The Kantian Ethics: Metaphysics of Morals, The Critique of Practical Reason & Perpetual Peace. Immanuel Kant
much by their different Duties, as rather by the difference of the Legislation which connects the one or the other kind of motive with their Laws.
Ethical Legislation is that which cannot be external, although the Duties it prescribes may be external as well as internal. Juridical Legislation is that which may also be external. Thus it is an external duty to keep a promise entered into by Contract; but the injunction to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard to any other motive, belongs exclusively to the internal Legislation. It does not belong thus to the ethical sphere as being a particular kind of duty or a particular mode of action to which we are bound,—for it is an external duty in Ethics as well as in Jurisprudence,—but it is because the Legislation in the case referred to is internal, and cannot have an external Lawgiver, that the Obligation is reckoned as belonging to Ethics. For the same reason, the Duties of Benevolence, although they are external Duties as Obligations to external actions, are, in like manner, reckoned as belonging to Ethics, because they can only be enjoined by Legislation that is internal.—Ethics has no doubt its own peculiar Duties,—such as those towards oneself,—but it has also Duties in common with Jurisprudence, only not under the same mode of Obligation. In short, the peculiarity of Ethical Legislation is to enjoin the performance of certain actions merely because they are Duties, and to make the Principle of Duty itself—whatever be its source or occasion—the sole sufficing motive of the activity of the Will. Thus, then, there are many ethical Duties that are directly such; and the inner Legislation also makes the others—all and each of them—indirectly Ethical.
The Deduction of the Division of a System is the proof of its completeness as well as of its continuity, so that there may be a logical transition from the general conception divided to the members of the Division, and through the whole series of the subdivisions without any break or leap in the arrangement (divisio per saltum). Such a Division is one of the most difficult conditions for the architect of a System to fulfil. There is even some doubt as to what is the highest Conception that is primarily divided into Right and Wrong (aut fas aut nefas). It is assuredly the conception of the activity of the Free-will in general. In like manner, the expounders of Ontology start from 'Something' and 'Nothing,' without perceiving that these are already members of a Division for which the highest divided conception is awanting, and which can be no other than that of 'Thing' in general.
General Divisions of the Metaphysics of Morals
I.
Division of the Metaphysic of Morals as a System of Duties generally.
1. All Duties are either Duties of Right, that is, Juridical Duties (Officia Juris), or Duties of Virtue, that is, Ethical Duties (Officia Virtutis s. ethica). Juridical Duties are such as may be promulgated by external Legislation; Ethical Duties are those for which such legislation is not possible. The reason why the latter cannot be properly made the subject of external Legislation is because they relate to an End or final purpose, which is itself, at the same time, embraced in these Duties, and which it is a Duty for the individual to have as such. But no external Legislation can cause any one to adopt a particular intention, or to propose to himself a certain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act of the mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such a mental condition may be commanded, without its being implied that the individual will of necessity make them an End to himself.
But why, then, it may be asked, is the Science of Morals or Moral Philosophy, commonly entitled—especially by Cicero—the Science of Duty and not also the Science of Right, since Duties and Rights refer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own Freedom—from which all Moral Laws and consequently all Rights as well as all Duties arise—only through the Moral Imperative, which is an immediate injunction of Duty; whereas the conception of Right as a ground of putting others under Obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it.
2. In the Doctrine of Duty, Man may and ought to be represented in accordance with the nature of his faculty of Freedom, which is entirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purely according to his Humanity as a Personality independent of physical determinations (homo noumenon), in distinction from the same person as a Man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hence the conceptions of Right and End when referred to Duty, in view of this twofold quality, give the following Division:—
I. Juridical Duties to: Perfect Duty.Oneself I. The Right of Humanity in our own Person (Juridical Duties towards Oneself)Others II. The Right of Mankind in others (Juridical Duties towards Others)
II. Ethical Duties to: Imperfect Duty.Oneself III. The End of Humanity in our Person (Ethical Duties towards Oneself).Others IV. The End of Mankind in Others (Ethical Duties towards Others).
II.
Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to Relations of Obligation.
As the Subjects between whom a relation of Right to Duty is apprehended—whether it actually exist or not—admit of being conceived in various juridical relations to each other, another Division may be proposed from this point of view, as follows:—
DIVISION possible according to the Subjective Relation of those who bind under Obligations, and those who are bound under Obligations.
| 1. | 2. |
| The juridical Relation of Man to Beings who have neither Right nor Duty. Vacat.—There is no such Relation. For such Beings are irrational, and they neither put us under Obligation, nor can we be put under Obligation by them. | The juridical Relation of Man to Beings who have both Rights and Duties. Adest.—There is such a Relation. For it is the Relation of Men to Men. |
| 3. | 4. |
| The juridical Relation of Man to Beings who have only Duties and no Rights. Vacat.—There is no such Relation. For such Beings would be Men without juridical Personality, as Slaves or Bondsmen. | The juridical Relation of Man to a Being who has only Rights and no Duties—(God). Vacat.—There is no such Relation in mere Philosophy, because such a Being is not an object of possible experience. |
A real relation between Right and Duty is therefore found, in this scheme, only in No. 2. The reason why such is not likewise found in No. 4 is, because it would constitute a transcendent Duty, that is, one to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and capable of imposing Obligation. Consequently the Relation from the theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a Relation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves. But the conception of this object is not entirely empty. On the contrary, it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and the maxims of our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practice generally. And it is in this bearing, that all the Duty involved and practicable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies.
III.
Division of the Metaphysic of Morals.
as a System of Duties generally.
According to the constituent Principles and the Method of the System.