The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany. L. Douglas Keeney
1943. There was drawn up at the same time by General Eaker’s staff a troop basis incorporating the combat and service units for the strategic air force as well as for the tactical air force which was to support the invasion. All the units included in the troop basis were standard War Department units designed to operate in any theater. This troop basis was not accepted because it was believed that in a stabilized theater where bases were located in a highly industrialized nation a considerable saving in manpower could be effected by organizing certain units under manning tables. General Arnold realized that the air build-up plans for the United Kingdom current in April of 1943 called for more personnel (691,051) than could ever be shipped or than would ever be approved by the War Department. On 14 April he sent a cable to General Eaker directing that he initiate a study with the purpose of determining what economics could be exercised and telling him that he was sending General Bradley and two other officers to the theater for the investigation of the same problems.
Somewhat later in the month the Commanding General of the AAF gave definite instructions to General Bradley for his important assignment. The Air Inspector was to: (1) find whether the ultimate planned strength of 120 groups for the United Kingdom could be operated and maintained with no more than 550,000 personnel, and if that could not be done, to determine what strength could be operated with that number; (2) study certain proposed adjustments in organization and maintenance with the view of incorporating them in other theaters; (3)make an estimate of the operational saturation point of RAF and USAAF numbers in the theater; (4) obtain the preferences of the theater commander concerning the ratio of AAF ground to combat troops; and (5) collaborate with Generals Andrews and Eaker in preparing a troop basis to implement the plan for the bomber offensive.
The Bradley Committee visited a number of typical RAF and AAF installations, interviewed the agencies concerned, and on 23 May made its recommendations which were based upon the following assumptions: (1) that since strategic bombardment was the mission of the Eighth during 1943 and 1944, rapid build-up of the bomber command was necessary to success; (2) that there was to be a separate tactical air force to operate initially from fixed bases in England and eventually from the Continent; (3) that both tactical and service units on a station should be under the group commander, who was to have the assistance of competent air and ground executives; (4) that approved method by which technical control of service functions by the Air Service Command could be accomplished was through the establishment of control areas to operate sub-depots on tactical stations.
Important recommendations were made concerning the organization of the bomber command and the air service command, a troop basis and rate of build-up were set forth for both strategic and tactical air forces, and manning tables were drawn up for a variety of units in order to effect the saving in manpower that had been directed by AAF Headquarters.
The most important organizational recommendation for VIII Bomber Command was that there be activated the administrative units known as air divisions. A recommendation for such units had already been made by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force. This departure from the conventional AAF organization was based partly upon the RAF Bomber Command model, partly on the signals arrangements of British Airdromes, and partly upon the need for some decentralization in the administration of so large an organization as the VIII Bomber Command was destined to become. The air division was to consist of five or six combat wings, each of which in turn would be composed of three heavy ground. A heavy bomb group, made up of four squadrons, would occupy a single airdrome. The combat wing was not to have administrative functions but was to be entirely a tactical organization. Thus the VIII Bomber Command was a counterpart of the RAF there the bomber command is divided into groups, each composed of a series of bases, each base controlling three (3) stations with two (2) squadrons on each station with an I. E. [initial equipment] of twenty-four (24) aircraft each.
Other organizational recommendations affecting tactical units were (1) that there be air and ground executives at each station responsible to the station commander who would normally be the tactical group commander, and (2) that station complement organizations (for housekeeping functions) and guard organizations be provided for each station.
Important recommendations of the Bradley Committee also affected the VIII Air Force Service Command. The details of this mater cannot we covered here and need not be since the history of the Service Command is available. The significant recommendation was that decentralization should be achieved in the operation of this command through the creation of subdivisions known as control areas. There was to be a Base Air Depot Area to control the base air depots, an Air Service Strategical Control Area for advance air depots serving the heavy bombardment stations, and Air Service Tactical Control Area to supervise the units serving tactical aviation.
The Bradley Committee recommended that troop allocation for the air forces in the United Kingdom should eventually be:
It was intended that the air force strength should grow during 1943 at the following rate:
Strategic air force units were given priority over tactical units in the planned build-up, which was envisaged during 1943 as:
The so-called Bradley Plan was favorably indorsed by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force on 30 May, and by Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General of ETOUSA, on 8 June 1943. The plan was promptly approved by AAF Headquarters, and after much study, by the War Department, tentatively on 18 August, and finally on 8 November 1943. The over-all troop basis as finally approved was cut to 407,333.
The Commanding General of the Eighth stated that the Bradley Plan met the organizational and personnel problems of both the strategic and tactical air forces. He felt hat the rate of build-up and the flow of replacement crews and aircraft would permit six to eight maximum missions per month which would enable the Eighth to carry out the task set for it in the CBO Plan. He pointed out that the rate of operations was controlled by the flow of replacements, especially of crew replacements. This was to remain the controlling factor until fairly late in 1943, for the Eighth’s position with respect to operational heavy bombers was better than that for available crews until December of that year.
Headquarters AAF set about fulfilling the requirements of the Bradley Plan in June of 1943, some months before it was finally approved by the War Department, and this also thus became the principal guide for the build-up of the air forces in the United Kingdom, even during the summer of 1943.
The fact that the Army Air Forces and the theater had a build-up plan did not mean that unit and replacement flow would follow it automatically. The same matters of inter-theater competition, training and activation schedules, production of equipment, and shipping were still to govern. The question of balance between training and production was very troublesome. In fact, the deficiency of the Eighth in replacement combat crews became so serious before the first phase of the bomber offensive was over that it was to slow down the arrival of new units because AAF Headquarters set a goal of 1 ½ crews per aircraft unit equipment in order to be sure that groups could operate at full strength.
The demands of the Mediterranean theater, which had so depleted the strength of the Eighth in 1943, were again to make inroads during the first phase. Planned in that theater were two important operations which required more heavy bombardment then was than was there available. These were the invasion of Sicily (operation HUSKY and the attack on the Ploesti oil refineries (SOAPSUDS). Although they were not to be undertaken until later in the summer, the presence of the aircraft and crews was required for training. Consequently, the War Department ordered bombs groups scheduled for the United Kingdom, diverted to North Africa, with other bomb groups sent from the United Kingdom. .
Despite the drain of heavy group strength at the end of June, the Eighth had more than doubled its unit strength during the first phase of the bomber offensive. In the matter of operational groups the growth experienced was indicated by the total on hand at the end of each month: