The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha. Madhava
target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_c8c2bc50-2065-5078-bc9b-649d8bf5dc8f">[8] Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.
[9] I take kaṇa as here equal to the Bengali kunṛ. Cf. Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. Aśváḥ kaṇá gávas taṇḍulá maśakás tusháḥ.
[10] See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.
[11] I.e., personality and fatness, &c.
[12] I read dehe for dehaḥ.
[13] Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance (vyápti)."
[14] For the sandigdha and niśchita upádhi see Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.
[15] Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire).
[16] The attributes of the class are not always found in every member—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.
[17] See Sáhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and Siddhánta-M., p. 80.
[18] The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument.
[19] "Upamána or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.
[20] The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true vyápti, there is, of course, no upádhi.
[21] 'Αντιστρἑφει (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A with distributed predicate.
[22] If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upádhi "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" would serve as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi, to establish the vyabhichára fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted clause excludes it, as an upádhi must be consistent with either party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyáyika maintains that "being produced" always accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upádhi "the nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi "the not causing audition," i.e., the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.
[23] This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanáchárya, "where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (i.e., universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as e.g., to prove the existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term is thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many another, difficulty in the Sarva-darśana-śaṅgraha to my old friend and teacher, Paṇḍit Maheśa Chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College.
[24] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist system infra, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.
[25] Adṛishṭa, i.e., the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.
[26] This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. 209.
[27] Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aśwamedha rites, see Wilson's Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.
[28] Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be handled in the rites."
CHAPTER II.
THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.
At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly been said—
"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases."[29]
On