Japan's Total Empire. Louise Young
War, see Mainichi shinbunsha, Nisshin Nichiro sens, vol. 1 of Ichiokunin no Shwashi: Nihon no senshi (Mainichi shinbunsha, 1979), pp. 78-205.
21. Alvin Coox lists casualties at 12,000: Coox, Nomonhan, vol. 1, p. 9.
22. Manshikai, vol. 1, p. 84.
23. Hirano, p. 148.
24. Manshikai, vol. 1, p. 297.
25. Mansh keizai zuhy (Dalian: Dalian sh
26. The best general histories of Sino-Japanese relations during the Republican period are by Marius B. Jansen: The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), and Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), pp. 224-314.
27. McCormack refers to this as “two-faced diplomacy”: McCormack, pp. 124-126.
28. Ogata, p. 18.
29. Yoshihashi, pp. 143-144; Edward Earl Pratt, “Wanpaoshan, 1931: Japanese Imperialism, Chinese Nationalism and the Korean Problem in Northeast China on the Eve of the Manchurian Incident,” Master's thesis, University of Virginia, May 1983.
30. Yoshihashi, pp. 143-145.
31. Ogata, p. 18.
32. For basic sources on the military history of the Manchurian Incident, see Chapter 1, note 1.
33. For a brief account of the Kwantung Army, see Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension,” pp. 409-428. For exhaustive treatment, see Coox, Nomonhan, vols. 1-2.
34. Hayashi Takehisa, Yamazaki Hiroaki, and Shibagaki Kazuo, Nihon shihon-shugi, vol. 6 of Koza teikokushugi no kenky: rytaisenkan ni okeru sono sai-hensei (Aoki shoten, 1973), p. 250; Kaneko Fumio, “Shihon yushutsu to shoku-minchi,” in
35. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, pp. 130-132.
36. Sometimes called the reform bureaucrats, the term new bureaucrats is loosely applied to officials who supported a variety of state-strengthening economic and social reforms which often had a fascist tinge. For more detail, see Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, pp. 116-156; Barnhart, pp. 71-76, 171-175; and William Miles Fletcher, The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 88-105.
37. For basic references, see Chapter 1, note 2.
38. Hara Akira, “1930 nendai no Mansh
39. Ishid
40. On the Manchurian settlement program, see Mansh
41. Manshikai, vol. 2, p. 84.
42. Mantetsu, ed., Mansh nenkan: Shwa 8 nen (Dalian: Mansh
43. The phrase comes from John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), p. 85.
44. On the occupation of China, see Lincoln Li, The Japanese Army in North China, 1937-1941: Problems of Political and Economic Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), and John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).
45. On the Co-prosperity Sphere, see E. Bruce Reynolds, “Anomaly or Model? Independent Thailand's Role in Japan's Asian Strategy, 1941-1943,” and Ken'ichi Got
46. Carter J. Eckert, “Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea,’ in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 3-39.
47. Wan-yao Chou, ‘The K
PART II
THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT
AND THE NEW
MILITARY IMPERIALISM,
1931–1933
3 War Fever
Imperial