Observations on the Disturbances in the Madras Army in 1809. John Malcolm
their proceedings, they commenced with all the zeal of converts in their new career. In their ardour to make amends for the past, they took the lead in violence. Their numbers and apparent unanimity inspired them with fatal confidence: and this force, who were excited to action by a weak and unwise attempt to divide them from the rest of the army, became the most active promoters of sedition, and gave an example of opposition to Government, in which their repentance came too late to prevent the ruin of many of those who were betrayed, by a reliance on them, into the adoption of the same unjustifiable course.
The general spirit of indignation which the orders of the 1st of May were calculated to excite, must have been foreseen; but it was perhaps expected, that the terror struck by so decided and vigorous a proceeding would repress the effects of this spirit, and alarm even the most violent into order and obedience. If such was the intention, the measure was certainly inadequate to the end proposed. When we bear in mind the inflamed state of the minds of a great majority of the officers of the coast army, was it reasonable to expect, that the suspension from the service, and the removal from their commands, of a few of the most popular (including some of the most moderate[9]) officers in the service, would strike a panic in a body of men so agitated? Was it not more likely that they would deem this a repetition of what they had before considered injustice, and rush on the extreme of violence? It could have no other effect; and therefore, if it had been resolved to take no steps to conciliate or restore the temper of the army, this was the period (before their combinations were matured,) that a severe and wise Government would have chosen to come to issue; and, had the danger been fully met at this moment, those consequences which resulted from the line pursued would, in all human probability, have been avoided: but if the object of the Government of Fort St. George had been the ruin of its own army, no measures could have been more calculated to effect that object than those pursued. The character of its acts till the 1st of May has been fully shown. It would be as tedious as useless to dwell upon the many trifling but irritating measures to which it had recourse from that period till the 26th of July. These measures were, if not oppressive, all marked by a spirit of the most provoking suspicion, and never contained one particle of that generous feeling of noble confidence, which, by exalting the character of authority, attaches those that are wavering, reclaims the insubordinate to their duty, and, by giving a motive in which they have a pride, recalls the most guilty to the path of honour and virtue. A bare catalogue of a few of the expedients to which the Government resorted will be sufficient to show the nature of the whole. Some officers were removed from the command of corps, and sent to distant stations, without any reason being assigned; others were insulted, by being ordered away from the Presidency and other places at a few hours' warning, upon the ground of private information regarding their conversation or actions. Leave to visit the Presidency was refused to all officers. An institution of cadets (boys) was dissolved, because they had a quarrel with one of their comrades in consequence of his going to Lady Barlow's ball. A corps was removed to a distant and unpleasant (if not unhealthy) station, because its officers refused to dine with the Governor. But the conduct of the officers of the European regiment at Masulipatam, in consequence of a dispute about a toast at their mess-table, and the measures that precipitated a mutiny in that garrison, (the particulars of which will be stated in my narrative,) forms one of the completest examples of the character of that system of irritation pursued by the Government of Fort St. George, during this short but important and eventful period. In viewing this system, we ought not to take any single case, but look at the whole; and we shall find it, as such, fully adequate to the end which it effected, of making a brave and meritorious though mistaken body of men rush upon their own ruin; and of greatly weakening, if not destroying, by its probable operation on the attachment and allegiance of our native army, the most essential of all those principles, on the preservation of which must depend the future safety and existence of our empire in India.
The mutiny which an imprudent measure of Government (the particulars of which will be hereafter stated) brought on at Masulipatam, was one of the first acts of open violence committed by the officers on the coast establishment. As the Governor of Fort St. George thought it might be quelled by means short of coercion, he directed me to proceed to that garrison, in the hope that I should recall the officers to their duty. But his other measures ill accorded with the avowed principles of that conciliatory and moderate proceeding. It had long been reported throughout the army, that Government intended to make such a distribution of the native corps as would place them under the complete check of his majesty's regiments. The alarm, and indeed despair, caused by this report, were excessive and general. The numerous officers of the Company's army who had become engaged in guilty combinations, thought their destruction was certain, and that union and resistance offered the only hope of safety. It might not have been the intention of Government to make such an impression; but is it not clear to the most common understanding which reflects on what had passed, and the actual state of feeling in the army, that this impression must have been produced[10]? Was it not evident that the mutiny at Masulipatam had been caused by the mere rumour of this intention on the part of Government? And could it be expected by the most weak, or infatuated, that the actual execution of this plan would not produce the same effect in a situation such as Hyderabad, where the spirit of disaffection was more violent, and the power of resistance as great, if not greater. It is hardly possible to make any other conclusion, but that those who advised this measure foresaw the result, and thought that such an act of open disobedience would give the colour of unavoidable necessity to the extreme measures[11] which they then contemplated. It produced its natural effect—the order for the march of the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment from Hyderabad to Goa was disobeyed, and the Company's officers at that station forced down a precipice of guilt, at which, in spite of their violent language, they shuddered. This act of open disobedience, accompanied by a violent and seditious paper styled their Ultimatum[12], which they transmitted to the Governor, constituted the immediate grounds upon which Government adopted the extreme measure of the 26th of July, of calling upon all the European officers of the native corps to sign a test of their fidelity, and, on their refusal, of separating the officers from their men.
Though a violent agitation certainly existed at this time throughout almost all ranks of the officers of the Company's army, this agitation had a variety of shades, which it is of importance to consider. Many officers in the Company's service had no share whatever in those proceedings which had met with the disapprobation of Government: but these, though they severely condemned the conduct of the disaffected, and regretted their errors, could not but be alive to the character and reputation of the army to which they belonged; they were, of course, anxious for measures that would retrieve the service from that disgrace and ruin with which it was threatened: and it was the natural wish of this class (who were stronger in influence than numbers,) that Government should endeavour to reclaim the discontented to their duty by some act that mixed as much consideration and indulgence for the errors into which they had fallen, with a vigorous exertion of its authority as it was possible to mix, without a sacrifice of its strength and dignity.
The next, and a very principal if not a numerous class, were officers of some rank and influence, who had gradually, and without reflection, involved themselves in proceedings, the scope and extent of which they had never contemplated till they had gone too far to retract. They had persuaded themselves that Government would yield to the representations of the army; and the hope of success, added to the fear of being accused of defection, had hitherto kept them firm to the general cause: but these men, at the period of which I speak, contemplated their situation with affliction and horror; they saw themselves borne away in a tide that they could not resist: they conceived, from a false but imperious sense of honour, which, from a singular but powerful principle of human nature, was felt to be the more binding because at variance with duty, that they were pledged to support the rest; or, more properly speaking, not to abandon them. They were sensible too late of having lost their authority and control over the younger and more violent part of the service, and regretted their proceedings; but at the same time saw, under the rigid course pursued by Government, no safety but in union. This class of men would have rushed to any door that had been opened to their retreat; they would have made a stand on any ground that the clemency or generosity of Government had afforded them; and would not only have reclaimed themselves, but the rest; for they were, generally speaking, of that rank and character who had the chief influence with the troops; and, if extremes had been resorted to, with them on the side of Government,