England, Canada and the Great War. Louis Georges Desjardins
once concluded that she was not in duty bound to do so. That most discreditable inference was, of course, the natural sequence of the wrong principle aforesaid. They further drew the conclusion that it was no part of the duty of Canadians to join the Colors to help winning the war.
It was in flat contradiction of those erroneous notions that I positively declared, in my letter dedicating my book to my French Canadian compatriots, that "in defending with the most sincere conviction the sacred cause of the Allies, I am doing my duty as a free subject of the British Empire, as a citizen of Canada and of the Province of Quebec, as a son of France, as a devoted servant of Justice and Right."
Very narrow minded indeed is the man who has no higher conception of his duty than the one limiting him to the observance of positive and negative laws enacted by the legitimate authority to protect society and every one of its members.
When England, together with the other leading nations, was brutally challenged by Germany, and threatened in her very national existence, it is beyond comprehension that Canada, and all the British colonial possessions overseas, could so mistake their bounden duty as to refuse rushing to help the Mother Country in such a trying occurrence. Moreover, have we not, merely as men, duties to perform to protect Civilization against the deadly attack of barbarism, to have Justice and Right triumphant in international relations?
It is a matter of deep wonder to me that any one could have been so blind as not to perceive that in joining with Great Britain to defend the cause of the Allies, we were surely defending our own territory, our own soil, our own homes. How incredible was the "Nationalist" contention that we should have waited for the actual German attack of our land before mustering our resources of resistance. Who could not see, at a glance, that if Germany had, as it fully expected, easily triumphed over the combined forces of France, England and Russia, it would have been sheer madness to attempt resisting the victorious onslaught of a few hundred thousands of her veteran soldiers, whose valour would have been doubled by the enthusiasm of their European conquest.
After mature consideration of the possible results of the disastrous defeat of the combined efforts of the Allies, both on land and sea, the conclusion was forced upon my mind that Germany, ferociously elated by such a wonderful success, would no doubt have exacted from England the cession of Canada to her Empire. So that without even firing a gun against our territory, our wide Dominion would have been instantly transferred from the British to the German Sovereignty. I shuddered at such a vision, and still more deeply realized how much we, Canadians, were all in duty bound to help the Allies in crushing Prussian militarism.
CHAPTER XII.
The Soudanese and South African Wars
In the two previously mentioned pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa argued at length to prove that Canada had been led to intervene in the great European war as a consequence of her intervention in the South African War. It is well known throughout the Dominion that the South African conflict was the occasion chosen by the "Nationalist" leader to proclaim his doctrine that the autonomous colonies should have nothing to do with the wars of the Empire – les guerres de l'empire. He then strongly opposed Canadian support of Great Britain in her struggle in South Africa.
In one of his pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa affirmed that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had, in 1884, refused the request of the Imperial Government to interfere in its favour in the Soudanese war. Well aware of the events of this struggle, I positively knew that the "Nationalist" leader's assertion was not borne out by the facts, and was historically false. I considered it my duty, in a special chapter, to explain fully the circumstances of the case to my French Canadian countrymen.
It should be well remembered that England was brought into the Soudanese conflict on account of her relations with Egypt, which she had delivered from the Turkish yoke.
Mr. Bourassa prefaced his above mentioned affirmation by recalling the fact that it was in consideration of the Soudanese difficulties that "for the first time in the history of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, offers of armed support were made by the autonomous colonies."
Is it not evident that if – as was true – such offers were made spontaneously by the Colonies, it cannot be pretended that the proffered armed support was asked by England. If England did not solicit such support, it is plain that Sir John A. Macdonald and his Cabinet could not refuse what was never applied for.
What are the true historical facts?
In November 1884, General Laurie, who has represented one of the electoral divisions of Nova Scotia at Ottawa, who has also held a seat in the British House of Commons, took the initiative to propose to raise a Canadian regiment for the campaign in the Soudan. In the regular official way, General Laurie's offer was addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Derby. The Imperial Government declined the offer.
On the 7th of February, 1885, on hearing the news of the disaster of Khartoum, which caused great excitement in England, and naturally created a strong public feeling to avenge the outrage, General Laurie, always enthusiastic, tendered anew his services. He was not the only Canadian officer wishing to go and fight the cruel Soudaneses. A member of the Canadian Parliament, Colonel Williams, commanding the 46th volunteer battalion of Durham-East, also desired to take part in the African campaign with his regiment. On the 9th of February, 1885, he tendered his proposition to Sir Charles Tupper, then High Commissioner in London, who sent it to the Colonial Office.
On the 10th of February, His Excellency the Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, cabled to the Colonial Secretary that the offers of military service were very numerous. This spontaneous movement, so rapidly spreading, was the forerunner of those of 1899 and 1914. Thirty years ago, and long before, there were brave men in Canada. There always have been and ever will be.
These news were no doubt very encouraging for the Imperial authorities.
Lord Derby, thanking Lord Lansdowne, begged him to say "Whether they (the offers of service) are sanctioned and recommended by the Dominion Government."
On the 12th of February, Lord Lansdowne answered Lord Derby that the Dominion Government was ready to approve recruiting in Canada for service in Egypt or elsewhere, provided that the men would be enlisted under the authority of the Imperial Army Discipline Act, and the expense paid by the Imperial Treasury.
It consequently follows from the above despatches that the Soudanese campaign offered to many officers of our volunteer Militia the long wished for opportunity to freely tender their services to the Imperial Government; that the British authorities never applied to the Canadian Government, then presided by Sir John A. Macdonald, for armed support in Soudanese Africa; that, on being officially informed of the offers of service received by His Excellency the Governor General, the Colonial Secretary, before accepting or declining them, enquired if the Canadian Government sanctioned and recommended them; that the Governor General answered him in the affirmative, the recruiting to be made according to the Imperial Military Act at the expense of the Imperial exchequer.
On the 16th of February, the War Minister, then the Marquis of Hartington, informed the Colonial Secretary that he had come to the conclusion to decline with thanks the offers of service from Canada, for the reason that it would have taken too long a time to recruit and organize the regiments offered by General Laurie and Colonel Williams.
Was I not right, when I refuted Mr. Bourassa's assertion, in saying that if a refusal was then given, it was by the British Government who had received the freely tendered services, and not by the Canadian Government, to whom no demand of armed support had been made by Great Britain?
If it is indeed very astonishing that Mr. Bourassa should have taken the responsibility to affirm that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had refused to help Great Britain in the Soudanese campaign, it is easy to understand his object in so doing. His purpose was to convince his French Canadian readers that the political leaders at the head of the Government, in 1899 and 1914, together with the Canadian Parliament, had, in a revolutionary way, reversed the traditional policy of Canada of non-intervention in the "wars of the Empire" —les guerres de l'empire. And to achieve his end, so detrimental to the best interests of the Dominion, he did not hesitate to draw an absolutely erroneous conclusion from undeniable historical facts.
The