Life and Freedom. The autobiography of the former president of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Роберт Кочарян
Do you object?" Of course, I didn't object. I knew what was happening in town, even though I didn't give it any significance yet. "Let's do it," I said. "If they are doing it everywhere else, perhaps this time it will happen." I discovered that almost everyone at our factory signed the petition in a couple of days. Within a week, all Stepanakert enterprises signed it, and by the end of the month, everyone in our city! Very quickly, in about three months or so, nearly the entire Armenian adult population of Karabakh had signed the petition – with the exception of very senior Communist Party officials, who didn't dare do it given their positions but nevertheless still treated the process with sympathy, empathized with the people, and supported them.
Signatures were collected secretly, so it's hard to say who led the process – there was no formal structure behind it (at least I never heard of it). There weren't any apparent leaders, either, but perhaps Arkady Karapetian stood out the most (later, during the war, he led the formation of the self-defense forces). Meanwhile, the movement initiated by a small group of enthusiasts grew exponentially and soon embraced the entire population. This bright, astonishing process captivated our people on a deep emotional level and united us. Optimism overwhelmed us; people sincerely hoped that they would be heard in the framework of perestroika and glasnost. We were convinced that the truth was on our side, and we hadn't done anything anti-Soviet – we had simply signed a lawful petition to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, to its Politburo, and to Gorbachev.
On December 1, 1987, our Karabakh delegation went to Moscow and submitted the petition – signed by several tens of thousands of people – to the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. In it, we explained our position, citing documents on the history, ethnography, and culture of Nagorno-Karabakh in defense of our views. A month later, in January 1988, another delegation went to Moscow. Each delegation attempted to present a simple idea to the central government: there was a problem, a serious problem, that had already surfaced, could not be ignored, and needed to be addressed. This could be done gradually, there could be different solutions, but we couldn't pretend that it didn't exist. Otherwise, we would witness uncontrollable repercussions. The Central Committee said they understood the situation, but they could only look into its socio-economic dimension. They told us that there were some 20 similar issues in the USSR, and solving one could trigger a chain reaction. Moscow's position wasn't encouraging. On the contrary, it only added to the tension, mobilized our people, and pushed their natural stubbornness to its limit. Eventually, all that uncontainable energy burst out, drove people into the streets, and erupted into public demonstrations and mass protests.
Unsanctioned, spontaneous mass street rallies were unheard of in the Soviet Union. The last one probably took place during the times of the Russian Empire. The first demonstrations were peaceful, with sincere and naïve slogans – we all still believed that the central government's decision would be fair. People carried banners saying, "Lenin, Party, Gorbachev." The number of protestors grew with each passing day. We all felt that events of great historic importance were taking place, and everyone wanted to be a part of it.
Even the highest government officials, who – as one would suspect – should have been more cautious, took part in the demonstrations. The reality was such that if, for example, the first secretary of a Regional Communist Party Committee didn't rally with the people in front of the party headquarters, he would instantly lose all credibility.
Informal leaders began to appear – people who were brave enough to speak at the rallies, analyze the situation, and guide the people. Some of them had radical views, while others were more moderate. People knew many of them and respected them for their track records; they trusted them and paid attention to their words. They were plant managers, party leaders, college professors, writers, and representatives of factory workers.
An exciting process, unusual for the Soviet Union, of organizing a movement began to take shape. An informal group of leaders began to make all the decisions about the rallies. They decided when and where to hold them and how to ensure people's safety. No one elected us; it all happened naturally. We were joined together by a shared activity. It was winter, and it was freezing. We made sure that people stayed warm – we brought hot water, made tea for everyone, and distributed food. Paramedics organized a stationary ambulance service – just in case.
We got together at any suitable location (at work or at someone's house, for example), discussed the current situation, and made decisions. At the same time, general assemblies and party congresses were taking place at all Karabakh workplaces. The main topic of discussion was the same burning issue that interested everyone: the transition of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia's authority. Moreover, all meetings concluded with the same resolution: to ask the higher authorities to rule in favor of NKAO's reunification with Armenia. These resolutions were passed along to the plenary sessions and party congresses of the regional central committees, city central committees, and congresses of people's deputies at all levels, and all were adopted unanimously.
Azerbaijan's central authorities tried to change our minds. Different party and government officials came from the republic's Communist Party Central Committee and tried to convince us to stop holding public rallies. They didn't feel very confident, though. We thought that the central government was lost and didn't know how to react to the situation.
In mid-February, Moscow sent in the army. At the same time, Baku reinforced its police force with additional personnel from neighboring Azerbaijani regions. This attempt at coercion went against the declared policies of the central government and incited a wave of outrage and negative vibes toward the Moscow authorities. Now the entire town took to the streets, and the rallies went on non-stop. The primary demand was to convene the Council of the People's Deputies of NKAO and make a decision to reunite with Armenia. A signature campaign was initiated among the legislators to convene the extraordinary session on February 20, with only one item on the agenda: Karabakh's secession from Azerbaijan and its unification with Armenia. Collecting enough signatures didn't require much effort in that situation.
On February 19, Azerinform – Azerbaijan's state information agency – announced that the Central Committee of the Soviet Union's Communist Party had not discussed any territorial matters and didn't plan to discuss them in the future. In protest, Karabakh announced a general strike. A strike was unthinkable in the Soviet Union – a truly extraordinary development. The very next day, a delegation arrived in Stepanakert – Kyamran Bagirov[10], Viktor Yashin[11], and some other members of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan's Communist Party – to prevent the session of the Council of People's Deputies.
Bagirov instructed his security services to undermine the gathering. All day long, we used detours to move legislators, ensuring that the session took place. As soon as they got to Stepanakert, we provided them with the necessary material and talking points for on-the-floor arguments. Back then, legislatures were formed at the directive of the Communist Party, using quotas for workers and farmers, many of whom were not great public speakers. By the evening, we were able to get a quorum, and at 9 p. m., the session started. The square in front of the parliament building was overcrowded with people. Unexpectedly, Bagirov, Yashin, and Boris Kevorkov[12], as well as members of the Bureau of the Region's Communist Party Committee, arrived for the session. Bagirov was the first to speak. He talked about the brotherly friendship of our two peoples, our happy, peaceful coexistence in Azerbaijan during the past 70 years, and that a small group of irresponsible nationalists was instigating reckless actions. He promised to swiftly correct all the mistakes that Azerbaijan made in Karabakh. He stressed that the session of the legislature had no authority to address territorial
Baghirov, Kamran Mammad oglu (1933–2000) – Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). From December 1982 until May 1988, First Secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party Central Committee.
Yashin, Victor Mikhailovich – advisor in the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee.
Kevorkov, Boris Sarkisovich (1932–1998) – First Secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) Communist Party (1973–1988).