Justicia de papel. Fabio Núñez del Prado
litigation but which, when joined as a class, become worthwhile to litigate”.
19 Este riesgo es distinto y muchas veces mayor al de los miembros de clase. Al respecto, véase Dam (1975, p. 57): “For the plaintiff, a defendant’s judgment may mean simply the defeat of an expectation, often of relatively small amount; for his lawyer it can mean the loss of years of costly effort by himself and his staff”.
20 Véase Hensler, Dombey-Moore, Giddens, Gross, Moller y Pace (2000, p. 10).
21 Principalmente en las mass tort class actions, en las que las órdenes de certificación se convierten en verdaderas “bombas nucleares” para los estados financieros de las compañías demandadas. Al respecto, véase Priest (2000, p. 482).
22 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
23 Véase Cooper (2001, p. 10): “Contingent fees agreements are not possible in class actions, because the class members do not (and, because of their number and anonymity, cannot) contract with the lawyer before the case is filed”.
24 Tenemos pues, los costos de búsqueda de los demandantes individuales, los costos de negociación relativo a los acuerdos que deberán adoptar dichos demandantes (elección de representante común, elección de abogado o abogados, determinación de los honorarios del o los abogados, entre otros) y los costos de ejecución de dichos acuerdos. Estos costos se evitan o, en todo caso, se distribuyen de forma eficiente, en las class actions.
25 539 U.S. 444 203 (2003).
26 Véase, por ejemplo, la Rule 3.
27 Véase Allen (2008, p. 548): “Even if the interpretation of New York law was wrong, it was at most mere error and not the kind of egregious misapplication of law that rises to the level of manifest disregard”.
28 S.D.N.Y. 04 Civ. 6069, October 11, 2007.
29 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007).
30 En efecto, como explican Cooter y Schäfer (2012), el derecho de contratos tiene distinta intensidad según el tipo de relación contractual: (1) relaciones al margen del derecho (piénsese en los non-binding agreements de la contratación corporativa y financiera), (2) contratación entre iguales (at arm’s length), y (3) contratación entre desiguales, en donde aplica —además— un derecho tuitivo (piénsese en el derecho de trabajo, derecho de consumidor, entre otros). La intensidad del derecho de contratos es casi nula en el primer supuesto, supletoria en el segundo, y restrictiva en el tercero.
31 Sobre las distintas opciones y reglas sobre las costas y costos, véase los artículos 410 al 419 del Código Procesal Civil Peruano.
32 Véase (Nagy, 2012, p. 5); García Long (2019a, pp. 347 y ss).
33 Históricamente llamados como pacta de quota litis. Por su parte, en Inglaterra se diferencia entre damages-based agreements (DBA) y conditional fee arrangements (CFA).
34 Esto no quiere decir que no pueda haber partes débiles, pero claramente se abre un mercado para beneficiar a partes fuertes.
35 Rubin (2011, p. 674): “Maintenance is assistance in a lawsuit by someone who has no interest in the case; champerty is an agreement between a litigant and a stranger by which the stranger pursues the claim in return for a share of the proceeds; and barratry is vexatious persistence or incitement to litigation”.
36 No necesariamente tiene que ser un fondo sino otro tercero financista, pero acá se considerará —a efectos expositivos— que el financista es un fondo de inversión al ser una de las prácticas comunes.
37 Sahani, Smith y Deniger (2018, p. 31): “This investment is made on a non-recourse basis, meaning that the claimant has no obligation to reimburse the third-party funder is the claim is unsuccessful”; Daughety y Reinganum (2014, p. 2552): “Such financial support takes the form of a “nonrecourse” loan; that is, the litigation funder advances payment to the plaintiff, and repayment occurs only if the plaintiff is successful (either in settlement or at trial), and then only up to the plaintiff’s recovery (net of attorney fees, which are generally a percentage of the plaintiff’s received transfer from the defendant)”.
38 Sahani, Smith y Deniger (2018, p. 27): “Third-party funding is particularly relevant in the context of damages because, ultimately, the magnitude of damages of any claim is one of the determining factors influencing whether a claim will be financed and, if so, at what level”.
39 Véase Kaplan (2013).
40 Por ejemplo, explica Benatti (2019b, p. 168) que: “The duty to provide timely and complete information only pertains to internal rapports: in accordance with ethical principles, lawyers’ duty of loyalty only applies to the professional-client relationship (independent of the contract with the fund), and it is doubtful that the fund may also be considered a client. This seems to be one of the more complicated aspects, especially because, in practice, the fund interacts directly with the lawyers and often has frequent contact with these same law firms — not just because of the fund’s trust in the firm’s experience and ability, but also because the fund may be referred clients or receive leads on potential proceedings to finance. If not properly managed, this close relationship with the fund can cause tension or create a conflict of interest (which might be abused with relation to compensation, knowing that the fund is backing the costs). Indeed, we are dealing with a hypothesis in which there are duties only toward the represented party, but “there are effectively two clients”. Particular attention must be given to this aspect when the client is not a multinational or large company but is actually weak”.
41 Véase Scherer y Goldsmith (2012a, p. 210).
42 Véase Goldsmith y Melchionda (2012, p. 55).
43 Essar Oilfields Services Limited v. Norscot Rig Management PVT Limited [2016] EWHC 2361.
44 Véase Szymanski (2016); Hemming y Elliott (2016); Torres (2016); Dundas (2017); Henriques (2017); Kühn y Van Oeveren (2018); Benatti (2019b). Antes del caso Norscot, algunos comentaristas consideraban que los costos del financiamiento no eran reembolsables por la parte perdedora en favor de la ganadora. Véase Scherer y Goldsmith (2019b, p. 662).
45 Véase Abrams