England, Canada and the Great War. Louis Georges Desjardins
permanent peace. Germany and Austria, the latter already for years dominated by the former, opposed the patriotic move of the Emperor of Russia, suggested to him by Great Britain. They agreed to be represented at the Conferences for the only object of thwarting the efforts in favour of a satisfactory enactment of new rules of International Law to henceforth protect the world against a general conflagration, and to free the nations from the crushing burdens of a militarism daily developing more extravagant.
Ministerial changes in Great Britain in no way altered this part of the foreign policy of the Mother Country. In 1905, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman became Prime Minister of England. He was well known to be an ardent pacifist. Deprecating the mad increase of unchecked militarism, he said, in his ministerial program: —
"A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences."
On the 8th of March, 1906, Lord Haldane, then Minister of War, declared in the British House of Commons: —
"I wish we were near the time when the nations would consider together the reduction of armaments… Only by united action can we get rid of the burden which is pressing so heavily on all civilized nations."
The second Conference of The Hague which took place in July and October, 1907, was then being organized. Russia was again its official promoter. Well aware of the uncompromising stand of Germany on the question of reduced armaments, she had not included that matter in the program she had decided to lay before the Conference. The British Government did all they could to have it placed on the orders to be taken into consideration. A member of the Labor Party, Mr. Vivian, moved in the House of Commons, that the Conference of The Hague be called upon to discuss that most important subject. His motion was unanimously and enthusiastically carried.
Informing the House that the Cabinet heartily approved the Resolution, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said: —
"I do not believe that at any time has the conscious public opinion in the various countries of Europe set more strongly in the direction of peace than at the present time, and yet the burden of military and naval expenditure goes on increasing. No greater service could it (the Hague Conference) do, than to make the conditions of peace less expensive than they are at the present time… It is said we are waiting upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expenditure. As a matter of fact, we are all waiting on each other. Some day or other somebody must take the first step… I do, on behalf of the Government, not only accept, but welcome such a resolution as this as a wholesome and beneficial expression of opinion."
In July, 1906, a most important meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union took place in London. Twenty-three countries, enjoying the privileges, in various proportions, of free institutions, were represented at this memorable Congress of Nations. In the course of his remarkable opening speech of the first sitting, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, Prime Minister, said: —
"Urge your Governments, in the name of humanity, to go into The Hague Conference as we ourselves hope to go, pledged to diminished charges in respect of armaments."
A motion embodying the views so earnestly pressed by the British Government was unanimously carried.
On the fifth of March, 1907, only four months before the opening of the Second Hague Conference, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, affirming the bounden duty of England to propose the restriction of armaments, said, in the British House of Commons: —
"Holding the opinion that there is a great movement of feeling among thinking people in all the nations of the world, in favor of some restraint on the enormous expenditure involved in the present system so long as it exists… We have desired and still desire to place ourselves in the very front rank of those who think that the warlike attitude of powers, as displayed by the excessive growth of armaments is a curse to Europe, and the sooner it is checked, in however moderate a degree, the better."
Unfortunately, German hostility to reduced armaments prevented any good result from the second Hague Conference in the way of checking extravagant and ruinous military organization. There was sad disappointment in all the reasonable world and specially in England at this deplorable outcome. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman expressed it as follows: —
"We had hoped that some great advance might be made towards a common consent to arrest the wasteful and growing competition in naval and military armaments. We were disappointed."
Unshaken in her determination to do her utmost to protect Civilization against the threatening and ever increasing dangers of German militarism, England persisted with the most laudable perseverance in her noble efforts to that much desired end. But all her pleadings, however convincing, were vain. Germany was obdurate. Finally, on the 30th of March, 1911, speaking in the Reichstag, the German Imperial Chancellor threw off the mask, and positively declared that the question of reduced armaments admitted of no possible solution "as long as men were men and States were States."
A more brutal declaration could hardly have been made. It was a cynical challenge to the World. Times were maturing and Germany was anxiously waiting for the opportunity to strike the blow which would stagger Humanity.
Through all the great crisis of July and August, 1914, directly consequent upon the odious crime of Sarajevo, England exhausted all her efforts to maintain peace, but unfortunately without avail.
Knowing very well how much England sincerely wished the maintenance of peace, the German Government was to the last moment under the delusion that it could succeed in having Great Britain to remain neutral in a general European war. They were not ashamed to presume they could bribe England. Without blushing they made to the British Government the infamous proposition contained in the following despatch from Sir E. Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: —
(Telegraphic.)
I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligation as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain was certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.
In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.
Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram