Migration and Political Theory. Gillian Brock
and poverty on a global scale. And so, on this argument, states have duties to open their borders to the global poor. Failure to do so entrenches inequality and global poverty.
Many challenges can be marshaled to such a view. One important challenge concerns debates around this question: Is migration an effective means for addressing global poverty? This depends on what you believe effectively addresses global poverty (an issue we consider in more detail in chapter 8) and with what kinds of alternatives you are comparing migration. Many believe that foreign aid is an effective solution. You might have the view that migration can be more effective than foreign aid in some circumstances, for instance when there are high levels of corruption, incompetence in aid distribution, or aid is otherwise ineffective. Or you might have the view that opening borders does not help those most in need since those who migrate are often the more advantaged of the disadvantaged, having (for instance) sufficient resources to make the trip.
Indeed, you might believe that migration actually worsens the situation of the global poor because of the phenomenon of brain drain. The idea here is that when those with specialist skills emigrate in high numbers, they can make things worse for those who remain since their departure can result in a shortage of skills and undermine supply in core services, such as education or health. In chapter 8, I consider such arguments, along with some of the alleged benefits such high-skill migration might bring to those left behind.
2.2.4 The utilitarian case for open borders
There are several ways in which utilitarians might launch their case. One concern is that closing borders leads to economic inefficiencies that reduce the prospects for promoting utility or wellbeing. Barriers to participation in markets prevent people from being happily and usefully employed in countries where their skills are needed. Open borders make it more likely that markets can function well, as labor moves to where it is most needed. Open borders result in increased productivity and promote economic wellbeing.
A utilitarian might also worry about closed borders resulting in unequal distributions of wealth. If borders were open, many from poor countries would migrate to places that could improve their life prospects. Similarly, if borders were open, those who currently live under tyrannical regimes would be able to move away from such situations. In both cases, the countries experiencing large-scale migrations might be incentivized to improve domestic prospects. And those recipient countries experiencing large inflows might also be motivated to assist in stemming political oppression and improving life prospects in countries of origin. So on this line of argument, opening borders can therefore be expected to improve economic efficiency, reduce global inequality, and improve the prospects for those living under oppressive regimes.
Some believe this case is unconvincing, however, since it fails to take account of important costs (e.g. Christopher Wellman in Wellman and Cole 2011). If one factors in the costs of denying states control over immigration, it is not clear that there are the net gains imagined. For instance, a system of closed states may enable us to avoid a situation we could describe as a global tragedy of the commons. One important role that governments play is in taking responsibility for the territory, such as the environment and, according to Rawls (1999), the population size. Only if countries are forced to internalize the costs of their decisions will they take responsibility for matters in their territory that will have a bearing on how congenial life becomes in the future. Without governments being forced to take responsibility for the future wellbeing of their citizens, many of the necessary conditions that make for prosperity will be eroded.
In cases such as these, a utilitarian might argue that a better long-term strategy would be to support a system of self-determining states while also expanding efforts to export the economic and political arrangements that make wealthy liberal democracies desirable to so many migrants.
2.2.5 Co-ownership of earth’s natural resources
The right to control borders presupposes that the state has moral authority to determine who may enter or remain on its territory. But some might question this assumption of the state system, perhaps by asking this question: Who, after all, owns the earth’s resources? On some accounts, such as that of Michael Blake and Mathias Risse (2007), all human beings are co-owners of the natural resources of the earth. So, as co-owners, they may have rights to migrate to territory that they co-own. When a state fails to provide what citizens need at the most basic level – either by being unable or unwilling to do so – it is not clear why those citizens should feel obligated to remain where they are, given that the justification for the state system would have failed.
Michael Blake and Mathias Risse (2007) have developed arguments for more open borders that are based on a view about ownership of the earth’s natural resources. The earth’s natural resources were originally owned in common by all humankind. So each person on earth today is a co-owner of all its resources. On their view, using the metric of population density, we can calculate for any state whether it is underusing, overusing, or appropriately using its resources. Individuals would have a claim to immigrate to any state underusing its resources. States may choose to pay compensation and restrict immigration, so it would not necessarily mean that individual claims are overriding. But Blake and Risse have, through this argument, at least made a case for more compensation to be paid to those whose permanent entry a state restricts.
2.2.6 Taking history seriously
Some authors argue for obligations to open borders that are grounded in considerations of relevant history, which might give rise to the need for reparations. These authors argue that because states have harmed particular populations in the past, they should now open their borders to those migrants or their descendants who have been harmed (Cole 2000; Gibney 1986; Van Parijs 1993; Wilcox 2007).
Here I focus on Phillip Cole’s extended arguments for this position because he is one of the theorists who has done most to flesh out the position and, importantly, he offers some constructive suggestions concerning an alternative global migration scheme that could inform a new regime of regulating borders. Cole argues against the legitimacy of immigration controls. His first line of argument engages with liberal theorists’ accounts and shows that “a morally consistent liberal political theory would embrace freedom of international movement” (Cole in Wellman and Cole 2011: 159, henceforth in this section, Cole 2011). He uses two central arguments which I explore in more detail below. The first is to argue against the analogies often used that nation-states are like families, clubs, or marriages. States are unlike such associations, so arguments concerning rights of entry and exit in these associations do not easily carry over to the terms of entry and exit for the state. His second main line of argument is that debates about immigration often neglect relevant past and present context, airbrushing out salient moments in our past, such as colonialism and slavery, and when we consider these factors properly, we would see that they have relevance for how we should think about migration rights today.
With respect to the argument by analogy, we can’t establish whether there is a right to exclude by appealing to associations like golf clubs since the associations are different. States are not like golf clubs. One key point of difference is that when we exit a marriage, golf club or job, we do not have to have another similar association to enter into in order to exercise the right to exit. But leaving one state without another one willing to grant admission would render one stateless, which is a perilous condition in our contemporary world. So Cole argues that there are relevant dis-analogies in the case of individuals’ and states’ freedom of association.
Moving on to his second line of argument, Cole believes we should situate the immigration debate in the relevant context and that must include the history of slavery and colonialism perpetrated by European powers. Colonialism distorted local economies to serve the needs of the colonizers and their metropolitan economies. By the time of independence, many of those nations were left with large labor forces and insufficient capital to make that labor productive. The result was a large reserve