surrender of Mason and Slidell, he conducted himself in an exemplary manner. Reticent of speech, he was receptive of information and advice which came to him from many quarters abroad and at home; much of it was excellent.87 In his communication to Adams, of November 27, he had explained to him that Captain Wilkes had acted without any instructions whatever and that the United States intended no action until "we hear what the British Government may have to say on the subject."88 It was undoubtedly between the two interviews with Lyons, if not before, that Seward came to the conclusion that the commissioners must be surrendered; thenceforth he conducted the affair in his most skilful manner. His own decision made, he had to convince the President, "the overruling authority" necessary "to consult in all cases."89 "Governor Seward," Lincoln said, "you will go on, of course, preparing your answer, which, as I understand it, will state the reasons why they ought to be given up. Now I have a mind to try my hand at stating the reasons why they ought not to be given up. We will compare the points on each side."90 The President made a draft of a despatch in which he expressed his unwillingness to believe that Great Britain would now "press for a categorical answer"; he would like the question left open for discussion in order that the United States might present her case; she would then be willing to submit the question to a "friendly arbitration"; but if Great Britain would not arbitrate and, after listening to the American case, still insisted on the surrender of Mason and Slidell, the surrender would be made, provided this disposition of the matter should serve in the future as a precedent for both countries. The key to the President's attitude lay in his words, "We too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous of their rights."91 Obviously, the draft did not satisfy him as suited to the present exigency, and he did not present it to his Cabinet.
The result justified William H. Russell's entry in his Diary of December 20 to the effect that Seward would control the situation.92 And a day earlier Charles Eliot Norton had written from New York to Lowell, "There is apparently no reason to fear war as the result of any popular excitement here or of any want of temper or discretion on the part of the administration. It is a fortunate thing for us that Seward has regained so much of the public confidence. He will feel himself strong enough not to be passionate or violent."93
The Cabinet met at ten o'clock on the morning of Christmas day; probably only two members of it, Seward and Blair, were at that hour in favor of the surrender. Seward submitted the draft of his answer to Lord Lyons, complying with the British demand. Sumner94 came by invitation and read letters from Bright and Cobden, staunch friends of the North, giving an account of English public sentiment and offering advice that may be summed up in Bright's words, "At all hazards you must not let this matter grow to a war with England."95 If Sumner's opinion was asked, he doubtless expressed himself warmly in favor of Seward's decision. The discussion went on until two o'clock, when the Cabinet adjourned until next day; it was then resumed. Seward maintained that the claim of the British government was just and had not been "made in a discourteous manner."96 Bates, Attorney-General, came to his support, arguing that war with England would be ruin97 but, as he recorded in his Diary, "there was great reluctance on the part of some of the members of the Cabinet and even the President himself"98 to give up the commissioners. In the end, however, from the considerations that Wilkes had acted contrary to our precedents, violated international law and that we could not afford a war with Great Britain, all came to Seward's position and approved his answer [December 26]. He said at the end of his long despatch to Lyons, the persons in question "will be cheerfully liberated."99 The disavowal of the act was accepted as a sufficient apology.
Fearing popular excitement, Seward arranged with Lyons that Mason and Slidell should not be delivered to an English vessel in Boston harbor. An American steam tug therefore took them to Provincetown, where they were delivered to a British ship-of-war, which sailed immediately for Halifax, whence they made their way to Europe.
There was no excitement in Boston nor anywhere else in the country when Mason and Slidell left Fort Warren. Bates had explained the reluctance of the President and some members of the Cabinet in coming to Seward's position as being due to a fear of "the displeasure of our own people lest they should accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of England."100 They had misread public sentiment. During the forty days that had elapsed between the news of the seizure of Mason and Slidell and their surrender, the sober second thought had asserted itself and the decision of the government was "unitedly and thoroughly sustained by the whole people."101 This seemed to indicate that if the President and his Secretary of State had come at once to their final decision, they might have reckoned on having the country at their back. Such a disposition of the case would have made the subsequent history of the relations between England and the North far different. As it was, the transaction left a rankling wound. Many Americans thought that their country had been humiliated by being obliged to submit to a peremptory demand. Chase, in his opinion during the Cabinet Council, expressed that view. While giving his "adhesion to the conclusion at which the Secretary of State has arrived," he said, "it is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than consent to the liberation of these men I would sacrifice everything I possess."102 Pending the settlement and afterwards, there was a complete misunderstanding between the two countries. The impression prevailed abroad that the North was "determined to pick a quarrel with England."103 On the other hand, there was a general belief here that Great Britain only wanted a pretext for a quarrel with the United States. Even among those who did not hold such extreme views a spirit of grim resolution prevailed. "I cannot believe," wrote Norton to Lowell, "that the English ministry mean war-if they do, they will get it and its consequences."104 The misunderstanding arose from each country believing that the chauvinists represented the majority in the other. As a matter of fact, a large majority in England and at the North rejoiced at the peaceful settlement of the Trent difficulty. In the South there was bitter disappointment.105
1 For the Confiscation act and the Confederate Sequestration act, see III, 464; Schwab, 111-120.