Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions. Eleanor L. Schiff
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Bureaucracy’s Masters
and Minions
Bureaucracy’s Masters
and Minions
The Politics of Controlling the U.S.
Bureaucracy
Eleanor L. Schiff
LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London
Published by Lexington Books
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
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ISBN 978-1-4985-9777-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-4985-9778-4 (electronic)
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
to Steve, Robert, Josephine, and Grace
Contents
1 Bureaucracy as a Whipping Boy for Politicians and Citizens Alike
2 A Survey of Bureaucratic Control Mechanisms
3 The Business of Agency Budgeting: Incrementalism
4 Reflecting, Refining, and Revising the Principal-Agent Approach: An Agent-Principal Model
5 Using an Agent-Principal Model to Test Who Controls the U.S. Bureaucracy
6 Elites’ Influence on Education Policy: Understanding the Dynamics of K-12 Educational Policy Changes
7 Bureaucratic Control, Intransigence, and Fortitude
Appendix A: Average Levels of Managers in Bureaus from 2000 to 2014
Appendix B: Average Levels of Political Appointees in Bureaus from 2000 to 2014
Appendix C: Average Levels of Policy Work among Bureau Workforce 2000 to 2014
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
Figure 4.1 | Agent-Principal Incentives |
Figure 4.2 | Naïve Hierarchical Models |
Figure 4.3 | Naïve Heterarchical Models |
Figure 4.4 | Naïve Hybrid Model |
Figure 5.1 | Descriptive Statistics |
Figure 5.2 | Cross-Sectional Time Series Regression Analysis on Political Control |
Figure 6.1 | Annualized Dynamic Weighted Scores for Education Laws from 1947 to 2012 |
Figure 6.2 | Education Policy Mood |
Figure 6.3 | Variation in Workforce Composition, Workforce Structure, and Workforce Responsibilities at the U.S. Department of Education from 1988 to 2012 |
Figure 6.4 | Descriptive Statistics |
Figure 6.5 | ADL Regression Models for Education Policy Dynamics |
Figure 6.6 | ADL Regression Models with Interactive Effects |
Figure 6.7 | Effect of a One Unit Change in Managers for Democrats and Republicans Presidential Administrations on Education Policy |
Figure 6.8 | Effect of a One Unit Change in Policy-Focused work for Democrats and Republicans Presidential Administrations on Education Policy |
Figure 6.9 | Effect of a One Unit Change in Managers for Democrats and Republican-Controlled House on Education Policy |
Figure 6.10 | Effect of a One Unit Change in Policy-Focused work for Democrats and Republicans-Controlled House on Education Policy |
This project is a long culmination of thought and work over many years. At the beginning of my career I did not know, of course, that I would eventually write a book on the U.S. bureaucracy. I had the honor and privilege of working in several governing institutions in Washington, DC. I served for over a year as an aide in Senator Bill Frist’s, MD, office when he was the junior senator from Tennessee, serving alongside Fred Thompson, who had taken Al Gore’s old seat. It was an incredible education. I absorbed the history of the capital with its Minton tiles imported from England at US$2 a piece on the eve of the Civil War. I was a sponge and was always observing everything around me. I saw firsthand how hearings worked, how the senator related to his constituents, how the office was run, how senators spoke to one another on the floor, and how people in power treated not only one another but also those who worked for them. I loved working in that august institution and for Senator Frist. He is a good man and always treated everyone with respect and kindness. I could not believe that providence had given me at the age of twenty-two the great good fortune of working in one of America’s governing institutions.
Little did I know that the Senate was only the beginning of my public service career. Shortly after the 2000 presidential election, Senator Frist’s senior health policy aide was asked to join the Bush transition team. After the inauguration, she received a presidential appointment as a commissioned officer in the White House as part of the Domestic Policy Council (DPC) staff working on a myriad of health-care issues—the Patients’