Theories in Social Psychology. Группа авторов
states that when two freedoms are threatened, the reactance arousal of the first threat in which there are restrictions in the expression of reactance is channeled into the reactance arousal of the second threat to freedom. Brehm and Brehm (1981) later complemented the principle by identifying conditions under which the principle would best be applied. They identified three conditions: threats must be different, and at least two present, with some relationship between the threats or freedoms; a time-lapse must exist between threats, and there is no reduction of reactance for the first threat – the reactance is still present.
Some social factors that contribute to the magnitude of psychological reactance include monetary and verbal inducements, the attractiveness of the communicator, instructions, modeling behavior, role play, and the exertion of pressure for compliance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).
Effects of Reactance
Muhlberger et al. (2020, p. 204) in discussing the irrationality of psychological reactance note:
“Wicklund (1997) says that a person whose freedom is not threatened moves toward the best solution in terms of cost-benefit ratio but as soon as the freedom is threatened, reactance stops this process and the person gets biased toward the freedom-restoring.”
Reactance as a motivational force pushes the individual to reduce levels of arousal. Display of reactance decreases arousal and leads to restoration of free behavior either directly, via exhibiting the threatened behavior, or indirectly, via focusing on the source (i.e., discrediting or attacking). Reactance is displayed on two levels – behavioral and nonbehavioral (subjective) – and a range of reduction options exist on these levels (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006). The theory also distinguishes between reactance motivation and reactance striving, with the former referring to the subjective desire to restore or maintain the freedom that is perceived to be threatened and the latter an attempt to engage in actual behavior to restore or maintain the threatened freedom (Brehm, 2004 ; Mühlberger et al., 2020).
The individual adopts several behaviors to reestablish a sense of freedom, including direct behavioral reassertion of freedom; developing a greater liking for the behavior that was threatened and displaying the threatened behavior; indirect reassertion of freedom by adoption of extreme (e.g., costly, taboo, or dangerous) behaviors that imply power to display eliminated behaviors (boomerang effect); and aggressive behavior directed toward the entity threatening the freedom. There are situations in which outcomes are uncontrollable (e.g., a situation of learned helplessness) and freedoms are impossible to restore.
In these situations, an individual may relinquish freedom so as to reduce or eliminate reactance (Brehm & Wortman, 1975). In situations of exposure to threats by powerful communicators, reactance is reduced when there is a possibility of future interaction, negative consequences to others, and negative consequences to oneself (Miron & Brehm, 2006). In group situations, individuals may comply with the group’s alternatives rather than display reactance. However, consequences for future interaction within the group would be considered. In both individual and group situations, the cost and benefit analysis will determine the reduction of reactance strategy adopted (Miron & Brehm, 2006).
Reactance effects exist on a continuum from physiological arousal with no observable signs to hostility. Other reactance reduction strategies suggested in the literature include the following:
1 Derogate and discredit threatening sources. This strategy is adopted, especially if the source does not have the legitimate power to threaten the freedom.
2 Display aggression and hostility toward the threatening source.
3 Decrease the proportion of freedoms that were threatened.
4 Compensate by increasing other freedoms .
5 Seek opportunities to counter threatening messages/sources.
6 Increase the number of available freedoms.
7 Reduce compliance behavior.
8 Position oneself to increase future freedom behavior.
9 Increase self-direction to one’s behavior in achieving one’s goal of reducing reactance.
10 Change cognition (e.g., reevaluate the threat and define it as not posing a threat to freedom).
11 Change behavior (e.g., engage in behaviors that would compensate for the threat).
12 Remove the threat (e.g., leave the relationship).
13 Reconcile oneself to the loss of freedom.
14 Reduce reactance by implication. Reactance by implication occurs when we observe someone’s freedom being threatened. Reactance can also be reduced vicariously in the same way by observing the restoration of the other’s freedom.
15 Seek out others who can assist in the restoration of our freedom.
16 Subjectively increase perceived available behavior alternatives.
17 Subjectively, imaginatively, seek out others who can assist in the restoration of our free behavior.
18 Deny the presence of a threat.
19 Persevere by focusing on maintaining and protecting non-threatened free behaviors.
20 Adopt impression-management strategies.
21 Adopting the perspective of threatening person – perspective-taking
22 Restoration postscript suggesting freedom of decision making is still present.
23 Creating autonomy and self-determination.
Research on Reactance
Research on psychological reactance has been immense over the years, with findings that have questioned conventional wisdoms. Research on reactance has been helpful in critically developing the dynamism of the theory to offer explanations for a wide range of phenomena.
This section describes some of the critical reactance research undertaken over the years and focuses on situational factors in the arousal of reactance.
Social Interaction
Andreoli, Worchel, and Folger’s (1974) research examines arousal by implication (i.e., observing another’s freedom being threatened – indirect) and not only by the presence or intended presence of a future threatener. Earlier work by Sensenig and Brehm (1968) found that the magnitude of reactance was increased for persons who expected future interaction with a previously direct threatener. The 1974 study asked persons to give a ranking of five desired topics for discussion. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and then placed in a room and, while waiting, heard a discussion in which a person’s (B) freedom-of-topic choice was threatened by another person (A) (threat condition).
The respondent’s first-ranked topic choice was chosen by A without consultation with B. The threatened and restored condition by the experimenter (restored condition) involved the respondent’s first-ranked topic choice being chosen by A without consultation with B, but the experimenter intervened to ensure B’s participation in the topic selection. The third condition was a non-threat (neutral condition), where there was a preference for the respondent’s first topic choice, but consultation with B was implied. Following exposure, respondents rated the five topics.
The major findings of the study suggest that indirect threats to the freedom of others (i.e., indirect threats to the observer) provoked reactance in the observer as though they were direct threats and despite whether there would be future interaction with the threatener. As a result of the threat to their freedom to choose their first-ranked topic in the threat condition, subjects were more desirous of their second and third-ranked topics than the first. The study also found that reactance emerging from implication can be restored by implication, as in the restored condition with the experimental intervention. Unlike previous studies (Worchel, 1974; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974), derogation of the threatener was absent, with no significant difference in the attractiveness rating of the threatener among the three conditions. In the previous studies,