The Combined Bomber Offensive 1943 - 1944: The Air Attack on Nazi Germany. L. Douglas Keeney

      An examination of the above table makes it at once evident that the controlling factor in effective strength during all the first phase was the availability of crews and not the maintenance of aircraft. The wide difference between assigned and available crews is explained by the fact that most of the crews arriving in the theater had to undergo a considerable period of training before they were ready for combat.

      The growth in personnel during the first three-month phase was more than 150%, the total climbing from 40,860 on 31 March to 101,349 on 30 June. It will be recalled that the Bradley Plan troop basis forecast the growth of the Eighth to reach 110,000 by 30 June.

      General Nature of First-Phase Operations

      The combined bomber offensive was a joint undertaking of the United Staten and British air forces. The plan for the offensive that was drawn up in the theater in April 1943 and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated that the capabilities of the two forces were complementary. The Eighth Air Force was the racier attacking precision targets by daylight. The RAF was the bludgeon destroying German material facilities and undermining the morale of the German worker. The coordination of the two forces was not left to chance. Moreover, the problem was not simply one of coordinating the efforts of two bomber commands. Much of the fighter support provided for the U. S. heavy bombers during the first phase (April-May-June 1943) was by the RAF Fighter Command. It was necessary to assure the closest cooperation among bomber and fighter commands of both forces and with RAF Coastal Command in connection with air-sea rescue.

      The chief agency for coordinating the efforts of the forces involved was called the Combined Operational Planning Committee (CCPC). It was established about April 1943, shortly after the VIII Fighter Command but three groups of P-47’s into operation. This committee was composed of representatives of VIII Bomber Command, VIII Fighter Command, RAF Bomber Command, and RAF Fighter Command. After 15 October 1943 the Ninth Air Force representative was included. The committee was charged with the function of planning the operations against major targets. The plans, after completion, were submitted to the commanders concerned, and after approval by the Eighth Air Force Commander, they were given code names and filed at each operating headquarters against future need. When the VIII Bomber commander, at his daily operational conference, selected one of these targets for attack, the code name was immediately passed to all related commands and the operational plan previously prepared was put into effect.

      The CCPC received the sanction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the directive of 1 June 1943. Certain terms of reference under which this committee was to operate were set forth in an enclosure to this directive which formally launched the combined bomber offensive. Not only was the CCPC given a planning function; it was instructed to “observe critically the tactical execution of these plans and to report to their Commanders of the four commands concerned.

      The operations of the combined bomber offensive made full use of the scientific method in the application of air power to destruction, and this subject merits consideration. Air warfare, employing so man of the products of scientific research, might have been quite unscientific in its operations had these operations been controlled merely by the opinions of commanding officers, even though the latter possessed great experience. The Eighth Air Force agency for the scientific study of all phases of air operations was known as the Operational Research Section (ORS). There were, of course, agencies in the United States which mad valuable studies of the tactics of air warfare. The AAF School of Applied Tactics made many contributions to the solution of the problems of the Eighth and other air forces, but the Operational Research Section functioned in the field, secured its data at the sources, and drew its conclusions on the facts as they were found. As General Eaker’s report later pointed out, “Operational research was originated in the VIII Bomber Command … It is composed of a group of scientists who study every phase of our operations and of enemy reaction, catalogue results and draw conclusions. It has now been definitely demonstrated that the studies of this organization are invaluable to air force commanders and that operational research has a staff function and staff agency in modern aerial warfare and fills a requirement not supplied by any other staff section.” The results of some of the studies of ORS will presently be examined.

      The scale of Eighth Air Force operations during the first phase does not now seem consequential. During the eight months prior to April 1943, General Eakers “piddling force of Fortresses” had engaged in 45 missions, flown 3364 sorties, and dropped 4715.7 tons of bombs on targets. April, May, and June were to see that eight-month record beaten badly on the sortie and tonnage counts. It took but 33 missions (two of there were wholly recalled) during these months to pile up 4267 sorties and drop 6435.4 tons on targets. Yet that first-phase effort was itself “piddling” when command with the over-all achievement of the Eighth During its 33 months of operations against Germany. Even though this effort of the second quarter of 1943 was small when compared with what was to follow, it did constitute the first experience with an expanding force and it did help to make succeeding efforts more effective.

      April 1943 was a slack month for VIII Bomber Command, its operations falling considerably short of the record piled up in March. The reasons were two. It has already been noted how small were the effective forces; furthermore, the conduct of operations was greatly hampered by bad weather. During this month there were but four missions flown by the heavy bombers; and on only one of the four (17 April, Bremen) were there as many as 109 aircraft reported attacking the target.

      Reasonably good bombing weather and the expansion of the force combined to make May the best month the VIII bomber Command had ever seen. The heavy bombers were out nine days during the month and dropped approximately 2800 tons of bombs on 18 different targets. Three of these were attacked by more than 100 bombers each. The last operation in May (on the 29^th) saw the Eighth break all its previous records, for a single day as well as for a month, dispatching 272 heavies of which 239 actually attacked. The May operations cost 6 heavy bombers against claims of 389 enemy aircraft destroyed.

      The month of May witnessed also the initial experimental operations of the medium bombers of the Eighth Air Force. The Combined Bomber Offensive Plan had provided for medium bombers as necessary adjuncts to heavy bombers and as a vital factor in the support of combined operations scheduled for 1944.

      The first U. S. medium bomb group to become operational in the United Kingdom was the 322d, which had arrived in the theater on 8 March. Before its May effort it was given eight weeks of training in low-level operations. This type of training indicated the tactics that were contemplated to capitalize on the speed and ruggedness of the B-24. Since these tactics were changed after but two missions, it is appropriate to inquire into the reasons for their adoption. In the first place, since mediums were to be used to support surface operations, low-level tactics would be needed, and training in them would be of great value. In the second place, the B-26’s were not equipped with bombsights for medium-altitude attack. Furthermore, it was desirable to learn whether a well trained force could utilize the element of surprise on an important objective.

      The strategical directives for the Eighth Air Force were delivered through the British Air Ministry, so in March when the commander of the Eighth was planning the operations of the mediums, he wrote to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal and asked that certain targets in occupied Europe be cleared for attack. These targets required very shallow penetration of the Continent and included airdromes as first priority, marshaling yards, power stations, and port facilities in France, Belgium, and Holland. Mediums were also to be used on targets in Germany.

      Air Marshall Portal’s reply suggested that the most important matter to consider in planning the operations of the medium bombers was to see that their activities were coordinated with other daylight operations. It was his idea that the Eighth’s mediums should give first priority to transportation targets rather than to airdromes. This was the policy of the RAF light bombers, and was in accord with the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (In March the bomber offensive was functioning under the Casablanca