The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany. L. Douglas Keeney
in a definite way on the size of the force of heavy bombers and upon the crews available to fly them.
Behind the sortie rate of the operational aircraft are very many highly important factors which are beyond the scope of this examination of the forces available to the Eighth Air Force for conducting the combined bomber offensive. Here the concern is to be primarily with the size of the force in terms of combat nits in too large for treatment at this time. The aim is to set forth the effective combat strength available to the Eighth during the first three months of the combined bomber offensive, and to make a brief inquiry as to why it was not larger.
The Eighth Air Force had been sent to the United Kingdom in the spring of 1942 as a part of the so-called “BOLERO Task Force.” BOLERO was the plan for the build-up of a force in the British Isles which was to launch an invasion of the Continent. This invasion was to be preceded by an air offensive designed to gain the necessary degree of air superiority. After that was accomplished, air forces were to disrupt the German industrial machine by strategic bombardment and to operate in conjunction with ground forces. As long as the invasion of the Continent was planned for the summer of 1943, the Eighth had a definite mission. But a change in plans occurred in July of 1942 when the decision was made to invade North Africa (TORCH project). The Eighth was, in consequence, left without a clear-cut mission for some time, or perhaps it is better to say, with its mission postponed for an indefinite time. Nevertheless, it continued to carry the fight to the enemy as best it could.
The size of the forces available was, of course, adversely affected by the strategical decision. During the last five months of 1942 the Eighth really served as “a giant replacement pool” for the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa. During that time the Eighth dispatched to the new air force more than 1050 aircraft, practically all its organizational equipment, and huge quantities of supplies. It supplied three P-38 fighter groups in October, one heavy bomb group in November, and two in December. In addition it provided training for other Twelfth Air Force groups.
During these last months of 1943 the Eighth never had more than seven heavy bomber groups operating at any one time, and after September it had but one fighter group (Spitfire). Its average number of operational heavy bomber aircraft was less than 100 during every month except December; its average number of heavy crews available was never much above 100; and its greatest average effective heavy bomber strength, attained in December, was only 114. The Commanding General of the Eighth was not exaggerating when he described his command at this period as “our piddling force of Fortresses.”
The U. S. air arm in the British Isles had its mission restated in clear-cut terms at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, but that did not immediately raise the size of the effective forces. During the first quarter of that year there were operational no more than six heavy bomb groups, one fighter group, and one photoreconnaissance group. The effective heavy bomber strength was even lower than it had been during the last quarter of 1942.
The failure of the Eighth Air Force to build up to greater strength was not due to lack of planning by the Army Air Forces. Back of our air strength in Great Britain there was planning of two general types. In the first place, such over-all plans as AWPD-1 (1941) and AWPD-42 had made theoretical calculations of the size of forces necessary to do a certain kind of strategical job against Germany. In the second place, considerable attention was given to the very practical matter of allocating what was available among the various theaters and charting the rate of flow of units and replacements. The Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement of June 1943 specified a definite build-up plan for the Eighth to be achieved by the first of April 1943. In September of 1943 the so-called Peabody Flow Chart set forth a rate of build-up for the air forces in the United Kingdom as well as in other theaters. A variety of other factors governed the flow of aircraft and crews to the Eighth. Over-all strategical decisions, as that to invade North Africa before Western Europe, continued to affect the build-up of force, and demands of the Mediterranean and other theaters were again to draw strength from the United Kingdom. As important as any other factor was the rate of production of aircraft and equipment, and closely parallel to this was the state of training of combat and service units. The limitations of shipping moreover, were constantly threatening to upset any planned flow of units and material to a theater.
Despite these difficulties there was an understandable demand from the European theater for definite commitments. The British wanted a reliable plan for the flow of new units in order that they might prepare the airdromes and accommodations for their reception. The air force commander wanted a chart of the arrival of new units in order that he might plan his operations accordingly. His forces sank to such a low point in February 1943, that he pleaded for just the air echelons of groups even though there was no shipping available for ground echelons. He needed to know the rate at which replacements, particularly crews, would arrive, for these determined the rate at which the old units could conduct operations. The theater commander needed to know the dates on which units and certain types of equipment would be ready in order that he might properly assign shipping priorities.
The AAF expended great effort in the preparation of flow charts for the United Kingdom, both to meet the needs of the European theater and to aid in the planning of allocations to all theaters. During the first quarter of 1943, and even thereafter, they were produced in quantity but all were subject to change without notice and none could be carried out on schedule.
At the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 General Arnold gave to Air Vice Marshal J.M. Slessor, RAF Director of Plans, a table showing the build-up of the VIII Bomber Command for 1943. It had a goal of 39 heavy groups and 10 medium groups, and indicated that the command would be maintained at this strength during 1944. Later in January Air Vice Marshal Foster received from Maj. Gen. George Stratemeyer, U. S. Chief of Air Staff, another chart which forecast the rate of build-up of the Eighth in all types of combat aircraft, but projected the expansion to 30 June 1944, at which time the heavy bomber strength was to reach 45 groups; medium bomber, 11 groups; and fighter, 35 groups. Strength was also forecast for 30 June 1943, and 31 December 1943. According to this chart, heavy bomb groups were to have 48 aircraft per group; medium groups, 64; and fighters, 100. About a month later General Arnold stated that changing circumstances made it impracticable to forecast the flow of aircraft with any degree of accuracy. The Commanding General of the AAF explained that the situation in the Mediterranean theater had occasioned the revisions of the Stratemeyer program of January.
General Eaker complained on 1 March to General Arnold that he was greatly embarrassed in his conferences with the British Chief of the Air Staff by not having accurate figures on the proposed build-up of his air force. General Arnold relied on the 24th with another chart that forecast the flow of all types of aircraft as of 30 June and 3 December 1943, and 30 June 1944. He told the commander of the Eighth, however, that the figures were not sufficiently reliable to be used as definite commitments. They were simply the best estimate that could be made at the time on the basis of the training and activation schedule and the expected availability of aircraft. That was all that any flow chart could be because it was impossible to predict with exactness the rate at which men and airplanes would arrive in any theater.
Another flow chart taken to Europe in April by the Chief of Air Staff, and called in the theater the Stratemeyer Flow Plan, seems to have had more significance during the first phase of operations than any of the others. It evidently was the basis for planning on both sides of the Atlantic until it was amended by the Bradley Plan in May.
The latter plan, named for Inspector General of the Army Air Forces. Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, was the most significant step taken in the build-up of the Eighth Air Force and deserves somewhat detailed consideration. It had much greater scope than simply the charting of the flow of units or aircraft to the United Kingdom. It made recommendations for fundamental organizational changes in the strategic air force, provided for the organization of a tactical air force, and set up a troop basis for both of them. It had a difficult time in the War Department and was finally approved only after it was out of date. It did, however, serve the theater, the AAF, and the War Department as a basis for planning and therein lies its significance.
The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan which was drawn up in the theater in April 1943 and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May, provided for the build-up of heavy and medium bomber forces by three-month intervals beginning with