A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics. Richard Baxter
hath power to forgive such crimes, the meaning is no more than this: 1. That as to the species of these sins, if he do forgive the temporal punishment which in his office he should have inflicted, yet no human power can question him for it, because he hath none on earth above him; but yet God will question him, and show him that he had no power to dispense with his laws, nor disoblige himself from his duty. 2. And that in some cases an individual crime may be forgiven by the magistrate as to the temporal punishment, even where the ends of the law and government require it; but this must not be ordinary.
Prop. II. It is not always in the power of the magistrate to remit the temporal punishment of heinous crimes, against the common good. Because it is ordinarily necessary to the common good that they be punished; and his power is for the common good, and not against it. The enemies of the public peace must by punishment be restrained.
Prop. III. Much less is it in the power of a private man to remit a penalty to be inflicted by a magistrate. And what I say of magistrates, holdeth of parents, and other governors, cæteris paribus, according to the proportion of their authority.
Prop. IV. I may by just means exact satisfaction for damages to myself, in my reputation or estate, when the ends of christianity, even the honour of God, and the public good, and the benefit of men's souls, require it; that is, when I only vindicate these by lawful means, as they are the talents which God hath committed to me for his service, and for which he will call me to account. It may fall out that the vindicating of a minister's or other christian's name from a slander, may become very needful for the interest and honour of religion, and for the good of many souls. And if I have an estate which I resolve to use for God, and a thief or a deceiver take it from me, who will do no good with it but hurt, I may be bound to vindicate it; that I may be enabled to do good, and may give God a comfortable account of my stewardship; besides the suppressing of thievery and deceit, as they are against the common good.
Prop. V. When my estate is not entirely my own, but wife or child or any other is a sharer in it, it is not wholly in my power to remit any debt or damage out of it, but I must have the consent of them that are joint-owners; unless I be intrusted for them.
Prop. VI. If I be primarily obliged to maintain wife and children, or any others, with my estate, I am bound on their behalf to use all just means to vindicate it from any that shall injuriously invade it; otherwise I am guilty of their sufferings whom I should maintain; I may no more suffer a thief than a dog to go away with my children's meat.
Prop. VII. And as I must vindicate my estate for others to whom I am intrusted to administer it by God, so must I for myself also, so far as God would have me use it myself. For he that hath charged me to provide for my family, requireth also that I famish not myself; and he hath required me to love my neighbour but as myself; and therefore as I am bound to vindicate and help my neighbour if a thief or oppressor would rob him, (according to my place and power,) so must I do also for myself. In all these seven cases I am not obliged to forgive.
But on the other side, in all these cases following, I am bound to forgive and let go my right.
Prop. I. As the church may declare to penitent sinners, the remission of the eternal punishment, so may it remit the temporal punishment of excommunication, to the penitent; yea, this they are obliged by Christ to do, ministerially, as under him.
Prop. II. When the repentance and satisfaction of the sinner is like to conduce more to the public good, and the honour of God, and other ends of government, than his punishment would do, a private man may not be obliged to prosecute him before the magistrate, and the magistrate hath power to forgive him as to the penalty which it belongeth to him to inflict. (Though this may not extend to the remitting of crimes ordinarily and frequently, nor to the remitting of some sort of heinous crimes at all; because this cannot attain the ends of government as aforesaid.)
Prop. III. All personal wrongs, so far as they are merely against myself, and disable me not from my duty to God and my neighbour, I may and must forgive: for my own interest is put more in my own power; and here it is that I am commanded to forgive. If you say that I am bound to preserve my own life and soul as much as another's; I answer, it is true, I am bound to preserve my own and another's ultimately for the service and glory of God; and God's interest in me I cannot remit or give away. As there is no obligation to duty but what is originally from God, so there is none but what is ultimately for God, even to please and glorify him.
Object. But if this be all, I shall forgive no wrongs; for there is none which doth not some way hinder me in my duty. Answ. Yes, there may be many to your body, your estate, and name, which yet may be no disablement or hinderance to you, except you make it so yourself: as if you receive a box on the ear, or be slandered or reviled where none heareth it but yourself, or such as will make no evil use of it, or if a little be diminished injuriously out of a superfluous estate, or so as to be employed as well as you would have done. 2. But I further answer this objection in the next propositions.
Prop. IV. If my patient suffering a personal injury, which somewhat hindereth me from my duty, be like to be as great a service to God, or to do more good, than by that duty I should do, I ought to pass by and forgive that injury; because then God's interest obligeth me not to vindicate my right.
Prop. V. If when I am injured, and thereby disabled from doing some good which I should else have done, I am not able by seeking reparation or the punishment of the person, to recover my capacity, and promote the service of God, I am bound to pass by and remit that injury. (I speak not of the criminal part, but the injury as such; for a man may be bound to bring a thief to punishment, on the account of God's honour, and the common good, though else he might forgive the injury to himself.)
Prop. VI. If it be probable that he that defraudeth me of my estate, will do more good with it than I should have done, I am not bound to vindicate it from him for my own interest (though as he is criminal, and the crime is hurtful, as an ill example, to the common good, so I may be bound to it). Nay, were it not for the said criminal respect, I am bound rather to let him take it, than to vindicate it by any such means as would break charity, and do more hurt than good.
Prop. VII. If I am absolutely trusted with the person or estate of another, I may so far forgive the wrongs done to that other, upon sufficient reasons, as well as against myself.
Prop. VIII. A private man may not usurp the magistrate's power, or do any act which is proper to his office, nor yet may he break his laws, for the avenging of himself; he may use no other means than the law of God and his sovereign do allow him. Therefore he may not rail, or revile, or slander, or rob, or strike, or hurt any, (unless in case of defence, as afterward,) nor take any other prohibited course.
Prop. IX. No rigour or severity must be used to right myself, where gentler means may probably do it; but the most harmless way must first be tried.
Prop. X. In general, all wrongs, and debts, and damages, must be forgiven, when the hurt is like to be greater, which will come by our righting ourselves, than that which by forbearance we shall sustain; and all must be forgiven where God's law or man's forbiddeth us not to forgive. Therefore a man that will here know his duty, must conduct his actions by very great prudence (which if he have not himself, he must make use of a guide or counsellor): and he must be able to compare the evil which he suffereth with the evil which will in probability follow his vindication, and to discern which of them is the greater; or else he can never know how far and when he may and must forgive. And herein he must observe,
1. That hurt that cometh to a man's soul is greater than the hurt that befalleth the body; and therefore if my suing a man at law be like to hurt his soul by uncharitableness, or to hurt my own, or the souls of others, by scandal or disturbances, I must rather suffer any mere bodily injuries, than use that means; but if yet greater hurt to souls would follow that bodily suffering of mine, the case is then altered the other way. So if by forgiving debts or wrongs, I be liker to do more good to the soul of him whom I forgive, or others, than the recovery of my own, or the righting of myself, is like any way to equal, I am obliged to forgive that debt or wrong.
2. The good or hurt which cometh to a community or to many, is (cæteris paribus) to be more regarded than that which cometh to myself or any one alone. Because many