A Manual of Ancient History. A. H. L. Heeren
had actually made an attempt to enslave Carthage. The object of the institution was no doubt attained; but in later times the council assumed to itself a power which increased its evils. to absolute despotism. It is not improbable that this court likewise constituted the select committee (the γερουσία) of the senate.
Finances of Carthage.
Tributes from the African federates:
Sardinia, etc.
the Syrtic hordes:
dues and customs:
mines.
10. Our information respecting the financial system of the Carthaginians is extremely meagre. The following seem to have been the principal sources of the public revenue. 1. The tribute drawn from the federate cities, and their African subjects. The former paid in money, the latter for the most part in kind; this tribute was imposed at the will of the government, so that in pressing cases the taxed nations were obliged to give one half of their income. 2. The case was the same with their external provinces, particularly with Sardinia. 3. The tribute furnished by the nomad hordes, partly by those in the Regio-Syrtica, and occasionally also by those on the western side. 4. The customs, which were levied with extreme rigour, not only in Carthage, but likewise in all the colonies. 5. The products of their rich mines, particularly those of Spain. In considering the financial system of the Carthaginians, it should not be forgotten that many of the nations with whom they traded, or who served in their armies, were unacquainted with the use of money.
Trade of Carthage:
11. System and extent of their commerce. Their object was to secure a monopoly of the western trade; hence the practice of restricting the growth of their colonies, and of removing as much as possible all strangers from their commercial marts. Their trade was carried on partly by sea to Britain and the Guinea coast; by sea, and partly by land. Their sea trade, arising from the colonies, extended beyond the Mediterranean, certainly as far as the coasts of Britain and Guinea. Their land trade was carried on by caravans, consisting principally of the nomad tribes resident between the Syrtes: the by land to the interior of Africa. caravans travelled eastward to Ammonium and Upper Egypt, southward to the land of the Garamantes, (Fezzan,) and even still further into the interior of Africa.
SECOND PERIOD.
From the breaking out of the wars with Syracuse, to the commencement of those with Rome, BC 480—264.
Views of Carthage upon Sicily.
1. The great object of Carthaginian policy during the whole of the above period, was to subdue Sicily; this object the nation pursued with extraordinary pertinacity, often approximating to, but never obtaining, complete success. The growing power of Syracuse, which likewise aimed at the sole possession of the island, laid the foundation of that national hatred which now arose between the Sicilian Greeks and the Carthaginians.
rout at Himera by Gelon, BC 480.
2. First attempt, arising out of the league formed with Xerxes I. upon his irruption into Greece. Gelon of Syracuse, in a victory more decisive even than that gained by Themistocles over the Persians at Salamis, routs the Carthaginians near Himera, and compels them to accede to a disgraceful peace.
General extension of the Carthaginian empire in Africa, 480—410.
3. This defeat was followed by a period of tranquillity lasting seventy years, during which we know little about Carthage. All that we can say with any probability is, that in the mean time the struggle for territory between Cyrene and Carthage commenced and terminated to the advantage of the latter state, whose dominion was generally extended and confirmed in Africa by wars with the aboriginal tribes.
War in Sicily renewed, 410.
4. But the accession of Dionysius I. to the throne of Syracuse, and the ambitious project formed by him and his successors, of subjecting to their rule all Sicily and Magna-Grecia, rekindled once more the embers of war, which had only smouldered for a short time, to burst forth with additional violence.
Repeated and bloody wars with Dionysius I. between the years 410—368. Neither party able to expel the other: terms of the last peace; that each party should remain in possession of what he then occupied. Second commercial treaty with Rome.
Crafty advantage taken by the Carthaginians of the internal commotions at Syracuse during and subsequent to the reign of Dionysius II: they endeavour to obtain their end; but are thwarted by the heroism of Timoleon, 345—340.
A new and frightful war with Agathocles, the seat of which is transferred from Sicily into Africa itself; it at last terminates in favour of Carthage, 311—307.
The war with Pyrrhus, 277—275, whose ambition gave rise to an alliance between Carthage and Rome, contributed likewise to increase the preponderance of the Carthaginians in Sicily; and probably the perseverance of that people, and their skill in profiting by circumstances, would at last have enabled them to attain their object, had not the seeds of war been thereby scattered between Carthage and Rome.
Two attempts at revolution. 340; 308.
Excellent state of the Carthaginian finances at the beginning of the first Punic war.
5. What effect these Sicilian wars had upon the state we are not informed. They were probably regarded in Carthage as a beneficial channel for carrying off the popular fermentation;—nevertheless, two attempts, both unsuccessful, were made by some of the aristocratical party, to overthrow the constitution; first by Hanno, 340, and afterwards by Bomilcar, 308.—At the breaking out, however, of the war with Rome, the commonwealth was so formidable and mighty, that even the finances of the state do not appear to have been at all affected; a circumstance of the highest importance. What consequence was it to Carthage whether 100,000 barbarians more or less existed in the world, so long as there remained plenty of men willing to suffer themselves to be sold, and she possessed money to purchase them?
THIRD PERIOD.
From the beginning of the wars with Rome, to the downfal of Carthage, BC 264—146.
Causes of the Punic wars.
1. The wars between Carthage and Rome were the necessary consequences of a desire of aggrandizement in two conquering nations; any one might have foreseen the struggle between the two rivals as soon as their conquests should once begin to clash. It is, therefore, a question of little importance, to enquire which was the aggressor; and although Rome may not be entirely cleared of that charge, we cannot help observing that, according to the principles of sound policy, the security of Italy was hardly compatible with the sole dominion of the Carthaginians over the island of Sicily.
First war with Rome, 264—241, (twenty-three years,) waged for the possession of Sicily, and decided almost at its commencement by Hiero's passing over to the Roman side. (For the history of it, see below, in the Roman history, Book V. Period ii, parag. 2 sq.)
Fatal consequences of the first Punic war to Carthage.
2. This war cost the republic, Sicily and the sovereignty of the Mediterranean, by which the fate of its other external possessions was already predetermined. But that which appeared at the first view to threaten the greatest danger, was the total exhaustion of its finances; a circumstance which will no longer surprise us, when we consider how many fleets had been destroyed and replaced, how many armies had been annihilated and renewed. Carthage had never before been engaged in such an obstinate struggle as this; and the immediate consequences were more terrific even than the war itself.
Dreadful civil war, BC 240—237.
3. The impossibility of paying the mercenaries produced a mutiny among the troops, which rapidly grew into a rebellion of the subject nations, who had been most cruelly oppressed during the war. The consequence was a civil war of three years and a half, which probably would have spared the Romans the trouble of destroying Carthage, had not the state been snatched from ruin by the heroism of Hamilcar.
This war, which lasted from 240 to 237, produced lasting