Trial of the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Savannah, on the Charge of Piracy, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. Warburton Adolphus Frederick
of these privateersmen?
A. I have not.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion whether the acts charged upon them, if proved, constitute piracy?
A. No, sir; I have not formed any opinion with regard to the question whether it was piracy or not.
Challenged peremptorily by the prisoners.
George H. Hansell challenged for principal cause.
Q. In a capital case, where the evidence is sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty, have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque:
Q. Have you read the account of the capture of the Savannah privateer?
A. I believe I read the account at the time. I have a very indistinct recollection of it.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. I do not remember that I have, sir. I certainly do not have any opinion now; and certainly would not have until I have heard the evidence.
Q. Do you say you do not recollect whether you have formed or expressed any opinion?
A. I do not remember that I have, sir. I may, on reading the article, have expressed an opinion on it; but I am not positive of that.
Q. Have you formed or expressed an opinion whether the facts charged, if proved, amount to piracy?
A. I should not consider myself competent to form an opinion upon that until I have heard the law on the subject.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
Panel completed.
Mr. E. Delafield Smith opened the case for the prosecution. He said:
May it please the Court, and you, Gentlemen of the Jury:
The Constitution of the United States, in the eighth section of the first article, authorized the Congress, among other things, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.
In pursuance of that authority, the Congress, on the 30th of April, 1790, made provisions contained in an act entitled "An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." I refer to the 8th and 9th sections of that act, which is to be found in the first volume of the U.S. Statutes at Large, page 112.
In the State Courts, gentlemen, it is common to say that the jury is judge both of the law and the fact; but such is not the case in the United States Courts. The Court will state to you the law, which you are morally bound to follow. But in opening this case, I refer to the statutes for the purpose of showing you precisely what the law is supposed to be under which this indictment is found, and under which we shall ask you for a verdict.
The 8th section of the act of 1790, commonly called "The Crimes Act," and to which I have just referred, declares, that if any person or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, murder or robbery, or any other offence which, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandize to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and, being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.
The 9th section of the same act provides, that if any citizen shall commit any piracy or robbery aforesaid, or any act of hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high sea, under color of any commission from any foreign prince or state, or on pretence of authority from any person, such offender shall, notwithstanding the pretence of any such authority, be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be a pirate, felon, and robber, and, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death.
A statute, on this subject, enacted in 1819, expired by its own limitation; but on the 15th of May, 1820, an act was passed making further provisions for punishing the crime of piracy. This law is printed in the third volume of the U.S. Statutes at Large, page 600. The 3d section provides, that if any person shall, upon the high seas, or in any open roadstead, or in any haven, basin, or bay, or in any river where the sea ebbs and flows, commit the crime of robbery in or upon any ship or vessel, or upon any of the ship's company of any ship or vessel, or the lading thereof, such person shall be adjudged to be a pirate; and, being thereof convicted before the Circuit Court of the United States for the district into which he shall be brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death.
I now refer to the act of March 3d, 1825, to be found in the 4th volume of the Statutes at Large, page 115. It is entitled, "An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes." I cite it simply on the question of jurisdiction. The 14th section provides, that the trial of all offences which shall be committed upon the high seas or elsewhere, out of the limits of any State or district, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought. The twenty-fifth section of this act repeals all acts, or parts of acts, inconsistent therewith.
Under the act of 1790 a question of construction arose, in the Supreme Court of the United States, as to whether robbery on the high seas was punishable with death. It was settled (3 Wheaton, 610) that the statute did punish robbery with death if committed on the high seas, even though robbery on land might not incur that extreme penalty. I refer to the United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheaton, 610; the United States v. Jones, 3 Washington's Circuit Court Reports, 209; United States v. Howard, Id., 340; 2 Whar. Crim. Law, fifth ed., p. 543.
I have been thus particular in referring to the laws under which this indictment is framed, in order that you may perceive precisely the inquiry which we now have to make. It is, whether the statutory law of the United States has or has not been violated? You have all, undoubtedly, heard more or less of the crime of piracy as generally and popularly understood. A pirate is deemed by the law of nations, and has always been regarded as the enemy of the human race,—as a man who depredates generally and indiscriminately on the commerce of all nations. Whether or not the crime alleged here is piracy under the law of nations, is not material to the issue. It might well be a question whether, in regard to depredations committed on the high seas, by persons in a foreign vessel, under the acknowledged authority of a foreign country, Congress could effectively declare that to be piracy which is not piracy under the law of nations; but it is not material in this case. Congress is unquestionably empowered to pass laws for the protection of our national commerce and for the punishment of those who prey upon it. Congress has done so in the statutes to which I have referred. If the words "pirate and felon" were stricken out from the act of 1790, and if the statutes simply read that any person committing robbery on the high seas should suffer death, the law would be complete, and could be administered without reference to what constitutes piracy by the law of nations.
Having thus referred to the statutory law under which this indictment was found, I will state as succinctly as possible, with due regard to fullness, fairness, and completeness, the facts in this case. In the middle or latter part of May, 1861, a number of persons in the city of Charleston, South Carolina, conceived the purpose of purchasing or employing a vessel to cruise on the Atlantic with the object of depredating on the commerce of the United States. They proceeded to the fulfillment of that design by procuring persons willing to act as captain, officers, and crew of such piratical vessel. This there was at first considerable difficulty in effecting, and it was not until many men were thrown out of employment in Charleston, by the acts of South