Proceedings of the New York Historical Association [1906]. New York State Historical Association. Meeting
![Proceedings of the New York Historical Association [1906] - New York State Historical Association. Meeting](limg_read866290.jpg "Proceedings of the New York Historical Association [1906] - New York State Historical Association. Meeting")
for political leadership in New York did not strengthen his usefulness in France. It was the breadth of view which distinguished him in the formation of the Union that brought him success as a diplomat. With the map of America spread out before him he handled the Louisiana problem as patriotically as he had argued for a stronger national life, and when, at last, he signed the treaty, he had forever enlarged the geography of his country.
As the American minister to the court of Napoleon, Livingston reached France in November, 1801. President Jefferson had already heard a rumor of the retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to France, and had given it little heed. He had cheerfully acquiesced in Spain's occupation of New Orleans, and after its retrocession to France he talked pleasantly of securing West Florida through French influence. "Such proof on the part of France of good will toward the United States," he wrote Livingston, in September, 1801, "would contribute to reconcile the latter to France's possession of New Orleans." But when, a year later, a French army, commanded by Leclerc, Napoleon's brother-in-law, had devastated St. Domingo and aroused the hostility of American merchants and ship-masters by his arbitrary treatment, Jefferson sensed the danger of having Napoleon for a next-door neighbor on the Mississippi. In a moment his tone changed from one of peace to a threat of war. "The cession of Louisianan to France," he declared, in a letter to Livingston, April 16, 1802, "works most sorely on the United States. There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans. France, placing herself in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."
In his anxiety the President also instructed Madison, his Secretary of State, to write Pinckney, the American minister at Madrid, to guarantee to Spain, if it had not already parted with its title, peaceable possession of Louisiana beyond the Mississippi, on condition of its ceding to the United States the territory, including New Orleans, on the east side. As the year wore on, however, and Leclerc's death followed his report of his losses, Jefferson became much easier, advising Livingston that French possession of Louisiana would not be "important enough to risk a breach of the peace." But before the ink had time to dry, almost simultaneously with the death of Leclerc, came the news, through Governor Claiborne of the Territory of Mississippi, that the Spanish Intendent had forbidden Americans the right to deposit their merchandise at New Orleans. This was a stunning blow to the President. The treaty of 1795 stipulated that the King of Spain would "permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the Port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence, without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores, and his majesty promises either to continue this permission if he find during that time it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or, if he should not agree to continue it thus, he will assign to them on another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establishment." That the three years' limitation had expired during President Adams' administration without the right being extended or its equivalent established, did not help Jefferson out of his difficulty, since the Kentucky and Tennessee settlers were already cleaning their flintlocks on the theory that it was easier to drive out a few Spaniards than to dislodge a French army after it had fortified. This was good reasoning if Louisiana was to be taken by force. But Jefferson, even when writing threatening letters, had no thought of war. "Peace is our passion," he wrote Sir John Sinclair, and in the presence of threatening hostilities he did nothing to prepare for war. His message to Congress, which opened a few days after the reception of Claiborne's dispatch, made no mention of the New Orleans trouble. He talked about everything else, but of what everybody else was talking about the President said nothing. The western settlers, vitally interested in a depot of deposit at New Orleans, resented such apparent apathy, and by resolutions and legislative action encouraged the federalists to talk so loudly for war that the President, alarmed at the condition of the public mind, sent James Monroe's name to the Senate as minister extraordinary to France and Spain. On January 13, 1803, the day of Monroe's confirmation, Jefferson hastened to write him, explaining what he had done and why he had acted. "The agitation of the public mind on occasion of the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans," said he, "is extreme. In the western country it is natural and grounded on honest motives; in the seaports it proceeds from a desire for war, which increases the mercantile lottery; among federalists generally, and especially those of Congress, the object is to force us into war if possible, in order to derange our finances; or, if this cannot be done, to attach the western country to them as to their best friends, and thus get again into power. Remonstrances, memorials, etc., are now circulating through the whole of the western country, and signed by the body of the people. The measures we have been pursuing, being invisible, do not satisfy their minds. Something sensible, therefore, is necessary."
This "sensible something" was Monroe's appointment, which "has already silenced the federalists," continued the President. "Congress will no longer be agitated by them; and the country will become calm as fast as the information extends over it."
The better to support Monroe, Madison explained to Pichon, the French minister in Washington, the necessity for the undivided possession of New Orleans, claiming that it had no sort of interest for France, while the United States had no interest in extending its population to the right bank, since such emigration would tend to weaken the state and to slacken the concentration of its forces. "In spite of affinities in manners and languages," said the Secretary of State, "no colony beyond the river could exist under the same government, but would infallibly give birth to a separate state, having in its bosom germs of collision with the east, the easier to develop in proportion to the very affinities between the two empires."
This explained the true attitude of Jefferson and Madison. They did not seek territory west of the Mississippi. Their thought centered in the purchase of New Orleans; it was the "one spot on the globe, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy;" France's possession of it "must marry us to the British fleet and nation;" upon it "every eye in the United States is now fixed;" to gain it Pinckney was charged "to guarantee to Spain the peaceable possession of the territory beyond the Mississippi;" in Madison's opinion "the boundary line between the United States and Louisiana should be the Mississippi;" according to his theory "no colony beyond the Mississippi could exist under the same government with that on the east side;" nor did the United States have any interest in building up a colony beyond the Mississippi. In other words, Jefferson saw only New Orleans; he wanted only New Orleans and peace; and to get the one and keep the other, Monroe was sent to Paris to secure "our rights and interests in the river Mississippi and in the territories eastward thereof."
In the meantime Livingston had taken a different view. It is not clear that he appreciated the future value of the great northwest more than did Jefferson or Madison, but in his argument for the purchase of New Orleans he had included in his request nine-tenths of the territory now known as the Louisiana Purchase. Singularly enough Livingston's letter happened to be addressed to Talleyrand, Napoleon's Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the very day Monroe's name went to the United States Senate for confirmation, and although the latter's instructions limited negotiations to the east bank of the Mississippi, Livingston's argument included the west bank. "Presuming," he writes Talleyrand, "that the Floridas are in the hands of France, I shall predicate what I have to offer upon that presumption. France can have but three objects in the possession of Louisiana and Florida: The first is the command of the Gulf; second, the supply of her islands; third, an outlet for the people, if her European population should be too great for her territory."
"Having treated this subject more at large in a paper which you have had the goodness to read," Livingston continued, "I will not dwell upon it here; but propose what it appears to be the true, policy of France to adopt, as affecting all her objects, and at the same time conciliating the affections of the United States, giving a permanency to her establishments, which she can in no other way hope for. First, let France cede to the United States so much of Louisiana as lays above the mouth of the river Arkansas. By this a barrier will be placed between the colony of France and Canada, from which she may, otherwise, be attacked with the greatest facility, and driven out before she can derive any aid from Europe. Let her possess Florida as far