The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany. L. Douglas Keeney
which placed transportation targets in third priority.) The change to airdromes against priority for mediums, in his opinion, might prove profitable later if it were decided to shift the main effort of the entire bomber attack to the German Air Force.
Eventually, during the first week in May when the 322d Group was well advanced in its low-level training, certain industrial installations were cleared as freshman targets” for the 34 Wing which contained this medium bomb group.
The objective actually selected for the initial medium mission of 14 May was the power station at Ijmuiden, Holland. The same objective was hit three days later on the ill-fated second operation that finally convinced the Eighth Air Force commander that the low-level technique was not feasible in Western Europe. One intelligence officer of the 3d Bombardment Wing had been convinced of this for many months before the attack. This officer, Major Von Kolnitz, had advised the commander of the 3d Wing in December 1943 that in his opinion low-level attacks on heavily defended targets would be disastrous. Between the 14 May and 17 May missions the same officer made strong representations to the commander of the 322d Group about the dangers of the operation. It certainly would seem, however, that the first attack on Ijmuiden was not a fair test of the ability of the B-26 to surprise the defenses for the RAF had hit it on the 2d and 5th of May.
On the 14 May Mission, 13 B-26’s had taken off and 11 of them dropped 10.75 tons of high-explosive bombs from an altitude of between 200 and 300 feet. The bombs employed had 30-minute delayed-action fuses. Apparently very little damage was done to the power station. The one medium that failed to bomb had an engine shot out by flak as it crossed the enemy coast and was forced to return to base. No enemy fighters were encountered, but nine of the bombers were damaged by flak. One ship crash-landed at its base and killed the pilot after the reminder of the crew had bailed out. Since this test was inconclusive, the second attempt was made three days later. Twelve B-26s got out on the 17th, and again one turned back, this time because of engine failure. The attack was again made from minimum altitude employing 30-minute delayed-action fuses. Of the 11 attacking, not one returned, although one of them, badly shot up, was abandoned by the crew near its base. The remainder were lost to flak, ground fire, collision and unknown causes. This was enough to convince the Commanding General of the Eighth that a change in policy for mediums was required:
The simple truth appears to be that worthwhile targets on the coast of Western Europe are too heavily defended to make low-level attack feasible and economic … . I am now convinced that we must discontinue low-level attack except for that against surface vessels. We have a plan to get some training and experience of the latter category. I am going to put the medium bombers in the Air Support Command and give them maximum training was part of the tactical air force to support any ground forces invading the Continent. Their crews will get their fighting experience by medium altitude attacks heavily defended by fighter aviation. This will necessitate the installation of some bomb sights, at least for lead aircraft.
The 322d Group was removed from operations, and the mediums got no more action against the enemy until July.
June operations by the Eighth fell somewhat short of the record achieved in May, for the weather kept both the USAAF and the RAF grounded during the first 10 days of the month.
The geographical pattern of the Eighth Air Force operations during the first phase of the bomber offensive calls attention to what has been one of the great tragedies of World War II – the necessity of fighting over and destroying so much in territory belonging to peoples who were enemies of the Axis powers. Of the 6,435.4 tons of bombs dropped by United Kingdom-based U.S. heavy bombers during the second quarter of 1943, just slightly more than half (51.4%) fell on Germany. France received 37.3% Belgium slightly more than 10, and Holland the remainder.
Bombardment policy in Allied or neutral territory occupied by the enemy was carefully regulated. Only military objectives (these were narrowly defined) were to be bombed and such bombing was subject to certain principles. The bombing of civilian populations as such was forbidden. The military objective had to be clearly identified and the attack made with reasonable care to avoid undue loss of life to civilians in the vicinity of the target. If doubt existed as to the possibility of accurate bombing, the attack was to be withheld. All Red Cross conventions were observed. Despite the fact that both RAF and AAF took every possible precaution to reduce the risks to civilian populations in occupied countries to a minimum, casualties could not be avoided. The protest of the subject peoples and their representatives to the Allied powers did not make the tasks of the air leaders any easier. They were faced with the fact that many of the facilities in occupied countries were contributing to German war effort, and they had no choice but to attempt to destroy them.
The efficiency of daylight precision bombardment is difficult to assess, but one can hardly study the operational site without becoming aware of the tremendous effort necessary to achieve even a small result. Some notice has already been given to the size of the forces available to the Eighth during the first phase of the bomber offensive, but it must be remembered that only the planes in commission can engage in operations. During April, May, and June more than two-fifths of the heavy bombers were unserviceable because they were undergoing repair, being modified, or awaiting parts. Planes in commission, even planes airborne on operations, are of slight offensive account unless they can get over the target. Of the sorties flown in April, May, and June, only 60 actually accomplished the mission assigned (effective sorties) of dropping bombs in the target area. The question as to the accuracy of the bombing is very difficult, particularly in the early period of operations. The scant evidence available indicates that first-phase daylight bombing accuracy was low, even lower than during the first quarter of 1943. This may have been due in part to the lower level of experience resulting from the sudden expansion of VIII Bomber Command in May.
The Defense of the Day Bomber
Presently the effectiveness of first-phase bombardment is to be examined from another point of view, but first one of the most important problems of first-phase operations deserves some attention. As a statement from an Eighth Air Force intelligence report indicated, the U. S. heavy day bomber posed a formidable problem to the German Air Force:
The first operations of Flying Fortress formations in high altitude daylight precision bombing attacks over Europe opened a new chapter in the oldest conflict in warfare. That conflict is the perpetual struggle between offensive and defensive technique. Our Fortresses, as used here, were a new offensive weapon.
Against them the Germans confidently pitted the three-fold mechanism of defense which aerial bombing has itself generated: Radar detection and counter attack by both flak and highly maneuverable heavily armed fighter planes. This defensive technique as developed by both Germans and British was believed to have precluded large scale daylight bombing in this theater forever.
But the Fortress brought to its work two unique features. The first was its ability to operate effectively above the maximum effectiveness of light flak. The second was its formidable armament of .30 caliber machine guns, which, compounded by the mutual support of close formation flying, provided withering air power against conventional fighter plane attack.
It is true that the countermeasures taken against the Fortresses and the Liberators threatened to restore the balance between the offense and the defense which the first operations had upset. The complete redress of the balance would have nullified the bomber offensive. Our air leaders were forced to great efforts in the defense of the day bombers to keep the offensive going. It is necessary to note some of these efforts as they developed during the first phase.
The simplest statement of the problem is presented in the figures for the heavy bombers. The operations of the last five months of 1942 cost 31 heavies missing in action, 26 attributed to enemy aircraft and 5 to flak or a combinations of flak and enemy aircraft; and the first quarter of 1943 saw 59 of our bombers lost on operations. During the first month of the period under review, April 1943, 20heavies were lost; in May there were 69, and in June 85, giving a total of 161 for this first phase of the CBO. Of these losses, 9 were due to the action of enemy aircraft, 98 to flak or a combination of flak and enemy aircraft, and the remainder to accidents and unknown causes.
The rate of loss is more revealing than the absolute loss.