Thirty Years' View (Vol. II of 2). Benton Thomas Hart
the action which the constitution permits, and which the subject requires; but the senator from Massachusetts has risen in his place, and called upon us to shift our view; to transfer our contemplation – from the constitution of the United States to the British statute book – from actual bankruptcy among ourselves to historical bankruptcy in England; and to confine our legislation to the characteristics of the English model.
As a general proposition, I lay it down that Congress is not confined, like jurists and judges, to the English statutory definitions, or the Nisi Prius or King's Bench construction of the phrases known to English legislation, and used in our constitution. Such a limitation would not only narrow us down to a mere lawyer's view of a subject, but would limit us, in point of time, to English precedents, as they stood at the adoption of our constitution, in the year 1789. I protest against this absurdity, and contend that we are to use our granted powers according to the circumstances of our own country, and according to the genius of our republican institutions, and according to the progress of events and the expansion of light and knowledge among ourselves. If not, and if we are to be confined to the "usual objects," and the "usual subjects," and the "usual purposes," of British legislation at the time of the adoption of our constitution, how could Congress ever make a law in relation to steamboats, or to railroad cars, both of which were unknown to British legislation in 1789; and therefore, according to the idea that would send us to England to find out the meaning of our constitution, would not fall within the limits of our legislative authority. Upon their face, the words of the constitution are sufficient to justify the President's recommendation, even as understood by those who impugn that recommendation. The bankrupt clause is very peculiar in its phraseology, and the more strikingly so from its contrast with the phraseology of the naturalization clause, which is coupled with it. Mark this difference: there is to be a uniform rule of naturalization: there are to be uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. One is in the singular, the other in the plural; one is to be a rule, the other are to be laws; one acts on individuals, the other on the subject; and it is bankruptcies that are, and not bankruptcy that is, to be the objects of these uniform laws.
As a proposition, now limited to this particular case, I lay it down that we are not confined to the modern English acceptation of this term bankrupt; for it is a term, not of English, but of Roman origin. It is a term of the civil law, and borrowed by the English from that code. They borrowed from Italy both the name and the purpose of the law; and also the first objects to which the law was applicable. The English were borrowers of every thing connected with this code; and it is absurd in us to borrow from a borrower – to copy from a copyist – when we have the original lender and the original text before us. Bancus and ruptus signifies a broken bench; and the word broken is not metaphorical but literal, and is descriptive of the ancient method of cashiering an insolvent or fraudulent banker, by turning him out of the exchange or market place, and breaking the table bench to pieces on which he kept his money and transacted his business. The term bankrupt, then, in the civil law from which the English borrowed it, not only applied to bankers, but was confined to them; and it is preposterous in us to limit ourselves to an English definition of a civil law term.
Upon this exposition of our own constitution, and of the civil law derivation of this term bankrupt, I submit that the Congress of the United States is not limited to the English judicial or statutory acceptation of the term; and so I finish the first point which I took in the argument. The next point is more comprehensive, and makes a direct issue with the proposition of the senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. Webster.] His proposition is, that we must confine our bankrupt legislation to the usual objects, the usual subjects, and the usual purposes of bankrupt laws in England; and that currency (meaning paper money and shin-plasters of course), and banks, and banking, are not within the scope of that legislation. I take issue, sir, upon all these points, and am ready to go with the senator to England, and to contest them, one by one, on the evidences of English history, of English statute law, and of English judicial decision. I say English; for, although the senator did not mention England, yet he could mean nothing else, in his reference to the usual objects, usual subjects, and usual purposes of bankrupt laws. He could mean nothing else. He must mean the English examples and the English practice, or nothing; and he is not a person to speak, and mean nothing.
Protesting against this voyage across the high seas, I nevertheless will make it, and will ask the senator on what act, out of the scores which Parliament has passed upon this subject, or on what period, out of the five hundred years that she has been legislating upon it, will he fix for his example? Or, whether he will choose to view the whole together; and out of the vast chaotic and heterogeneous mass, extract a general power which Parliament possesses, and which he proposes for our exemplar? For myself, I am agreed to consider the question under the whole or under either of these aspects, and, relying on the goodness of the cause, expect a safe deliverance from the contest, take it in any way.
And first, as to the acts passed upon this subject; great is their number, and most dissimilar their provisions. For the first two hundred years, these acts applied to none but aliens, and a single class of aliens, and only for a single act, that of flying the realm to avoid their creditors. Then they were made to apply to all debtors, whether natives or foreigners, engaged in trade or not, and took effect for three acts: 1st, flying the realm; 2d, keeping the house to avoid creditors; 3d, taking sanctuary in a church to avoid arrest. For upwards of two hundred years – to be precise, for two hundred and twenty years – bankruptcy was only treated criminally, and directed against those who would not face their creditors, or abide the laws of the land; and the remedies against them were not civil, but criminal; it was not a distribution of the effects, but corporal punishment, to wit: imprisonment and outlawry.1 The statute of Elizabeth was the first that confined the law to merchants and traders, took in the unfortunate as well as the criminal, extended the acts of bankruptcy to inability as well as to disinclination to pay, discriminated between innocent and fraudulent bankruptcy; and gave to creditors the remedial right to a distribution of effects. This statute opened the door to judicial construction, and the judges went to work to define by decisions, who were traders, and what acts constituted the fact, or showed an intent to delay or to defraud creditors. In making these decisions, the judges reached high enough to get hold of royal companies, and low enough to get hold of shoemakers; the latter upon the ground that they bought the leather out of which they made the shoes; and they even had a most learned consultation to decide whether a man who was a landlord for dogs, and bought dead horses for his four-legged boarders, and then sold the skins and bones of the horse carcases he had bought, was not a trader within the meaning of the act; and so subject to the statute of bankrupts. These decisions of the judges set the Parliament to work again to preclude judicial constructions by the precision, negatively and affirmatively, of legislative enactment. But, worse and worse! Out of the frying-pan into the fire. The more legislation the more construction; the more statutes Parliament made, the more numerous and the more various the judicial decisions; until, besides merchants and traders, near forty other descriptions of persons were included; and the catalogue of bankruptcy acts, innocent or fraudulent, is swelled to a length which requires whole pages to contain it. Among those who are now included by statutory enactment in England, leaving out the great classes comprehended under the names of merchants and traders, are bankers, brokers, factors, and scriveners; insurers against perils by sea and land; warehousemen, wharfingers, packers, builders, carpenters, shipwrights and victuallers; keepers of inns, hotels, taverns and coffee-houses; dyers, printers, bleachers, fullers, calendrers, sellers of cattle or sheep; commission merchants and consignees; and the agents of all these classes. These are the affirmative definitions of the classes liable to bankruptcy in England; then come the negative; and among these are farmers, graziers, and common laborers for hire; the receivers general of the king's taxes, and members or subscribers to any incorporated companies established by charter of act of Parliament. And among these negative and affirmative exclusions and inclusions, there are many classes which have repeatedly changed position, and found themselves successively in and out of the bankrupt code. Now, in all this mass of variant and contradictory legislation, what part of it will the senator from Massachusetts select for his model? The improved, and approved parts, to be sure! But here a barrier presents itself – an impassable wall interposes – a veto power intervenes. For it so happens that the improvements in the British bankrupt code, those parts of it which are considered best,
1
Whereas divers and sundry persons craftily obtained into their hands great substance of other men's goods, do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any of their creditors, their debts and duties, but at their own wills and own pleasures consume the substance obtained by credit of other men for their own pleasures and delicate living, against all reason, equity, and good conscience.