Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society. Samuel Pufendorf

      John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, originally published in Latin in 1689, is widely known as a founding text in the history of toleration. It is usually claimed that Locke was among the first who defended a “modern” concept of toleration. This interpretation rests on the basic distinction between a “traditional” and a “modern” doctrine of toleration. The former sees toleration as a grant or privilege bestowed on individuals or groups by the ruler. Toleration is conceived not as a good in itself but rather as a temporary means to overcome religious dissent. The ultimate goal remains the reunification of different religions or religious denominations. The “modern” doctrine of toleration is marked by a shift to religious liberty or freedom of conscience. In this view, liberty is an entitlement that does not depend on an agency that grants privileges. The liberty-based approach to toleration amounts to a principled defense of religious dissent and implies the permanence and ineradicability of religious diversity.¹

      Although Locke’s Letter marks an important step in the history of toleration, it is by no means unique.² It is part of a considerable body of literature on toleration that followed the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. By this measure the French king, Louis XIV, renounced the laws that granted toleration to the Huguenots—that is, the Calvinists—in France. It has to be considered as the last great effort of one of the European powers to bring about religious unity by means of force. It is thus no surprise that this act was met by an outcry of protestations in the European “Republic of Letters.” The lead was taken by Protestant countries such as The Netherlands, England, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Switzerland, where the Huguenot exiles had taken up residence.³

      II

      Samuel Pufendorf’s De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem (Of the Nature of Religion in Relation to Civil Life, translated as Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society) of 1687 is one of the remarkable pieces in this literature. It is exceptional, because the doctrine of toleration is developed within the framework of modern natural law, a doctrine for which Pufendorf is well-known as one of the founding fathers. His main works are De jure naturae et gentium (The Law of Nature and Nations, 1672) and its abridgment, De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem (On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, translated as The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, 1673). The first English translation of De habitu, which is reproduced in this volume, was published in 1698. By then Pufendorf was already renowned in England and elsewhere in Europe. The last decade of the seventeenth century witnessed extended discussion of his work in learned journals as well as the first translations of his writings. The first English translation of De officio dates from 1691, the second from 1698. The French, English, German, and many other translations of De jure and De officio that followed in the early eighteenth century testify to the lasting interest in Pufendorf’s writings on natural law. In fact, they were to play a major role in the shaping of German, Scottish, and French moral and political philosophy up to the American and French Revolutions.

      As Jodocus Crull mentions on the title page of his translation, Pufendorf’s Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion may be read as an “appendix” to The Whole Duty of Man. In fact, it can be understood as an application of his natural law theory to the domain of religion and church. At the outset (secs. 2–5) Pufendorf argues that the state is not founded for the sake of religion, since religion is part of natural human freedom that cannot be delegated to the sovereign. The end of civil society consists exclusively in the security of the citizens, while religion has to be left to the care of the individual. For that reason, respect for religious freedom is one of the duties of the sovereign. Relying on the contractual theory of the state, Pufendorf denounces the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, arguing that the sovereign transgresses the limits of his power when he extends his rule to religion. If the ruler persecutes subjects because of their religion, it cannot be considered an act of legitimate rule but an unjust, hostile, or tyrannical act (sec. 6). In Law of Nature Pufendorf had also argued that the sovereign can be unjust to his subjects when he transgresses the limits of his power.⁴ However, in that work he did not acknowledge a right to resistance but insisted that the people have to obey the ruler, even if he degenerates into a tyrant.⁵ The new persecutions by the French monarch led Pufendorf to conclude in the present work that, when rulers transgress their bounds, the subjects have a right to defend their religion, even by the force of arms (sec. 52).

      Important as it was, Pufendorf’s fierce opposition to the French king should not be mistaken as a turn to political radicalism. While his advocacy of religious liberty amounts to a principled defense of toleration comparable to that of Locke’s, Pufendorf’s teaching proves more complex when viewed from a broader perspective. More traditional aspects of his doctrine of toleration are brought to the fore when it is evaluated in the context of contemporary European politics, which he followed closely as adviser to some of the successful Protestant rulers.

      III

      Samuel Pufendorf was born in 1632 in a small village in Lutheran Saxony. Following studies in Leipzig and Jena, he took a position in 1658 as tutor to the family of Baron Peter Julius Coyet, the Swedish minister (ambassador) in Denmark. As a result of war between Sweden and Denmark, Pufendorf was put in prison, where he composed his first treatise on natural law, the Elementa jurisprudentiae universalis (Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, 1660). After a brief stay in Holland he was appointed professor of international law and philology