The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire. Glover Terrot Reaveley

The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire - Glover Terrot Reaveley


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work, pain and loss, that they may gather true strength.'" It is because God is in love with the good (bonorum amantissimus) that he gives them fortune to wrestle with. "There is a match worth God's sight (pardeo dignum) – a brave man paired with evil fortune – especially if he is himself the challenger."[187] He goes on to show that what appear to be evils are not so; that misfortunes are at once for the advantage of those whom they befall and of men in general or the universe (universis), "for which the gods care more than for individuals"; that those who receive them are glad to have them – "and deserve evil if they are not"; that misfortunes come by fate and befall men by the same law by which they are good. "Always to be happy and to go through life without a pang of the mind (sine morsu animi) is to know only one half of Nature."[188] "The fates lead us: what time remains for each of us, the hour of our birth determined. Cause hangs upon cause… Of old it was ordained whereat you should rejoice or weep; and though the lives of individuals seem marked out by a great variety, the sum total comes to one and the same thing – perishable ourselves we receive what shall perish."[189] "The good man's part is then to commit himself to fate – it is a great comfort to be carried along with the universe. Whatever it is that has bidden us thus to live and thus to die, by the same necessity it binds the gods. An onward course that may not be stayed sweeps on human and divine alike. The very founder and ruler of all things has written fate, but he follows it: he ever obeys, he once commanded."[190] To the good, God says, "To you I have given blessings sure and enduring; all your good I have set within you. Endure! herein you may even out-distance God; he is outside the endurance of evils and you above it.[191] Above all I have provided that none may hold you against your will; the door is open; nothing I have made more easy than to die; and death is quick."[192]

      Epictetus is just as clear that we have been given all we need. "What says Zeus? Epictetus, had it been possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free, and not exposed to hindrance… Since I was not able to do this, I have given you a little portion of us, this faculty of pursuing or avoiding an object, the faculty of desire and aversion and in a word the faculty of using the appearances of things."[193] "Must my leg then be lamed? Slave! do you then on account of one wretched leg find fault with the cosmos? Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole? … Will you be vexed and discontented with what Zeus has set in order, with what he and the Moiræ, who were there spinning thy nativity (génesin), ordained and appointed? I mean as regards your body; for so far as concerns reason you are no worse than the gods and no less."[194]

      The holy spirit within us

      In language curiously suggestive of another school of thought, Seneca speaks of God within us, of divine help given to human effort. "God is near you, with you, within you. I say it, Lucilius; a holy spirit sits within us (sacer intra nos spiritus sedet), spectator of our evil and our good, and guardian. Even as he is treated by us, he treats us. None is a good man without God.[195] Can any triumph over fortune unless helped by him? He gives counsel, splendid and manly; in every good man,

      What god we know not, yet a god there dwells."[196]

      "The gods," he says elsewhere, "are not scornful, they are not envious. They welcome us, and, as we ascend, they reach us their hands. Are you surprised a man should go to the gods? God comes to men, nay! nearer still! he comes into men. No mind (mens) is good without God. Divine seeds are sown in human bodies," and will grow into likeness to their origin if rightly cultivated.[197] It should be noted that the ascent is by the route of frugality, temperance and fortitude. To this we must return.

      Man's part in life is to be the "spectator and interpreter" of "God"[198] as he is the "son of God";[199] to attach himself to God;[200] to be his soldier, obey his signals, wait his call to retreat; or (in the language of the Olympian festival) to "join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time" (sympompeúsonta autô kaì syneortasonta pròs oligon), to watch the pomp and the panegyris, and then go away like a grateful and modest man;[201] to look up to God and say "use me henceforth for what thou will. I am of thy mind; I am thine."[202] "If we had understanding, what else ought we to do, but together and severally, hymn God, and bless him (euphemeîn) and tell of his benefits? Ought we not, in digging or ploughing or eating, to sing this hymn to God? 'Great is God who has given us such tools with which to till the earth; great is God who has given us hands, the power of swallowing, stomachs, the power to grow unconsciously, and to breathe while we sleep.' … What else can I do, a lame old man, but hymn God? If I were a nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale … but I am a rational creature, and I ought to hymn God; this is my proper work; I do it; nor will I quit my post so long as it is given me; and you I call upon to join in this same song."[203] Herakles in all his toils had nothing dearer to him than God, and "for that reason he was believed to be the son of God and he was."[204] "Clear away from your thoughts sadness, fear, desire, envy, avarice, intemperance, etc. But it is not possible to eject all these things, otherwise than by looking away to God alone (pròs mónon tòn theòn apobléponta) by fixing your affections on him only, by being dedicated to his commands."[205] This is "a peace not of Cæsar's proclamation (for whence could he proclaim it?) but of God's – through reason."[206]

