Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. P. M. S. Hacker

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - P. M. S. Hacker


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science; or they were used in a metaphorical or figurative sense. If these escape routes are available, then the accusation that neuroscientists fall victim to a mereological fallacy may be unwarranted. Although they make use of the same psychological vocabulary as the man in the street, they are using it in a different way. So objections to neuroscientists’ usage based upon the ordinary use of these expressions are irrelevant.

      First objection (Ullman): the psychological predicates thus used are homonyms of ordinary psychological predicates, and have a different, technical, meaning

      Second objection (Gregory): the psychological predicates thus used are analogical extensions of the ordinary expressions

      Third objection (Blakemore): neuroscientists’ ascription of psychological attributes to the brain is figurative or metaphorical, since they know perfectly well that the brain does not think or use maps

      Fourth objection (Searle):the brain is not a part of a person, so ascribing psychological attributes to the brain is not a mereological fallacy at all

      Fifth objection (Dennett): the distinction that we present is no more than the distinction between mechanical and non-mechanical properties

      3.4 Replies to Objections

      Reply to Ullman’s objection that neuroscientists are using the psychological vocabulary in a special technical sense

      Reply to Ullman: David Marr on ‘representations’


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