General Richard Montgomery and the American Revolution. Hal T. Shelton
maintained confidence in their abilities. The British officer corps held no doubt about the effectiveness of its military doctrine and training against any enemy. After all, the renowned reputation of the British army had been established throughout the world as it helped to win an empire upon which the “sun never set.” So, Montgomery received the news that his regiment would participate in the forthcoming operation with great expectation and even exhilaration.
On February 3, 1757, the British government issued orders for the 17th Regiment to march from its garrison at Galway to Cork in Ireland to prepare for overseas deployment. Brig. Gen. Edward Richbell commanded the regiment when Montgomery joined, but he died on February 24, 1757. Richbell’s successor, Col. John Forbes, led the unit during its initial activity. Six other Irish regiments joined the 17th at Cork to await passage abroad.5
All of the units designated for the expedition were foot (infantry) regiments—the backbone of the British army organization. A number of companies made up each regiment, including a company of grenadiers and a light-infantry company. Grenadiers represented the tallest and strongest men in the army, originally selected because they could throw a grenade, or hand bomb, farther than ordinary troops. By this time, none of them actually carried grenades, but they stood out for their physical strength and endurance. The light-infantry troops possessed similar attributes. They could march faster and farther while carrying less supplies than common soldiers. Separate ranger troops, who were specially trained in raiding tactics, were also included in the organization. These three units, then, formed the elite contingent of the army.
The standard-issue individual weapon of foot soldiers was a flintlock musket that weighed twelve pounds and measured four feet nine inches in length. Its nickname, “Brown Bess,” came from the color of the walnut stock. King George I introduced the weapon into the British army in the early 1700s. A thin-bodied triangular-shaped bayonet, fitted to the muzzle, added another fourteen inches and two pounds to the weapon, and might have been its most important component. The musket fired a lead ball three quarters of an inch in diameter (.75 caliber) and weighing one and a half ounces—considerable stopping power even by modern standards.
Yet, the range and accuracy of the musket presented a problem. Because the musket was designed to be loaded expeditiously by its muzzle using a ramrod, the clearance between the bore and the lead ball was not close. This caused much of the propelling power from the exploding powder charge to escape around the ball when the weapon discharged. The muzzle-loading characteristic of the musket limited its maximum effective range from fifty to one hundred yards. Because the musket had a smooth bore, it imparted very little guidance to the ball once it was shot out of the barrel. This unstable trajectory resulted in a relatively inaccurate weapon.
Consequently, the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore musket dictated the tactics that the soldiers armed with it used. Its inaccuracy was reflected in the British manual of arms. There was no command to “aim.” Instead, men were ordered to “level muskets” before firing. To compensate for the lack of accuracy from individual weapons, battlefield maneuvers stressed compact formations from which a wall of massed musket fire could be presented to the enemy. Foot soldiers usually deployed into battle lines three ranks deep. The musket’s restricted range also forced combat into an encounter at close quarters. Trained troops could perform the dozen steps involved in loading and shooting their weapons to lay down a steady two to four rounds per minute. This time-consuming reloading left soldiers vulnerable to return fire and promoted hand-to-hand combat. A volley from the muskets followed immediately by a bayonet charge was the logical battlefield tactic when forces converged in short-range engagements. The shock of cold steel was usually the moment of truth for opposing eighteenth-century field armies. Battles were won or lost by how well foot soldiers stood up to this physical and psychological trial.6
Artillery battalions were highly specialized units that employed cannons in an attempt to give depth to the battlefield by concentrating long-range firepower on enemy troop staging areas or dueling with opposing artillery positions. However, cannons lacked effectiveness during close infantry clashes because of their erratic accuracy and the possibility of inflicting friendly casualties. Supply and transportation difficulties persisted, because cannons consumed huge amounts of shot and powder and were ponderous to move. Thus, most cannonry was employed during more deliberate siege warfare.7 Military planners left British cavalry regiments in the British Isles, where they engaged in ceremonial and internal security tasks. Heavily forested terrain in the North American theater of operations led British strategists to regard it as unsuitable for the use of cavalry tactics. Also, support demands of mounted troops were much more costly to a field command than those of foot soldiers. Maintenance of horses required extensive forage, which created a drain on supply efforts. To conserve shipboard space, higher headquarters even ordered the Irish foot regiments to dispose of their baggage horses before they set sail.8
The seven Irish regiments embarked upon transport vessels at Cork on May 5 for the convoy to North America. These troop ships arrived at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in early July 1757. The French stronghold at Louisbourg on Cape Breton in the Gulf of St. Lawrence emerged as the vital military objective of the British forces. Only after the capture of this fortress could a British offensive be safely sent further up the St. Lawrence River to strike at the heart of New France. The amphibious assault and seizure of Louisbourg, which had been hardened against attack by extensive defensive preparations, hinged on establishing a clear superiority in land and sea forces. By late 1757, this prerequisite military buildup had not yet taken place. The British fleet at Halifax remained inferior to the French naval squadrons that retained command of the sea around Louisbourg.9
Meanwhile, the 17th and other regiments, deployed from both Ireland and England, made use of the time to practice maneuvers that would be employed during the projected confrontation. The combined British force occupied winter quarters at Halifax that year. Command and staff personnel changes also occurred during this interim period. Colonel Forbes became adjutant general of the general staff, leaving Lt. Col. Arthur Morris as acting commander of the 17th Regiment.10
While allowing the Royal Navy to concentrate more of its fleet in North American waters, the British expeditionary force under Gen. James Abercromby finalized its invasion plans. The strategy to be undertaken in America contained three campaigns. First, Gen. Jeffery Amherst with fourteen thousand British regular troops and two thousand provincial soldiers would besiege Louisbourg. Concurrently, Abercromby, aided by Gen. George Howe with ten thousand regulars and twenty thousand provincials, would advance upon Ticonderoga and Crown Point and push forward if possible to Montreal and Quebec. Additionally, nineteen hundred regulars and five thousand provincials were to repair Braddock’s loss and wrest Fort Duquesne from the French. Forbes, who received a promotion to brigadier general, led this last operation.11
By the spring of 1758, the British had amassed enough military resources to put their war plan into action. The French garrison at Louisbourg numbered three thousand regulars and some five hundred Swiss mercenaries, Canadians, and Indians. In addition, six ships of the line and five frigates in the harbor guarded the fortress. The British force at Halifax, consisting of eleven regular and two provincial regiments totaling 13,142 troops, was over three times greater than that of the French in Louisbourg. The Royal Navy component amounted to twenty-three ships of the line and thirteen frigates.12
An imposing fleet of 155 warships and troop transports put to sea from Halifax on the evening of May 28, 1758. By June 2, the British armada reached an anchorage about seven miles from Louisbourg, but five days of dense fog and stormy weather frustrated subsequent plans to land. Finally, at daybreak on June 8, the warships commenced firing on the French emplacements. Fifteen minutes later, landing craft filled with British soldiers rowed for shore. Selected landing areas lay from one to three miles from the fortified city. However, French troops had prepared defensive positions to cover these likely disembarking locations and were waiting for the British invasion. The defenders held their fire until the boats were well within range; then they opened up a withering fusillade as the invaders neared the beach.13
Although the soldiers accompanying Montgomery in the assault craft were anxious to return fire and ready bayonets in preparation for landing, he enforced the standing orders: “No man fire his piece from out of the boat . . .