      Humanity

      The man, who is thus in harmony with the Spermaticos, Logos, who has "put his 'I' and 'mine'"[207] in the things of the will, has no quarrel with anything external. He takes a part in the affairs of men without aggression, greed or meanness. He submits to what is laid upon him. His peace none can take away, and none can make him angry. There is a fine passage in Seneca's ninety-fifth letter, following his account of right worship already quoted, in which he proceeds to deduce from this the right attitude to men. A sentence or two must suffice. "How little it is not to injure him, whom you ought to help! Great praise forsooth, that man should be kind to man! Are we to bid a man to lend a hand to the shipwrecked, point the way to the wanderer, share bread with the hungry? … This fabric which you see, wherein are divine and human, is one. We are members of a great body. Nature has made us of one blood, has implanted in us mutual love, has made us for society (sociabiles). She is the author of justice and equity… Let that verse be in your heart and on your lip.

      Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto"[208]

      "Unhappy man! will you ever love? (ecquando amabis)" he says to the irritable.[209] A little before, he said, "Man, a sacred thing to man, is slain for sport and merriment; naked and unarmed he is led forth; and the mere death of a man is spectacle enough."[210] This was the Stoic's condemnation of the gladiatorial shows. Nor was it only by words that Stoicism worked for humanity, for it was Stoic lawyers who softened and broadened and humanized Roman law.[211]

      Yet Stoicism in Seneca and Epictetus had reached its zenith. From now onward it declined. Marcus Aurelius, in some ways the most attractive of all Stoics, was virtually the last. With the second century Stoicism ceased to be an effective force in occupying and inspiring the whole mind of men, though it is evident that it still influenced thinkers. Men studied the Stoics and made


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<p>187</p>

de providentia, 2, 6-9.

<p>188</p>

de Prov. 4, 1.

<p>189</p>

de Prov. 5, 7. See Justin Martyr's criticism of Stoic fatalism, Apol. ii, 7. It involves, he says, either God's identity with the world of change, or his implication in all vice, or else that virtue and vice are nothing – consequences which are alike contrary to every sane eeenoia, to logos and to noûs.

<p>190</p>

de Prov. 5, 8.

<p>191</p>

Plutarch, adv. Stoicos, 33, on this Stoic paradox of the equality of God and the sage.

<p>192</p>

de Prov. 6, 5-7. This Stoic justification of suicide was repudiated alike by Christians and Neo-Platonists.

<p>193</p>

D. i, 1.

<p>194</p>

D. i, 12. See also D. ii, 16 "We say 'Lord God! how shall I not be anxious?' Fool, have you not hands, did not God make them for you? Sit down now and pray that your nose may not run."

<p>195</p>

Cf. Cicero's Stoic, N.D. ii, 66, 167, Nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit.

<p>196</p>

Ep. 41, 1, 2. (The line is from Virgil, Aen. viii, 352.) The rest of the letter develops the idea of divine dependence. Sic animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus at propius quidem divina nossemus, conversatur quidem nobiscum sed hæret origini suæ, etc.

<p>197</p>

Ep. 73, 15, 16.

<p>198</p>

Epictetus, D. i, 6.

<p>199</p>

D. i, 9.

<p>200</p>

D. iv, 1.

<p>201</p>

D. iv, 1.

<p>202</p>

D. ii, 16 end, with a variant between sós eimi and ísos eimi, the former of which, Long says, is certain.

<p>203</p>

D. i, 16. Contrast the passage of Clement quoted on p. 286.

<p>204</p>

D. ii, 16.

<p>205</p>

D. ii, 16.

<p>206</p>

D. iii, 13.

<p>207</p>

D. ii, 22.

<p>208</p>

Ep. 95, 51-53.

<p>209</p>

de ira, iii, 28, 1.

<p>210</p>

Ep. 95, 33, homo sacra res homini.

<p>211</p>

See Lecky, European Morals, i, 294 ff.: Maine, Ancient Law, p. 54 f.