The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany. L. Douglas Keeney
first meeting of the Committee of Operations Analysts was held on 10 December, and it immediately went to work with the appointment of subcommittees to study enemy industrial systems.
Although it was desired that the committee submit a report before the Casablanca Conference, that could not be accomplished in the time available. An interim report was submitted on 23 December 1943 in which the committee’s methods and courses of intelligence were described and in which the principle of concentration of effort was stated thus: “ … it is better to cause a high degree of destruction in a few really essential industries or services than to cause a small decrease of destruction in many industries.”
The next few months were spent in the study of various target systems. Assistance was given by A-3, G-2, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of Strategic Services, the War Production Board, and certain other government agencies and experts in private industry. Certain members of the committee went to England where methods and materials were reviewed with the Eighth Air Force, the Royal Air Force, the Air Ministry, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.
The final report of the OCA was submitted on 6 March 1943. The over-all results of the researcher of the various subcommittees were presented in a bound volume which surprised data on 10 different German industrial systems – all that appeared to have bombardment significance. Under a separate tab the various production units in each system were listed. The distance of each unit from London and its percentage of total axis production were set forth. For security reasons the committee did not rank the 19 systems in order of priority, but it did announce a set of principles of strategic selection which apparently constitute one of its chief contributions to the planning chase of this type of warfare.
Although the report did not recommend definite target priorities or find it possible at the time to forecast a date on which invasion would be possible, it did arrive at two important conclusions:
1 The destruction and continued neutralization of some sixty targets would gravely impair and might paralyze the Western Axis war effort.
2 In view of the ability of adequate and properly utilized air power to impair the industrial sources of the enemy’s military strength, only the most vital considerations should be permitted to delay or divert the application of an adequate striking force to this task.
The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan and Directive
A committee composed of Brig. Gen. Heywood S. Hansell, Jr., Brig. Gen Orvil A. Anderson, the plans personnel of USAAF, the Royal Air Force, and the Eighth Air Force, was set up under General Eaker for the purpose of drawing up an operating plan to accomplish the desired result. The committee had as its task the establishment of target priorities and the calculation of the size of U.S. forces necessary to accomplish their destruction.
This committee completed its work in April 1943. The finished plan restated the mission of the strategic air forces as defined in the Casablanca directive and recommended the destruction of 76 specific targets that were to be found in the following systems:
1 Submarine construction yards and bases
2 German aircraft industry
3 Ball bearings
4 Oil
5 Synthetic rubber and tires
6 Military transport vehicles
It further stated that the destruction of the selected individual targets within those systems would achieve the elimination of commanding fractions of enemy production within the affected industries:
1 Destruction of the selected submarine yards would reduce German construction by 89%
2 German fighter capacity would be reduced by 43% and bomber capacity by 65%
3 Ball-bearing capacity would be reduced by 76
4 Destruction of Ploesti refineries and German synthetic oil plants would reduce production by 45%
5 Destruction of 50% of synthetic rubber production and nearly all of that for tires would be accomplished.
6 Destruction of seven plants producing motor vehicles would fatally weaken the capacity of the German people for armed resistance.
The German aircraft industry was placed second in the priority list of target systems, but the plan stated that German fighter strength was an intermediate objective of the bomber offensive second to none. That is to say that the German fighter force and to be destroyed before the combined bomber offensive, especially the American part of it, could b successful. It was pointed out in this connection that German fighter production had increased 44% and fighter strength on the Western front had nearly doubled since the entry of the United States into the war.
The plan emphasized the fact that the bomber offensive was in integrated RAF and USAAF effort, and that the capabilities of the two sources were complimentary.
A time schedule was worked out calling for AAF and RAF missions against a certain number of targets within certain systems in each of four three-month phases. The first phase was scheduled to run to 30 June, the second to 20 September, the third to the end of 1943, and the fourth to go into the early months of 1944. The specific targets for the Eighth during the first three phases were set forth in charts b category, and the distance from bases and the productive importance of each was shown. The RAF was given a certain definite assignment of cities in each phase for attack. In general, these coincided with the location of the USAAF targets. The precision targets of the Eighth and the area targets of the RAF were shown on maps using different symbols.
The Eighth Air Force penetrations of enemy territory were to become deeper as the offensive progressed. First-phase operations were to be relatively shallow and were to be concentrated against the submarine yards and bases along the coast. Second-phase range was to increase to approximately 400 miles, and about three-quarters of the effort was to be concentrated against German fighter aircraft factories and other German Air Force facilities. The third phase was to see attacks against all the principal objectives with continued effort to neutralize those previously attacked but capable of repair. Fourth phase was to witness the continuation of these operations with provision made for attacks against installations associated with a cross-channel invasion.
The calculation of the size of U. S. forces needed was based upon the experience of the Eighth in operating in the theater. It was stated in the plan that this force had conducted about 20 missions in the three-month period from January to April 1943, and that approximately 12 of these missions had been successful. It was stated also that the average number of aircraft dispatched by the Eighth was 86. It was assumed, therefore, that a force of about 100 bombers would be sufficient to destroy a target about 1000 feet in radius, and that about two-thirds of the missions could be expected to reach and strike their objectives. It was further assumed on the basis of Eighth Air Force experience that about 37.5% of the airplanes in the theater could be dispatched on missions at any one time. That percentage made allowance for airplanes in reserve., in depot repair, and being modified. Contemplating about 19 important operations during each three-month phase, of which 12 were expected to be successful, the heavy bomber force build-up for the U. S. continent called for in the plan was:
1 At the end of the first phase, 30 June 1943 : 944
2 End of the second phase, 30 September 1943 : 1192
3 End of third phase, 31 December 1943 : 1746
4 By 31 March 1944 : 2702
The plan also called for the build-up of the U. S. forces in medium bombers which were to be used in attacks on German airdromes and to aid in the heavy bomber raids by missions designed to divert enemy fighters. It was pointed out that medium bombers would also be required to support combined operations in 1944. The build-up program for the medium was set at:
1 By the end of the first phase : 300
2 End of second phase : 400
3 End of third phase : 600
4 By 31 March