The Prince. Никколо Макиавелли
on the other side colonies are useful. Moreover, he who is in a province of a different constitution, as is said before, ought to make himself head and protector of his inferior neighbours, and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said province with as much power as he; for it will always happen that somebody or other will be invited by the malcontents, either out of ambition or fear. This is visible in the Etolians, who brought the Romans into Greece, who were never admitted into any province but by the temptation of the natives. The common method in such cases is this: as soon as a foreign potentate enters into a province, those who are weaker or disobliged join themselves with him out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect of these inferior lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gained, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the State that is conquered. Only the conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong, nor be entrusted with too much authority, and then he can easily with his own forces and their assistance keep down the greatness of his neighbours, and make himself absolute arbiter in that province. And he who acts not this part prudently shall quickly lose what he has got, and even whilst he enjoys it be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The Romans in their new conquests observed this course, they planted their colonies, entertained the inferior lords into their protection without increasing their power; they kept under such as were more potent, and would not suffer any foreign prince to have interest among them. I will set down only Greece for an example. The Etolians and Achaians were protected, the kingdom of the Macedonians was depressed and Antiochus driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the Achaians and Etolians could never procure them any increase of authority, nor the persuasions and applications of Philip induce the Romans to be his friends till he was overcome, nor the power of Antiochus prevail with them to consent that he should retain any sovereignty in that province: for the Romans acted in that case as all wise princes ought to do who are to have an eye not only upon present but future incommodities, and to redress them with all possible industry; for dangers that are seen afar off are easily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unseasonable and the malady incurable. And it falls out in this case, as the physicians say of an hectic fever, that at first it is easily cured and hard to be known, but in process of time, not being observed or resisted in the beginning, it becomes easy to be known but very difficult to be cured. So it is in matters of state, things which are discovered at a distance—which is done only by prudent men—produce little mischief but what is easily averted; but when through ignorance or inadvertency they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable. The Romans, therefore, foreseeing their troubles afar off, opposed themselves in time, and never swallowed any injury to put off a war, for they knew that war was not avoided but deferred thereby, and commonly with advantage to the enemy; wherefore they chose rather to make war upon Philip, and Antiochus in Greece, than suffer them to invade Italy; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either; they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the mouths of our new politicians “to enjoy the present benefit of time,” but preferred the exercise of their courage and wisdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to France, and examine if what was there done was conformable to what is prescribed here; and to this purpose I shall not speak of Charles VIII but of Louis XII, as of a prince whose conduct and affairs (by reason his possession was longer in Italy) were more conspicuous, and you shall see how contrary he acted in everything that was necessary for the keeping of so different a State. This Louis was invited into Italy by the Venetians, who had an ambition to have got half Lombardy by his coming. I will not condemn the expedition, nor blame the counsels of that King for being desirous of footing in Italy, and having no allies left in that country, but all doors shut against him (upon the ill-treatment which his predecessor Charles had used towards them) he was constrained to take his friends where he could find them, and that resolution would have been lucky enough had he not miscarried in his other administration; for he had no sooner subdued Lombardy but he recovered all the reputation and dignity that was lost by King Charles. Genoa submitted, Florence courted his friendship, the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madam de Furli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesoro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino; the Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity; then the Venetians began to consider and reflect upon their indiscretion, who, to gain two towns in Lombardy, had made the King of France master of two-thirds of all Italy. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the said king might have kept up his reputation in that country if he had observed the rules aforesaid and protected his friends, who being numerous, and yet weak and fearful (some of the Pope, and some of the Venetians), were always under a necessity of standing by him, and with their assistance he might easily have secured himself against any competitor whatever. But he was no sooner in Milan but he began to prevaricate and send supplies to Pope Alexander to put him in possession of Romagna, not considering that thereby he weakened himself and disobliged his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms, and aggrandized the Church by adding to its spiritual authority (which was so formidable before) so great a proportion of temporal; and having committed one error, he was forced to proceed so far as to put a stop to the ambition of Pope Alexander, and hinder his making himself master of Tuscany; the said Louis was forced into Italy again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the Church and deserted his friends, but out of an ardent desire to the kingdom of Naples he shared it with the King of Spain; so that whereas before he was sole umpire in Italy, he now entertained a partner, to whom the ambitious of that province and his own malcontents might repair upon occasion; and whereas the King of that kingdom might have been made his pensioner, he turned out him to put in another that might be able to turn out himself. It is very obvious, and no more than natural, for princes to desire to extend their dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to achieve they are applauded, at least not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compass it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.
If France, then, with its own forces alone, had been able to have enterprised upon Naples, it ought to have been done; but if her own private strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the division of Lombardy, to which he consented with the Venetian, was excusable, it was because done to get footing in Italy; but this partition of Naples with the King of Spain is extremely to be condemned, because not pressed or quickened by such necessity as the former. Louis therefore committed five faults in this expedition. He ruined the inferior lords; he augmented the dominion of a neighbour prince; he called in a foreigner as puissant as himself; he neglected to continue there in person; and planted no colonies—all which errors might have been no inconvenience whilst he had lived, had he not been guilty of a sixth, and that was depressing the power of the Venetian. If indeed he had not sided with the Church, nor brought the Spaniards into Italy, it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the Venetian; but pursuing his first resolutions, he ought not to have suffered them to be ruined, because whilst the Venetian strength was entire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon Lombardy, to which the Venetian would never have consented, unless upon condition it might have been delivered to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from France to have given it to them; and to have contended with them both nobody would have had the courage. If it be urged that King Louis gave up Romagna to the Pope, and the kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain, to evade a war, I answer, as before, that a present mischief is not to be suffered to prevent a war, for the war is not averted but protracted, and will follow with greater disadvantage.
If the King’s faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprise for him be objected, and that he did it to recompense the dissolution of his marriage, and the cap which at his intercession his Holiness had conferred upon the Legate of Amboise, I refer them for an answer to what I shall say hereafter about the faith of a prince, how far it obliges. So then King Louis lost Lombardy because he did not observe one of those rules which others have followed with success in the conquest of provinces, and in their desire to keep them; nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reason. To this purpose, I remember I was once in discourse with the Cardinal d’Amboise at Nantes, at the time when Valentino (for so Cæsar