The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Butler Joseph

      1. It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God governs: and it is reasonable to suppose that he would govern righteously.

      1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.

      2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of government, now begun, shall be carried on.

      2. The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law.

      3. God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually punished by it.

      1.) Without this, society could not exist.

      2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as natural, as society.

      3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour.

      Objec. Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness.

      Ans. 1. This is not necessary, and consequently not natural.

      2. Good actions are never punished by society as good, but because considered bad.

      4. By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, as such, which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their qualities.

      1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness.

      2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation, remorse, &c.

      – This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune.

      – Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not their own fault.

      3.) Honest and good men are befriended as such.

      4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices are regarded with gratitude on account of the intention, even when they fail to benefit us.

      – This is seen in family government, where children are punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is hurt.

      – And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing.

      5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon approbation and disapprobation.

      6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being under God’s moral government.

      – We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral nature.

      – Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such, is a rule, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous.

      – The degree in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree.

      7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers; but this is disorder, and not the order of nature.

      8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have a sense of security, and a hope of something better.

      5. This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies beyond their present effects.

      1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.

      2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.

      – The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force.

      – As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case stands, as to reason:

      · Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason to triumph over brutes.

      · Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things.

      – A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.

      · By making the good of society, the object of every member of it.

      · By making every one industrious in his own sphere.

      · By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.

      3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a tendency in virtue to superiority.

      4.) But to produce that superiority there must be

      – A force proportioned to the obstacles.

      – Sufficient lapse of time.

      – A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite.

      5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies, though real, are hindered.

      6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.

      – Eternity will be lasting enough.

      – Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth, and ignorant of one another.

      – Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very nature of virtue is a bond of union.

      7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue.

      8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s declarations in its favor.

      9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, we may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages.

      Objec. Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered state as at present?

      Ans. We are not proving that God’s moral government is perfect, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observations confirm the doctrine of future retribution; for,

      1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice.

      2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in kind,