The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany. L. Douglas Keeney
The plan did not provide a schedule for the build-up of fighter forces. It did, however, call attention to the need for extensive U. S. fighter strength both to protect the bombers and to help reduce the German fighter strength. It also called attention to the necessity for the creation of a tactical air force in the European theater in order to be ready for combined operations in 1944.
This rather complete air plan, which restated the strategic air mission with respect to Germany, listed target priorities, contained a detailed schedule of operations by phases, and provided for the build-up of United States heavy and medium bombers, received the approval of the U. S. Army Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations and of the Chief of the British Air Staff. The plan was taken to Washington by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who granted approval in May. The Combined Bomber Offensive directive based upon it was issued through the British Air Staff to the Eighth Air Force and to RAF Bomber Command and Fighter Command on 10 June 1943. The directive reaffirmed the strategic air mission as it had been given in the Casablanca directive; it listed target priorities in the light of the then existing strategical situation; it assigned tasks to the British Fighter Command and to the American fighter forces, and provided for coordination of British and U. S. efforts.
Target priorities were assigned to the Eighth under three heads: intermediate, primary, and secondary objectives. The intermediate objective was stated to be the German fighter strength. Calling this an intermediate objective implies that it was something that had to be accomplished before the rest of the offensive could be effectively concluded. It was pointed out that any delay in the attack on German fighters would make the prosecution of the rest of the task progressively more difficult. Enemy fighter strength was to be cut down by attacks on airframe, engine, components, and ball-bearing factories; by area disorganization attacks; by strikes against repair depots and storage parks; and by the destruction of fighters in the air and on the ground.
Primary objectives of the heavy bombers were to be:
1 German submarine yards and bases
2 Facilities supporting the German air forces other than fighters
3 Ball bearings
4 Oil
It was directed that the German submarine yards and bases receive maximum effort whenever tactical and weather conditions precluded attacks on German fighter objectives. The offensive against oil was stated to be contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from the Mediterranean.
Secondary objectives of the bomber offensive were to be:
1 Synthetic rubber and tires
2 Military transport vehicles
The directive called for the British Bomber Command to be employed in the general disorganization of German industry, with all action designed as far as practicable to be complementary to that of the Eighth.
Judgments Concerning the Selection of Targets
Before proceeding with the account of operations in pursuance of the Combined Bomber Offensive directive, it might be well to examine tentatively, in the light of the strategical situation and the intelligence of the enemy available in 1943, some of the questions that have been raised concerning the wisdom of the target selection in that plan.
Basing a judgment upon subsequent events, the giving of high priority to submarine yards and bases as primary objectives might be questioned. We now have the testimony of Grand Admiral Doenitz to the effect that the bombing of these facilities was not very damaging. He declared that the U-boat assembly places were never hit until 1945 and that the turn-around time in the pens was not increased by bombing. Eighth Air Force studies made in late 1942 and early 1943 concerning the effectiveness of bombing submarine installations had already indicated that such action was none too effective. There was great doubt about the vulnerability of submarine pens; in fact a study mad by VIII Bomber Command on 5 December 149 expressed the opinion that none of the U. S. bombs available at the time were capable of penetrating the roofs of the pens from any practical bombing height. Another study on the target value of submarines concluded that because of the cushion of excess productive capacity an attack on components would have at best only a very long-term effect. Submarine yards, moreover, were not considered profitable targets unless the then current sinking rate by air and surface craft could be doubled. “Even total destruction of all yards would produce no decrease in the number of submarines operating in the Atlantic for the 12 months succeeding the destruction. The COA report of 8 March 1945 explained this lag in military results with the statement that the number of submarines under-going trials and nearing completion was sufficient to make good the sinking rate at the time. This report also said that there was no conclusive evidence that the bombing of bases would substantially reduce the number of submarines operating at any one time.
It seems, therefore, that neither submarine yards nor bases met the tests of a good target for strategic bombing. One must conclude, however, that the U-boat was such a menace in early 1943 that any method that offered any promise at all should have been used. Fortunately, the strategic bombardment of yards and bases was but one of the methods employed against this enemy weapon. The inclusion of the Aircraft Industry in high-priority target position is not open to so much questioning. It is true that testimony of German prisoners of war has indicated that our bombing was not nearly so damaging as we believed it would be or thought it was at the time. The reason seems to have been found in the ability of the enemy to effect dispersal of the industry. Of course, the degree of effectiveness of the bombing as it developed did not to any great extent invalidate the wisdom of selecting the aircraft industry as a target system in 1943. One of the fundamental tasks of an air force is the destruction of hostile air forces by attacks in the air, on the ground, and against all installations which support air cover. The aircraft industry met the economic and military criteria for a target system in 1943 and it would have been a violation of fundamental principles of air warfare not to have given it high priority. Moreover the effects were by no means negligible.
The ball-bearing industry was accorded third priority among primary objectives of the bomber offensive, immediately after submarines and aircraft. Some of the testimony by German prisoners of war seems to minimize the effectiveness of the bombing of this industry also. That its effect was not more marked was due to several factors: the dispersal that was achieved, the ability of the enemy to cut down on the delivery time of the finished product from the factory to the consumer, the fact that in the aircraft industry ball bearings could be replaced by other appliances, and that the German army had accumulated in the vicinity of Magdeburg several months supply for emergency purposes. Allied information on the ball-bearing industry rated it an excellent target system from both the economic and military standpoints. On the basis of American and British knowledge and practice it was believed impractical for the Germans to have accumulated any great stock of bearings. Nearly half the German supply was turned out in three plants around the one city of Schweinfurt, and 10 of the product came from two plants near Paris. The damaging of the ball-bearing industry would be crippling to all other industry which used high-speed moving parts. The bearing industry was too valuable to the German war effort not to have accorded it high priority in 1943.
The information concerning the effect of Allied strategic bombing in Europe that has been obtained from the German prisoners of war indicates that attacks on oil and transportation did more damage to German effort than any other bombing. The target priority list which according to Hermann Goering would have been most effective reads as follows:
1 Synthetic oil
2 Communications
3 Aero-engine factories
4 Airframe factories
5 Ball-bearing factories
6 Airfields
Albert Speer, former German Minister of Armaments and War Production, ranked objectives in order of relative importance from the point of view of armament production. His first two categories were:
1 Key points in the basic industries