Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress
by reason of these edicts, still there is nothing "abject or degrading" in carrying on such trade as these edicts leave open to us, let it be never so small or so trifling; which, however, it might be easily shown, as it has been, that it is neither the one nor the other. Sir, in this point of view, it is no more disgraceful for us to trade to Sweden, to China, to the Northwest coast, or to Spain and her dependencies – not one of which countries is now included in those edicts – than it is disgraceful for us to walk, because we are unable to fly; no more than it is shameful for man to use and enjoy the surface of this globe, because he has not at his command the whole circle of nature, and cannot range at will over all the glorious spheres which constitute the universe.
The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Campbell) called upon us just now to tell him what was disgraceful submission, if carrying on commerce under these restrictions was not such submission. I will tell that gentleman. That submission is "abject and disgraceful" which yields to the decrees of frail and feeble power, as though they were irresistible; which takes counsel of fear, and weighs not our comparative force; which abandons the whole, at a summons to deliver up a part; which makes the will of others the measure of rights, which God and nature not only have constituted eternal and unalienable, but have also endued us with ample means to maintain.
My argument on this clause of the report of the committee may be presented in this form: either the United States have or they have not physical ability to carry on commerce in defiance of the edicts of both or of either of these nations. If we have not physical ability to carry on the trade which they prohibit, then it is no disgrace to exercise that commerce which these irresistible decrees permit. If we have such physical ability, then, to the degree in which we abandon that commerce which we have power to carry on, is our submission "abject and disgraceful." It is yielding without a struggle; it is sacrificing our rights, not because we have not force, but because we have not spirit to maintain them. It is in this point of view that I am disgusted with this report. It abjures what it recommends; it declaims, in heroics, against submission, and proposes, in creeping prose, a tame and servile subserviency.
It cannot be concealed, let gentlemen try as much as they will, that we can trade, not only with one, but with both these belligerents, notwithstanding these restrictive decrees. The risk to Great Britain against French capture scarcely amounts to two per cent.; that to France against Great Britain is unquestionably much greater. But, what is that to us? It is not our fault, if the power of Britain on the ocean is superior to that of Bonaparte. It is equal and exact justice between both nations for us to trade with both, as far as it is in our power. Great as the power of Britain is on the ocean, the enterprise and intrepidity of our merchants are more than a match for it. They will get your products to the Continent in spite of her navy. But suppose they do not; suppose they fail, and are captured in the attempt; what is that to us? After we have given them full notice of all their dangers, and perfect warning, either of our inability or of our determination not to protect them, if they take the risk, it is at their peril. And, upon whom does the loss fall? As it does now, through the operation of your embargo, on the planter, on the farmer, on the mechanic, on the day-laborer? No, sir; on the insurer – on the capitalist – on those who in the full exercise of their intelligence, apprised of all the circumstances, are willing to take the hazard for the sake of the profit.
I will illustrate my general idea by a supposition. There are two avenues to the ocean from the harbor of New York – by the Narrows, and through Long Island Sound. Suppose the fleets, both of France and Great Britain, should block up the Narrows, so that to pass them would be physically impossible, in the relative state of our naval force. Will gentlemen seriously contend that there would be any thing "abject or disgraceful," if the people of New York should submit to carry on their trade through the Sound? Would the remedy for this interference with our rights be abandoning the ocean altogether? Again: suppose, that instead of both nations blockading the same point, each should station its force at a different one – France at the mouth of the Sound, Britain at the Narrows. In such case, would staying at home, and refusing any more to go upon the sea, be an exercise of independence in the citizens of New York? Great philosophers may call it "dignified retirement," if they will. I call it, and I am mistaken if the people would not call it, "base and abject submission." Sir, what in such a case would be true honor? Why, to consider well which adversary is the weakest, and cut our way to our rights through the path which he obstructs. Having removed the smaller impediment, we should return with courage, strengthened by trial and animated by success, to the relief of our rights, from the pressure of the strongest assailant. But, all this is war; and war is never to be incurred. If this be the national principle, avow it; tell your merchants you will not protect them; but, for Heaven's sake, do not deny them the power of relieving their own and the nation's burdens, by the exercise of their own ingenuity. Sir, impassable as the barriers offered by these edicts are in the estimation of members on this floor, the merchants abroad do not estimate them as insurmountable. Their anxiety to risk their property, in defiance of them, is full evidence of this. The great danger to mercantile ingenuity is internal envy – the corrosion of weakness or prejudice. Its external hazard is ever infinitely smaller. That practical intelligence which this class of men possesses, beyond any other in the community, excited by self-interest – the strongest of human passions – is too elastic to be confined by the limits of exterior human powers, however great or uncommon. Build a Chinese wall, and the wit of your merchants, if permitted freely to operate, will break through it or overleap it, or undercreep it.
–"mille adde catenas
Effugiet tamen, hæc sceleratus vincula Proteus."
The second branch of the alternatives under consideration is equally deceptive – "War with both nations." Can this ever be an alternative? Did you ever read in history, can you conceive in fancy, a war of two nations, each of whom is at war with the other, without a union with one against the other immediately resulting? It cannot exist in nature. The very idea is absurd. It never can be an alternative, whether we shall find two nations each hostile to the other. But it may be, and if we are to fight at all, it is a very serious question, which of the two we are to select as an adversary. As to the third branch of these celebrated alternatives, "a continuance and enforcement of the present system of commerce," I need not spend time to show that this does not include all the alternatives which exist under this head – since the committee immediately admit, that there does exist another alternative, "partial repeal," about which they proceed to reason.
The report proceeds. "The first" (abject and degrading submission) "cannot require any discussion." Certainly not. Submission of that quality which the committee assume, and with the epithets of which they choose to invest it, can never require discussion at any time. But, whether trading under these orders and decrees be such submission, whether we are not competent to resist them in part, if not in whole, without a total abandonment of the exercise of all our maritime rights, the comparative effects of the edicts of each upon our commerce and the means we possess to influence or control either, are all fair and proper subjects of discussion; some of which the committee have wholly neglected and none of which have they examined, as the House had a right to expect.
The committee proceed "to dissipate the illusion" that there is any "middle course," and to reassert the position before examined, that "there is no other alternative than war with both nations, or a continuance of the present system." This position they undertake to support by two assertions. First, that "war with one of the belligerents only, would be submission to the edicts and will of the other." Second, that "repeal in whole or in part of the embargo, must necessarily be war or submission."
As to the first assertion, it is a miserable fallacy, confounding coincidence of interest with subjection of will; things in their nature palpably distinct. A man may do what another wills, nay, what he commands, and not act in submission to his will, or in obedience to his command. Our interest or duty may coincide with the line of conduct another presumes to prescribe. Shall we vindicate our independence at the expense of our social or moral obligations? I exemplify my idea in this way. Two bullies beset your door, from which there are but two avenues. One of them forbids you to go by the left, the other forbids you to go by the right avenue. Each is willing that you should pass by the way which he permits. In such case, what will you do? Will you keep house forever, rather than make choice of the path through which you will resume your external rights? You cannot go both