Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress
to screen myself, as much as possible, from intermixing in discussions; a task which is never agreeable, but is at present peculiarly distressing and afflicting to my feelings. I also thought that the session had already been sufficiently fruitful of discussions intimately connected with the bill before us; and that the public interests, at this time, required action. I know, too, sir, that I owe an apology to the Senate, for the great number of amendments which, under their indulgence, has been made to this bill after it was first presented to their consideration. But, sir, you will find some apology in the intrinsic difficulty and delicacy of the subject itself, and also in the disposition manifested by the committee, to give to the objections made by the opponents of the bill, that respectful attention to which many of them were certainly entitled, and to accommodate its provisions, as far as possible, to the views of those gentlemen. After every effort, however, to effect this object, it still appears that the bill presents temptations for addressing the popular sensibility too strong to be resisted by gentlemen in the opposition. They have, accordingly, with great zeal and ability, described the provisions of the bill as dangerous and alarming to the rights and liberties of the people. This, sir, is the common course of opposition, and applies to every strong measure requiring the exercise of much Executive discretion. I think, however, I shall be able to show that there is no new principle contained in the provisions of that bill; but that every provision it contains is amply justified by precedents in pre-existing laws, which have not been found to be so destructive to the rights of the people, as gentlemen strenuously insist similar provisions in this bill will be, if they receive the sanction of law. In performing this task, I shall bring into view only such parts of the bill as have been objected to by gentlemen, presuming that, as their objections have evidently been the result of great industry and deliberation, all other parts of the bill remain unobjectionable. I shall also, perhaps, avoid some of the observations respecting minute details; apply my remarks generally to principles; and thus bring my observations and replies into as short a compass as possible.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Goodrich) commenced his remarks by declaring the embargo to be a permanent measure, deprecating its effects, as ruinous at home and ineffectual abroad. These observations have been repeatedly made by others, and already replied to by several gentlemen, as well as myself; and I am strengthened in the correctness of those replies by all the further reflections I have been enabled to bestow upon them. This part of the subject will, therefore, be passed over without further notice, except to remark, that perhaps one of the causes of the inefficacy of the measure abroad, has been the unprincipled violations of its provisions at home; and the great and leading object of the present bill is to prevent such violations. Upon this part of the subject I am happy to find that one of its most strenuous and judicious opposers (Mr. Hillhouse) has candidly informed the Senate, that the provisions of the bill are admirably calculated to effect that object – and if in their practical operation they should realize the character anticipated by that gentleman, I shall feel no regret for that portion of labor I have bestowed upon them. Indeed, I shall congratulate the committee as well as myself in having been so fortunate as to find a competent remedy for so great an evil.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Goodrich) informs us, that the public councils are pressing on to measures pregnant with the most alarming results. I hope the gentleman is mistaken in his apprehensions, and I should have been much pleased if the gentleman had been good enough to point them to a better course; but, sir, he has not done so, nor has any gentleman on the same side of the question. Indeed, sir, it would give me great pleasure to do something that would be agreeable to our Eastern friends; but, unfortunately, amidst all the intrinsic difficulties which press upon us, that seems to be not among the least of them. The gentlemen themselves will not explicitly tell us what would produce the effect – and I am inclined to think that nothing short of putting the Government in their hands would do it. Even this would not be exempt from difficulties. The gentlemen from that part of the United States are nearly equally divided among themselves respecting the proper course of measures to be pursued, and there is an immense majority in every other part of the United States, in favor of the measures proposed; we are therefore surrounded with real and intrinsic difficulties from every quarter, and those of a domestic nature are infinitely the most formidable, and most to be deprecated. Indeed, sir, under present circumstances, the administration of the Government cannot be a pleasant task; and, in my judgment, it requires a great effort of patriotism to undertake it, not on account of external pressures, but on account of internal discontents, stimulated, too, by so many artful intrigues. But for these unfortunate circumstances, every gentleman would feel an honorable pride in contributing his efforts to devise measures for repelling foreign aggressions, and he would court the responsibility attached to his station. I would not, Mr. President, give up a scintilla of that portion of the responsibility which the crisis imposes on me. Indeed, sir, to have the honor of bearing my full share of it, is the only inducement I have at this moment for occupying a place on this floor. Without that consideration I should now be in retirement. But when I turn my eyes upon internal divisions, discontents and violations of law, and am compelled to think of measures for their suppression, it produces the most painful sensations and distressing reflections.
The great principle of objection, the gentlemen tell us, consists in the transfer of legislative powers to the Executive Department. This is an old an abstract question, often heretofore brought into view, and leads to endless discussion. I think I shall be able to show that the bill introduces no new principle in this respect, but only applies an established principle to new practical objects. The general principle of the separation of departments is generally admitted in the abstract; but the difficulties in this discussion arise from applying the principle to practical objects. The great difficulty exists in the attempt to fix on the precise boundary line between legislative and Executive powers in their practical operation. This is not possi-1 You might attempt the search for the philosopher's stone, or the discovery of the perpetual motion, with as much prospect of success. The reason of this difficulty is, that the practical objects and events to which this abstract principle is attempted to be applied, are perpetually varying, according to the practical progression of human affairs, and therefore cannot admit of any uniform standard of application. This reflection might have saved the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) the trouble of reading to us the constitution or bill of rights of Massachusetts, in which the principle of separation of departments is very clearly and properly laid down, and which will be very readily assented to in the abstract, but which forms no part of the question in dispute. It cannot, however, escape observation, that this principle is not laid down, even in the abstract, in the Constitution of the United States; and, although it is the leading principle of the constitution, and probably was the principal guide in its formation, it is nevertheless in several respects departed from.
This body partakes essentially both of the legislative and Executive powers of the Government. The Executive Department also partakes of the legislative powers, as far at least as an approbation of, and a qualified negative of the laws extend, &c. I make these observations, however, not in derogation of the general principle of the separation of powers among the several departments, so far as is practicable, but merely to show that there must necessarily be some limitations in its practical operation. Perhaps the best general rule for guiding our discretion upon this subject will be found to consist in this: That legislation ought to extend as far as definition is practicable – when definition stops, execution must necessarily begin. But some of the particular provisions of this bill will furnish more precise illustrations of my opinions upon this question; it will, therefore, be waived until I shall come to their consideration.
I will now proceed to examine the more particular objections urged against the detail of this bill. Its provisions respecting the coasting trade are said to be objectionable in the following respects:
First objection: The penalty of the bonds required, is said to be excessive. To enable us to decide correctly upon this point, the object proposed to be effected, and the penalty required, should be considered in reference to each other. The object is to prevent, by means of coasting vessels, domestic articles from being carried abroad. Flour, for instance, to the West Indies. The price of that article here is less than five dollars; in the West Indies it is said to be thirty and upward. The penalty of the bonds required is six times the amount of the value of the vessel and cargo. Is any gentleman prepared to say a smaller penalty will effect the object?
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