The Bay State Monthly. Volume 2, No. 6, March, 1885. Various
in the morning, stretched out from Pittsburg Landing nearly to the Purdy Road, with General Sherman's division on the right, within about a mile of that road.
2nd. That General Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, not more than five miles from Pittsburg Landing; it being then uncertain which of the two would be the objective of attack.
3d. That General Grant visited General Wallace at Crump's Landing and ordered him to hold his command subject to orders, and then steamed onward to Pittsburg Landing.
4th. That before 6 o'clock, A.M., the sound of firing had led General Wallace to put his command under arms; and he was prepared to move wherever active work should demand, even before he was ordered to be thus ready.
5th. That he concentrated his brigades, then in three camps, into one mass, at the forks of the Purdy Road and the road to Pittsburg Landing, so that he might take either road, as orders should decide.
6th. That he understood the original line of battle and the disposition of its divisions, and knew that General Sherman held the right.
7th. That the order received by him, before 12 o'clock, M., from Captain Baxter, staff officer of General Grant, was in writing; and while pronounced verbally, at first, the form it assumed, when reduced to writing and subsequently delivered to General Wallace, was a direct order to "unite with the right," and that involved the march on the Purdy Road.
If the verbal order of General Grant to Captain Baxter, to hasten General Wallace's Division to Pittsburg Landing, was reduced to writing by that officer, after he noticed the early success of the Union Line, he would have shaped the approach of the fresh division to the best possible advantage, to join the army, not the precise Landing, if the army was not there; since General Grant, still being on crutches from a sprained ankle when his horse fell under and upon him, on the fourth, was compelled to depend largely upon staff-officers for judicious action, in exigencies which fell under their eyes, and where his riding was greatly limited. There is full harmony of events, by giving full credit to all the data which seem, at first, to work conflict.
8th. That the Staff Officer who delivered the order assured General Wallace and his staff that the Federal line was successful and driving the enemy at every point.
9th. That a movement at that time, toward Pittsburg Landing, would have taken General Wallaces' Division out of possible contact with the enemy, instead of supporting, and perfecting victory.
10th. That when the Division of General Wallace moved, as it did, within ten minutes after receipt of the orders, "impatiently waited for," it could see the distant smoke and hear the roar of battle, and moved directly toward the point of danger by the shortest route, with the greatest celerity and in harmony with the order received.
11th. That the defeat of the main army, the enforced retirement of Sherman's Division, and, in fact, the withdrawal of the entire original line, were new conditions, to be considered, when other Staff Officers notified General Wallace of the same; and then, the addition of his division to the rallying army, at Pittsburg Landing, seemed to be an important element to the very safety of that army, except as it could lean upon the divisions of Buel, already within supporting distance.
12th. That the original advance of General Wallace's Division on the Purdy Road, while thoroughly suited to the original conditions as they existed when the order was delivered to him, was, of necessity, useless and dangerous, when he found himself alone and unsupported, and that the enemy had already swept over the position which he expected to occupy.
13th. That there was no alternative, then, but to pass around the left of the enemy, and rejoin the army, at such expense of time or labor as the new conditions imposed; and that this was done, at great pains and with great celerity, without straggling or loss.
14th. That the prominent idea of withdrawing General Wallace's Division from Crump's Landing, to support the main army in its advance, is to be kept in mind;—whereby, confusion ceases as to the hour of the day when the order to report at Pittsburg Landing was delivered or became operative;—thereby, also, reconciling memories with the incidents of the day, with no discredit to any.
15th. That every theory of supporting an advanced line, from reserves sent forward from the base, must so bend to facts, that it may be the best thing possible, to strengthen the right of a successful line, even to overlapping and turning the enemy; and that such a movement has the emphatic endorsement of standard critics, and marked experience; while a formal movement to the rear, in order to move to the front and the right, as if on parade, would, under conditions such as presented to General Wallace, have been, simply, to wear out his men in marching, with small chance for taking any part in the assumed pursuit of a defeated enemy.
16th. That it is an unsound way of dealing with the facts of history, to gauge the responsibilities of officers and men, of small experience, by the rules which apply to the same officers and men after their experience has matured; and that, when the battle of Shiloh took place, and citizen regiments took part, with very slight knowledge of arms, it was equally true, that the officers themselves, both regular and volunteer, were proportionately unfamiliar with battle action on a large scale, and that, as a matter of fact, the Generals and Colonels, for the most part, had never seen a batallion drill, unless at West Point, much less drilled more than a company; and their conduct and opinions, in 1861-2, are not to be measured by the ripened experience of the years succeeding and succeeding years of reflection.
And finally, that the orders, movements, and results of the sixth day of April, 1862, must be judged by their relations to the passing hours and issues of that day, as practical men would act under changing conditions, and not by any formal order, which, however appropriate at one time, would, at any other time, defeat the work in hand. The Rules of Evidence, recognized by Civil and Military Courts alike, are but expressions of sound judgment of past experience; and Military Science, so called, has no other basis than that which belongs to the wise use of means to ends in all applied science and in all human endeavor. Whenever, therefore, the conduct of a battle is consistent with the conditions, as at the time understood, it is not exactly just to measure it by the terms of any instructions inconsistent with those conditions;—so that while an order to march to Pittsburg Landing became necessary upon the retirement of the original line, it ought not to be technically applied back to a time when that line was supposed to be sweeping on to victory and only sought fresh strength to mature that victory.
That a general action was precipitated by the Confederate forces under General Albert Sidney Johnson and was in the nature of a successful surprise of the Union Army, is the fact which harmonizes the reports of officers of both armies with the incidents of the day, and fairly distributes responsibility, without reflecting the narrow escape of the Union Army from destruction upon any single officer or command; especially, where all did so well, and so much is to be credited to the fall of General Johnson and the interruption of his deliberate plan, first to surprise, and then sweep on to victory, at whatever cost.
The Documents are as follows:
1st. Letter of Major General Lew Wallace to General U.S. Grant, February 26, 1869.
2nd. Letter of Lieutenant Colonel Ross, A.D.C. to General Wallace, January 25, 1868.
3rd. Letter of General J.A. Strickland to General Wallace, January 24, 1868.
4th. Letter of General G.F. McGinnis to General Wallace, February 20, 1868.
5th. Letter of General Fred. Knefler to General Wallace, February 19, 1868.
6th. Letter of Captain Ad Ware, A.D.C., to General Wallace (without date).
7th. Letter of General John M. Thayer to General Wallace, March 4, 1868.
8th. Letter of General U.S. Grant to General Wallace, March 10, 1868, commenting upon the letters cited and suggesting their publication, in justice to General Wallace.
The map of the Compte de Paris has been utilized. 1, 2 and 3 give location of Wallace's Brigades in line, perpendicular to the river, with right at Adamsville (3), 2. Concentration of Division. 4. Crossing at Snake creek to take the right of General Sherman. 4-5. Countermarch to lower crossing after retirement of the right. 6. Lower crossing which had for several