Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress
he should have many scruples as to the propriety of offering such a one. Were the precedent to be set by the passage of this resolution, the House might hereafter witness a struggle on the floor to determine who should be first to come forward with a proposition expressive of approbation. The human mind might be so operated upon that the Executive might feel himself under an obligation to promote the person bringing forward such a motion. I, said Mr. H., would be one of the last to introduce such a motion were I a friend to the President; and if I were not a friend to the President, I would not bring it forward, lest it should be thought that I was courting favor in his eyes. But why, sir, should this House give an expression of approbation of the President? Because, we are told, it may be a guide to him hereafter. Let this House be careful how it acts, and attend to its own duties. The President does not stand in need of this kind of support. I never will step forward as a member of this House, to excite him to his duty by a vote of this kind. I believe he possesses an attachment to his duty sufficient to induce him to perform it. I believe that the voice of the people of the United States is such, in relation to the present and late President, that they believe they were well disposed to do their duty, and that they have done their duty; but it does not follow that we ought to express our approbation as to any particular act. The gentleman himself says that the President has only done his duty. Is it not surprising, then, that we are called upon to give him the approbation of this House? What would be inferred from this procedure? Why, that it is so seldom our Presidents have done their duty, that, in the very first instance in which they have done it, the House of Representatives had discovered and applauded it. If the gentleman thinks so, I wholly disagree with him. If our officers do their duty properly, they will receive the thanks of the nation; and where is the propriety of singling out for approbation or disapprobation this particular act? I see none. It is asked, will you leave the President of the United States to grope in the dark, and not let him know whether he has received our approbation or not? And is the President to judge from the thanks of the House that he has done his duty? How is he to know that they have expressed their sense of his conduct from proper motives? Would he not be right to suspect those who vote for, and more especially those who bring forward such a proposition, of improper motives? He would be left still worse to grope in the dark. It has been said that former Presidents have been deceived in consequence of votes of approbation; and the same would again occur. On every ground I am opposed to the passing such resolutions on principle, and shall therefore vote for indefinite postponement. It was indefinitely postponed.
Saturday, May 27
Mr. Stanford said he had risen to offer a resolution, which he wanted to have offered immediately after that which had been offered by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) and adopted by the House, on the subject of prosecutions for libel at common law; but not being able to get the floor, he would now beg leave to move his by way of instruction to the same committee. That committee, Mr. S. said, had been charged with an inquiry into what prosecutions for libel at common law had been instituted in the courts of the United States, which he hoped the committee would duly make, and lay before the House. Thus the House would see what system of persecution, if any, had been resorted to, and cherished by the late Administration or its friends, in any part of the United States; and he equally hoped some remedy might be devised at this time, the beginning of a new Administration, to obviate any like occurrence in future. But, said Mr. S., let it not be that any thing be done partially. While we are about to bring to our view all the cases of prosecution for libel under the common law, we are not likely to know any thing about prosecutions for libel which had occurred under the sedition law, and that too under a different Administration. We have not authorized any such inquiry. That abuses have occurred under both, is but too probable, and I think it will be liberal, as it is just and fair, to make the inquiry more general on the subject. If any citizen has been oppressed or injured by such prosecutions, let it be known, and let justice be done him; even now, if with propriety any way can be devised to do so. Inquiry, however, is all that is asked for the present.
It may be perceived, said Mr. S., and if not, I wish it should be understood when I speak of justice being done, that I speak with rather peculiar reference to a gentleman of this House, who has been a principal sufferer under the well-known sedition law. I think it never too late to do justice, under whatever circumstances or motives of policy it may have been withheld for a time. I trust no gentleman will, upon this occasion, suspect me of a design to excite any party feelings. It certainly is not my wish, whatever may be the effect. The resolution I am about to offer is not so framed, nor would it necessarily involve the question of the constitutionality of the law. I feel persuaded, therefore, that the different gentlemen of the House may, from a spirit of liberality and fair concession, indulge the inquiry asked for.
But, sir, said he, since the other inquiry has been gone into, it cannot be unfair to say that the majority of the House owe it to themselves to extend the inquiry, as well to cases of prosecution under the sedition law, as to those under the common law; and I shall be permitted to say also, they owe it as well to the feelings and sufferings of the gentleman to whom I have alluded. Whatever may be the aspect of political opinions and parties now, it is known to you, sir, and a few others on this floor, that to him much is due for the present ascendency of the majority; perhaps to no one more, to the extent of his sphere of action and influence. In the famous contested election for President in this House, eight or nine years ago, he gave the vote of a State, which sufficed to decide the contest; and more especially so, if the blank votes of the State of Maryland could have rendered that vote doubtful. But, however such considerations may or may not avail, nothing is more clear to me than that the inquiry should be indulged on the most liberal principles.
Resolved, That the committee, appointed to inquire into what prosecutions for libels at common law have been instituted before the courts of the United States, be instructed to inquire what prosecutions for libels have been instituted before the courts of the United States under the second section of the act entitled "An act in addition to an act, entitled 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,'" passed the 14th day of July, 1798, and the expediency of remunerating the sufferers under such prosecutions.
Mr. Sawyer moved to amend the resolution by adding, at the end of it, the words "and that the committee also inquire whether any and what private compensation has been made to such suffering persons."
Mr. Macon said he did not know how the committee could go about to make such an inquiry as that contemplated by the amendment. The gentleman must be well satisfied that the Government could not rightfully inquire into transactions between individuals.
Mr. Dana said that he had no particular objection to meet this inquiry. As to the disclosure of facts as to the reimbursement by individual contribution, it might be amusing, if this House had authority to make it. He said he should like to know who contributed to the relief of James Thompson Callender, when he was prosecuted; but he had some doubt whether it was proper to enter into any inquiry or whether it was proper to pass the resolution pointing to the remuneration of sufferers under the sedition law. He should have supposed that it might be proper to leave it at large for the committee to report. He said he had certainly no objection to inquire, though he conceived that prosecutions at common law and under the sedition law were essentially different; because, supposing the Congress of the United States to pass such a law, the courts of the United States might take cognizance of it; but, without such a law, it did not belong to the judiciary to extend its care to the protection of the Government from slander. Such was the decision of Judge Chase, (said Mr. D.,) who decided that the court had no jurisdiction at common law in suits for libel; and the Supreme Court of the United States never did decide the question. The strong contrast is this: that while there was a description of men who said that no prosecution could be had at common law for libel, nor under the statute which modified the common law so as to allow the truth to be given in evidence – who, while they excited indignation against this statute, should afterwards undertake to institute prosecutions at common law where there was no limitation in favor of the defendant. There is this difference in the cases: that we find practice precisely different from professions. I do not say that the heads of departments were instrumental in instituting these prosecutions; but it marks some of the subordinate men who were active in making professions. I am very willing that the proposed inquiry should be made; but I cannot see the propriety of our undertaking to give