America's Betrayal Confirmed. Elias Davidsson
Such views were crystallized in an official, but classified, document leaked to the New York Times, which published excerpts thereof in 1992.{28} The document was drafted by Dick Cheney, then Defense Secretary, and Paul Wolfowitz, his Under Secretary for Policy. The policy statements in this document were developed “in conjunction with the National Security Council and in consultation with the President.” The document is known in Pentagon parlance as the “Defense Planning Guidance” and is also known as “The Wolfowitz Doctrine.”
America’s first objective in the post-cold-war era, as defined by the authors of this document, was “to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.” They mentioned, however, three additional aspects to this objective: (1) Establishing and protecting a new international order; (2) Discouraging advanced industrial nations from challenging U.S. leadership; and (3) Maintaining mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from “even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”
Another objective mentioned in the document was for the U.S. to “retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.” Such interests include the “access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking.”
While the document stated unmistakably the goal of the United States to remain the sole and leading superpower, it did not reveal the priorities assigned to the various interests that underpinned imperial policies. Placing side by side the need to ensure “access to vital raw materials” with the need to combat “threat to U.S. citizens from terrorism” manifested probably less the confused mind of the authors than their intent to confuse.
(3) Unique opportunities
The major positive effect for the U.S. arising from the demise of the Soviet Union was not military but political. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided dozens of Third World nations political, military and technical support that allowed these nations to assert their independence towards the West. The emergence of a resilient Non-Aligned Movement illustrates this situation. The demise of the Soviet Union reduced substantially the capacity of poorer nations to resist Western pressure and blackmail.
It was to be expected that the U.S., as the sole remaining superpower, would capitalize on this situation to entrench its global hegemony and impose its will on recalcitrant governments. U.S. leaders refrained for good reasons from gloating about the huge opportunities that the demise of the Soviet bloc opened for the United States. Occasionally the term “opportunity” appeared in speeches or articles, but was toned down by emphasizing countervailing challenges and threats.
Sometimes, however, the cat was out of the bag.
President George Bush Sr. recognized already in May 1989 the opportunities opened by what he called the “end of an idea: the final chapter of the Communist experiment.” Addressing graduates of the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London, he said:
So today, I want to speak about our security strategy for the 1990s, one that advances American ideals and upholds American aims. Amid the many challenges we’ll face, there will be risks. But let me assure you, we’ll find more than our share of opportunities. We and our allies are strong - stronger, really, than at any point in postwar period…There’s an opportunity before U.S. to shape a new world…The economic foundation of this new era is the proven success of the free market…This time is a time of tremendous opportunity, and destiny is in our own hands. We must combat misguided notions of economic nationalism that will tell us to close off our economies to foreign competition just when the global marketplace has become a fact of life.{29} [Emphasis added.]
When President Bush Sr. highlighted the opportunities opened by the demise of the Soviet bloc, he unwittingly revealed that the purpose of America’s security strategy — the theme of his talk — was not, as one would expect, to ensure the defense of the homeland, but to “shape a new world,” by which he meant a global order run by multinational corporations and global investors.
A year later, President Bush Sr. transmitted to Congress his report on the “national security strategy,” which reflected the “dramatic changes in the international environment” and observed that the United States had reached a “moment of historic opportunity.”{30}
Dick Cheney acknowledged at the time the unique window of opportunity that the U.S. could seize:
We have, in fact, won great depth for our strategic position. The threats to our security have become more distant, not only physically but in time as well. A challenger to our security would have to overcome our formidable alliances and their qualitative advantages that we displayed so impressively in Desert Storm...It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to US and Western security will emerge from the Eurasian heartland for years to come.{31}
Indeed, at the time this statement was made, no state or group of states could have conceivably challenged the supremacy of the United States. Assuming an unrelenting ascendance of China’s economic and military power, the U.S. faced at the time a window of opportunity of 20 years or more to entrench and consolidate its global hegemony. For U.S. leaders there was no time to lose if they were to seize upon this opportunity.
Lawrence Korb, vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration 1981-1985, also recognized the time-limited window of opportunity:
[W]hat we have to do right now is maintain stability in the international environment. The military is one of those devices that we have to do that. We have no peer competitor right now. [...] Could we have some in 10 to 15 years? Sure, we could, but we don't have anybody right now.{32}
Observers such as Andrew J. Bacevich warned early on against wasting opportunities: “[W]e would be ill-advised to waste the opportunity for strategic reassessment imparted by our Cold War triumph. Such opportunities are fleeting and we waste them at our peril.”{33}
But was the U.S. really wasting opportunities? In 1990, the United States had already availed itself of its newly gained supremacy to secure the adoption by the U.N. Security Council of a series of resolutions that imposed on the Iraqi people the most draconian economic sanctions in modern history, and authorized any willing State to use “all means” to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. It was clearly understood by the U.N. membership that the innocuous expression “all means” was not a figure of speech. It was promptly translated by the United States and its allies into a devastating bombing campaign against Iraq’s civilian infrastructure that brought the country back to the pre-industrial age.{34} When the representative of Yemen announced that he would oppose the resolution, the United States immediately retaliated by withholding desperately needed financial aid to that country.{35} The United States thus was already demonstrating that it would not permit any challenge to its supremacy.
After 9/11, it became easier to speak of opportunities. Donald Rumsfeld told the New York Times on 12 October 2001, that now “Maybe […] the world will sufficiently register the danger that exists on the globe and have this event cause the kind of sense of urgency and offer the kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion much of the world.”{36}
(4) The benefits of an external threat
The notorious Nazi leader Hermann Goering believed that any population can be induced to support war if presented with the perception of a credible external threat. During the war crimes trial at Nuremberg (1946), psychologist Gustave Gilbert visited Goering in his cell. Gilbert wrote in his diary, later published in book form:
We