The Art of Logical Thinking; Or, The Laws of Reasoning. Atkinson William Walker
It is much easier for us to think "horse" than it would be to think the full definition of that animal, or to think of it by recalling a mental picture of the horse each time we wished to think of it. Or, it is much better for us to be able to glance at a label on a package or bottle than to examine the contents in detail. As Hobbes says: "A word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise in our minds a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had or had not, before in his mind." Mill says: "A name is a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of a mark to recall to ourselves the likeness of a former thought and as a sign to make it known to others." Some philosophers regard names as symbols of our ideas of things, rather than of the things themselves; others regard them as symbols of the things themselves. It will be seen that the value of a name depends materially upon the correct meaning and understanding regarding it possessed by the person using it.
CHAPTER IV.
THE USE OF CONCEPTS
Having observed the several steps or stages of a concept, let us now consider the use and misuse of the latter. At first glance it would appear difficult to misuse a concept, but a little consideration will show that people very commonly fall into error regarding their concepts.
For instance, a child perceives a horse, a cow or a sheep and hears its elders apply the term "animal" to it. This term is perfectly correct, although symbolizing only a very general classification or generalization. But, the child knowing nothing of the more limited and detailed classification begins to generalize regarding the animal. To it, accordingly, an "animal" is identical with the dog or the cow, the sheep or the horse, as the case may be, and when the term is used the child thinks that all animals are similar to the particular animal seen. Later on, when it hears the term "animal" applied to a totally different looking creature, it thinks that a mistake has been made and a state of confusion occurs. Or, even when a term is applied within narrower limits, the same trouble occurs. The child may hear the term "dog" applied to a mastiff, and it accordingly forms a concept of dog identical with the qualities and attributes of the mastiff. Later, hearing the same term applied to a toy-terrier, it becomes indignant and cries out that the latter is no "dog" but is something entirely different. It is not until the child becomes acquainted with the fact that there are many kinds of creatures in the general category of "dog" that the latter term becomes fully understood and its appropriate concept is intelligently formed. Thus we see the importance of the step of Presentation.
In the same way the child might imagine that because some particular "man" had red hair and long whiskers, all men were red-haired and long-whiskered. Such a child would always form the concept of "man" as a creature possessed of the personal qualities just mentioned. As a writer once said, readers of current French literature might imagine that all Englishmen were short, dumpy, red-cheeked and irascible, and that all Englishwomen had great teeth and enormous feet; also that readers of English literature might imagine that all Frenchmen were like monkeys, and all Frenchwomen were sad coquettes. In the same way many American young people believe that all Englishmen say "Don't you know" and all Englishwomen constantly ejaculate: "Fancy!" Also that every Englishman wears a monocle. In the same way, the young English person, from reading the cheap novels of his own country, might well form the concept of all Americans as long-legged, chin-whiskered and big-nosed, saying "Waal, I want to know;" "I reckon;" and "Du tell;" while they tilted themselves back in a chair with their feet on the mantelpiece. The concept of a Western man, entertained by the average Eastern person who has never traveled further West than Buffalo, is equally amusing. In the same way, we have known Western people who formed a concept of Boston people as partaking of a steady and continuous diet of baked beans and studiously reading Browning and Emerson between these meals.
Halleck says: "A certain Norwegian child ten years old had the quality white firmly imbedded in his concept man. Happening one day to see a negro for the first time, the child refused to call him a man until the negro's other qualities compelled the child to revise his concept and to eliminate whiteness. If that child should ever see an Indian or a Chinaman, the concept would undergo still further revision. A girl of six, reared with an intemperate father and brothers, had the quality of drunkenness firmly fixed in her concept of man. A certain boy kept, until the age of eleven, trustworthiness in his concept of man. Another boy, until late in his teens thought that man was a creature who did wrong not from determination but from ignorance, that any man would change his course to the right path if he could but understand that he was going wrong. Happening one day to hear of a wealthy man who was neglecting to provide comforts for his aged mother in her last sickness, the boy concluded that the man did not know his mother's condition. When he informed the man, the boy was told to mind his own business. The same day he heard of some politicians who had intentionally cheated the city in letting a contract and he immediately revised his concept. It must be borne in mind that most of our concepts are subject to change during our entire life; that at first they are made only in a tentative way; that experience may show us, at any time, that they have been erroneously formed, that we have, abstracted too little or too much, made this class too wide or too narrow, or that here a quality must be added or there one taken away."
Let us now consider the mental processes involved in the formation and use of a concept. We have first, as we have seen, the presentation of the crude material from which the concept must be formed. Our attention being attracted to or directed toward an object, we notice its qualities and properties. Then we begin a process of comparison of the object perceived or of our perception of it. We compare the object with other objects or ideas in our mind, noting similarities and differences and thereby leading towards classification with similar objects and opposed dissimilar ones. The greater the range of other objects previously perceived, the greater will be the number of relations established between the new object or idea and others. As we advance in experience and knowledge, the web of related objects and ideas becomes more intricate and complex. The relations attaching to the child's concept of horse is very much simpler than the concept of the experienced adult. Then we pass on to the step of analysis, in which we separate the qualities of the object and consider them in detail. The act of abstraction is an analytical process. Then we pass on to the step of synthesis, in which we unite the materials gathered by comparison and analysis, and thus form a general idea or concept regarding the object. In this process we combine the various qualities discerned by comparison and analysis, and grouping them together as in a bundle, we tie them together with the string of synthesis and thus have a true general conception. Thus from the first general conception of horse as a simple thing, we notice first that the animal has certain qualities lacking in other things and certain others similar to other things; then we analyze the various qualities of the horse, recognized through comparison, until we have a clear and distinct idea of the various parts, qualities and properties of the horse; then we synthesize, and joining together these various conceptions of the said qualities, we at last form a clear general concept of the horse as he is, with all his qualities. Of course, if we later discover other qualities attached to the horse, we add these to our general synthesized concept – our concept of horse is enlarged.
Of course these various steps in the formation and use of a concept are not realized as distinct acts in the consciousness, for the processes are largely instinctive and subconscious, particularly in the case of the experienced individual. The subconscious, or habit mind, usually attends to these details for us, except in instances in which we deliberately apply the will to the task, as in cases of close study, in which we take the process from the region of the involuntary and place it in the voluntary category. So closely related and blended are these various steps of the process, that some authorities have disputed vigorously upon the question as to which of the two steps, comparison or analysis, precedes the other. Some have claimed that analysis must precede comparison, else how could one compare without having first analyzed the things to be compared. Others hold that comparison must precede analysis, else how could one note a quality unless he had his attention drawn to it by its resemblance to or difference from qualities in other objects. The truth seems to lie between the two ideas, for in some cases there seems to be a perception of some similarity or difference before any analysis or abstraction takes place; while in others there seems to be an analysis or abstraction before comparison is possible. In this book we have followed the arrangement