The Central Legislature in British India, 192147. Mohammad Rashiduzzaman
the Imperial Legislative Council on the 29th March, 1909.
32. Morris-Jones, W. H., Parliament in India, p. 48. See also Chapter III (Nature of Electoral System and Elections).
33. Para. 79, M/C Report.
34. Para. 79, M/C Report.
35. Pakistan Historical Society. Op. cit. pp. 64–65 also The Memoirs of Aga Khan, pp. 92–93. (“Our experience from the time of the Cross-Lansdowne reform in 1892 onwards had pointed out that there was no hope of a fair deal for us (Muslims) within the fold of the Congress Party or in alliance with it”).
36. These figures have been taken from History of Freedom Movement (Vol. III) Pt. I. pp. 64–65.
37. See also Chapter III (Nature of Electoral System and Elections).
38. Chapter IV. M/C Report.
39. Morris-Jones, W. H. Op. cit. p. 49.
40. Proceedings of the I.L.C. 21st March, 1911.
41. Para. 93, M/C Report.
42. “Kerala-Putra”The Working of Dyarchyp. 6.
43. On March 9, 1913 the daily Bengalee came out with an editorial condemning the elected members who opposed the amendments and supported the Criminal Conspiracy Bill, 1913. Similar comments about various controversial measures supported by the Indian elected Members are available in the files of the daily Bengalee from 1910 to 1917.
44. Despatch of the Secretary of State, Cmd. 4426, 1908.
45. Mehrotra, S. R.—The Politics behind the Montagu Declaration of 1917, an article in Politics and Society in India, edited by Philips, C. H.—p. 73.
46. Pantulu, S. Post War Reforms in Indian Review, March 1917.
47. Ibid.
48. Indian Review, May, 1917 (Memo. of the Nineteen Members.).
49. Proceedings of the I.L.C. 5th September 1917.
50. Sir Frederick Whyte’s article Political evolution in India in Foreign Affairs, January, 1926, p. 224.
51. Ibid.
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THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE AND INDIAN POLITICS, 1921 TO 1947
Without an iota of reservation, M. K. Gandhi’s (Gandhi) non-co-operation movement was a direct affront to the institutions created by the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms: the boycott campaign was so successfully carried out by the Indian National Congress Party (Congress) and the Khilafatists that only about 25% of the voters dared to cast their votes in the 1920 legislative elections.1 Many competent persons who would have been assets to the deliberative bodies stayed out of the first election that heralded the new-fangled legislative institutions offered by those constitutional reforms. As a result, only the so-called “moderate Indians” who refused to toe the line with the Congress and the Khilafatist non-co-operation protest throughout India entered the Legislatures; for sure, the newly elected law-makers found themselves in an uneasy predicament that could ruin their political future. Outside the legislatures, they were bullied as the “title-hunters and job-hunters.”2 Inside the legislatures, the Government apparently showed a degree of readiness to accommodate the non-official legislators’ demands and, in their turn, the elected representatives were too expected to co-operate with the Government to make the Reforms a perceptible success. Nevertheless, the elected representatives had to be extremely cautious in extending any collaboration with the Colonial Government as there was a vigorous political ← 13 | 14 → push against them in the larger political arena. And yet, the best contribution of the self-assured politicians was the acceleration of the 1919 Reforms to test their real worth in practice—their strategy was to assert their accomplishments in the new floor of constitutional politics. Without the support of those politicians at that juncture and without their dare to work the new reforms, the history of constitutional politics and institutional configuration in British India and the post-independent India, Pakistan and Bangladesh could have taken entirely different shapes.
With the visible decline of the country-wide non-co-operation rebellion and the large-scale arrest of the campaign leaders and their cohorts, the immediate and the unflinching threat to the legislatures seemingly weakened. No longer, it was a great secret—Gandhi had little faith in the legislatures as the training ground for self-government and steady organizational growth.3 However, several among his colleagues, such as C. R. Das, Pandit Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, V. J. Patel, B. C. Pal and Motilal Nehru saw the prospect of utilizing the new legislative bodies for exerting added pressure on the Government for making further political concessions. So it was almost an anti-Gandhi rise up when those leaders took initiative to enter the Central and provincial legislatures. Thus, the schism between the two groups inside the Congress: one with Gandhi’s boycott of legislatures and the other willing to enter the new legislatures culminated in the creation of the Swaraj Party in 1923; it was a new political forum under the leadership of C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru, which put forward the controversial agenda to put themselves into the legislatures.4 Few doubted that the 1923 election was a thumping victory for the Swarajists in the central as well as in a few provincial legislatures.
With the 48-strong Swarajists headed by Motilal and Patel and a few outstanding Independents like Jinnah and Rangachariar, the centre of gravity of Indian politics, for a while, shifted to the Central Legislature in 1924. With an eye towards the Congress Party-led nationalist movement in the country and also to establish the new group’s credibility in the legislature, the immediate Swarajist goal was to set forth the well known political grievances.5 Their main target was to keep up the spirit of resistance to foreign rule at a juncture when the non-co-operation stir was no longer in the highest gear and the nationalist churn was rather at low ebb.6 The moderates among the nationalists seemingly felt that certain good things could be achieved through the legislatures and a range of constitutional opportunities were indeed offered by the new reforms.7 On his election as the President of the Assembly, V. J. Patel openly admitted on the floor of the House that the working of the Reforms ← 14 | 15 → convinced him to give up non-co-operation and go into the legislatures. He outlined a number of achievements by his predecessor Sir Frederick Whyte.8 For a while at least, the Swarajists appeared to be the legislative wing of the Indian National Congress although few would then admitted it openly. Their political actions inside the Central Assembly such as the rejection of budget and periodic censures of the Government habitually received the utmost publicity in the country outside. Public opinion was fully aware of the limitations of the new legislatures, but they seemed to be impressed by the vigor and acumen with which the political questions were pushed in the Assembly floor. Summing up the Swarajist achievements in the Second Assembly, the daily Hindu wrote: “It has to its credit solid achievements in the direction of asserting and in some cases at any rate, receiving recognition of the rights of the subjects. It was this Assembly, again, that repeatedly rejected by majorities of 63 to 56, the Government demands for grants and subsequently threw out the Finance Bill by 60 votes to 57, acting on the principle of redressing grievances before supply.”9 Such reactions of the press confirmed how far the Central Legislature was alive to the political mood outside. The British press was also watching then with a great interest what was happening in the Central Legislature: The Times, for example, came out with editorial comments on all major events in the Central Assembly.
The years from 1924 to 1926 offered an excellent opportunity to the Government to take a forward step in Indian constitutional development when the Swarajists were ready to co-operate with the Government on a range of social, economic and political issues. A positive response, on behalf of the British government, to the demand for a Round Table Conference in 1924 would have strengthened the hands of those politicians who wanted to exercise only constitutional methods for India’s political emancipation. Motilal Nehru’s amendment demanding a Round Table Conference in February 1924 was far more conciliatory