Getting China Wrong. Aaron L. Friedberg
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CONTENTS
1 Cover
6 Preface
9 1. The Origins of Engagement Engagement 2.0 Notes
10 2. Rationales and Expectations Geopolitics: from quasi-ally to “responsible stakeholder” Economics: “markets over Mao” Politics: China’s “short march” to democracy Conclusion Notes
11 3. Politics: “The Party Leads Everything” Lenin’s legacy The Party’s evolving strategy for survival Was democracy ever possible? The lingering trauma of Tiananmen “Consultative Leninism” and the search for a “Harmonious Society” The demise of “soft authoritarianism” The totalitarian turn “Xi Jinping Thought,” pseudo-Confucianism, and the birth of the “China Dream” Conclusion Notes
12 4. Economics: “A Bird in a Cage” “Mercantilist Leninism” The Party’s evolving strategy for growth Deng crosses the river Jiang engineers a miracle Zhu Rongji and the transition illusion Hu at the crossroads “Indigenous innovation” Xi recasts the cage Seizing the “commanding heights” “Dual circulation” Conclusion Notes
13 5. Strategy: “The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” The roots of revisionism The Party’s evolving strategy for achieving regional preponderance and global power “Hide and bide” “Get some things done” “Strive for achievement” Conclusion Notes
14 6. Getting China Right The failure of engagement The lexicon of strategic paralysis Objectives Objections Mobilization Partial disengagement Counterbalancing Waging “discursive struggle” Conclusion Notes
15 Index
List of Illustrations
1 Chapter 2Figure 2.1 US–China trade, 1985–2020
2 Chapter 4Figure 4.1 US foreign direct investment flows to ChinaFigure 4.2 China GDP growth rate, 1980–2020Figure 4.3 Made in China 2025
3 Chapter 6Figure 6.1 Public attitudes towards China, 2002–2020Figure 6.2 Shares of global GDP, 2020
List of Box
1 Chapter 3Box 3.1 “Communiqué on the Current State