Hybrid. Ruth Colker
the implications of a bi perspective are not monolithic. A bi perspective on sexual orientation and gender may be very different from a bi perspective on race and disability. An individual who identifies as a bisexual may only be making a statement about her feelings. If she has not formed sexual relations with people of both biological sexes during her lifetime, she is not making a statement about actions. In other cases, it may reflect a statement about her actions. In virtually no case will a bisexual identity reflect a statement about her discernable physical appearance or family history.
Similarly, a bi perspective on gender usually reflects a statement about feelings or attitudes. Embracing a “bi” identity often means that one rejects or questions the traits that are considered “normal” for one’s biological sex. A bi perspective on gender may also reflect a statement about actions. A person may cross-dress, pursue a nontraditional occupation, or even have surgery to align one’s biological self with one’s psychological self. These actions or traits may also make an individual visually discernable as transgendered, although many individuals who are transgendered “pass” as fitting one pole of the bipolar categorization scheme.
By contrast, a bi perspective on race may not correspond to any particular feelings, attitudes, or life experiences. In some cases, such as that of Scales-Trent, one may be light skinned and appear “white” but identify as black because both of one’s parents are black. Society may view Scales-Trent as multiracial or even white because of her appearance, yet she self-identifies as black. Like some multiracial individuals, Scales-Trent may easily “pass” as belonging to one pole of the bipolar categorization scheme. Some of these individuals have a strong self-identity of being multiracial, and resent society trying to force them into the categories of black or white. Nonetheless, most individuals who have multiracial family histories prefer to be considered members of a monolithic racial category such as “black.” Being multiracial can therefore be a statement about identity or can simply be a statement about one’s ancestry. Often, it is physically indiscernible and may be unknown to the individual herself.
There is no parallel social movement for individuals who are between categories of disability. There is not even a label for this category. Thus, it is hard to argue that lying between categories can be a source of identity. In some cases, however, individuals who lie between disability categories have received public attention as “unworthy” of being considered disabled. For example, in one Wall Street Journal article, reporter Heather MacDonald questioned why mental impairments, drug addiction and alcoholism, and learning disabilities should be labeled as “disabilities” under the Social Security Act, because individuals with these disabilities purportedly “choose” or fabricate these impairments for financial gain. In a broadscale critique of “learning disorders,” she reports that “stories abound of parents coaching their kids to misbehave in school or fail their tests ... to ensure that they will fall back several grades and thus fail the ‘age-appropriate’ test”39 so that their parents can receive a monetary windfall. Her claim that “stories abound” of parents coaching their kids to misbehave is seemingly based on one isolated story from Wynne, Arkansas. Nowhere does she mention that most children only receive money to pay for designated medical and educational needs to specified providers.40 By disputing that these children have any genuine disabilities and by promoting the stereotype that their parents coerce their children into appearing disabled for money, Mac-Donald heightens the mistreatment of individuals who fit between the categories able-bodied and disabled. Her article highlights the need for us to recognize the category of people who are somewhat disabled yet do not fit the stereotype of the “truly disabled” in order to make sure that they are receiving assistance in the face of public criticism like that of MacDonald.
One purpose of MacDonald’s article was to criticize the Supreme Court decision, Sullivan v. Zebley,41 in which the Court concluded that the Social Security Administration had too restrictive a definition of “disability” for the purpose of determining whether a child qualified for Supplemental Social Security. The Social Security Administration’s definition failed to include such obviously disabling impairments as spina bifida, Down’s syndrome, muscular dystrophy, autism, AIDS, infant drug dependency, and fetal alcohol syndrome.42 Plaintiff Brian Zebley had been denied SSI despite the fact that he had congenital brain damage, mental retardation, development delay, eye problems, and musculoskeletal impairment, because his problems did not meet or equal any single disability category.43 The Supreme Court required the Social Security Administration to move to a more functional approach so that children who fell between discrete categories, and combined categories of disabilities could be covered by SSI. MacDonald’s broadside would leave such children unprotected by federal law.
The New York Times also published a critique of special education programs for children diagnosed as learning disabled but, unlike the Wall Street Journal, chose to attack a program at one of New York’s elite private schools.44 In that article, the schools and parents were not criticized for trying to get a free financial windfall from the government; instead, the parents were criticized for going along with researchers who told them that their children had learning disabilities. The parents of the children in the elite school often supplemented the free special education that was offered to their children with additional special education. In their case, the diagnosis of a learning disability was costly. The combination of the Wall Street Journal and New York Times stories suggest that parents of all classes want educational and medical assistance for their children with disabilities. The skepticism displayed by the Wall Street Journal and New York Times suggests that schools and parents are wise to devote whatever resources are available to solving these problems since mainstream society is unlikely to empathize with their children’s problems. These children do not appear to be “truly disabled” yet need our assistance because they fit into an unnamed middle category.
A bi perspective therefore provides us with different insights on race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability. The implications of living between categories also varies enormously within categories. A bi perspective requires that we be very attentive to context. Nonetheless, openly transcending categories makes a difference, one worth exploring.
III. The Critical Aspects of a Bi Perspective
Critical theorists have offered arguments parallel to, yet different from, my bi perspective. Angela Harris and Kimberlé Crenshaw have questioned how feminists have historically used the word “woman” to mean “white woman” and how civil rights activists have used the word “black” to apply to all persons with any African-American heritage.45 They have also questioned how judges have tried to force African-American plaintiffs in discrimination lawsuits to fit the category “woman” or “black” without considering the intersections of race and gender. This is sometimes called “intersectionality” theory. Other critical theorists, such as Scales-Trent, have questioned how lawmakers have created the labels “black” or “colored” to force multiracial individuals to conform to a single racial category.
The Harris and Crenshaw critiques of racial categories are somewhat different from the critique offered by Scales-Trent. Harris and Crenshaw consider how an individual crosses several categories—race, religion, and gender. They accept the fact, however, that such markers as “black” have an intrinsic meaning. They are therefore interested in the special ways in which race, religion, and gender intersect to construct identity. Scales-Trent adds to the discussion by considering the ambiguity of the categorical markers themselves; in particular, she focuses on the ambiguity of racial markers. Scales-Trent’s intersections lie within; they are really intrasections.
The Scales-Trent critique, as opposed to the Crenshaw or Harris views, parallels the bi perspective found in this book, insofar as a bi perspective is an intracategorical perspective rather than an intercategorical perspective. A bi perspective can provide us with special insights that we might attain through an intracategorical perspective that are overlooked in the work of Crenshaw or Harris. Questioning the meaningfulness of the labels that they employ can add to intersectionality theory.
In applying a bi perspective to race, I have asked myself why critical race theorists have not