Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History. Paul Vinogradoff
even that the old law books, i.e. those of Bracton and his followers, teach the opposite doctrine. They deal almost exclusively with the case of a feoffment made by the lord to a villain and his heirs, and give the feoffee an action only on the ground of implied manumission. The feoffor enfranchises his serf indirectly, even if he does not say so in as many words, because he has spoken of the feoffee's heirs, and the villain has no other heirs besides the lord87. The action eventually proceeds in this case, because it is brought not by a serf but by a freed man. One difficult passage in Bracton points another way; it is printed in a foot-note88. There can be no doubt, that in it Bracton is speaking of a covenant made by the lord not with a free man or a freed man, but with a villain. This comes out strongly when it is said, that the lord, and not the villain, has the assize against intruders, and when the author puts the main question—is the feoffor bound to hold the covenant or not? The whole drift of the quotation can be understood only on the fundamental assumption that we have lord and villain before us. But there are four words which militate against this obvious explanation; the words 'sibi et heredibus suis.' We know what their meaning is—they imply enfranchisement and a freehold estate of inheritance. They involve a hopeless contradiction to the doctrine previously stated, a doctrine which might be further supported by references to Britton, Fleta and Bracton himself89. In short, if we accept them, we can hardly get out of confusion. Were our text of Bracton much more definitely and satisfactorily settled than it is90, one would still feel tempted to strike them out; as it is we have a text studded with interpolations and errors, and it seems quite certain that 'sibi et heredibus suis' has got into it simply because the compositor of Tottell's edition repeated it from the conclusion of the sentence immediately preceding, and so mixed up two cases, which were to be distinguished by this very qualification. The four words are missing in all the MSS. of the British Museum, the Bodleian and the Cambridge University Library91. I have no doubt that further verification will only confirm my opinion. On my assumption Bracton clearly distinguishes between two possibilities. In one case the deed simply binds the lord as to a particular person, in the other it binds him in perpetuity; and in this latter case, as there ought not to be any heirs of a bondman but the lord, bondage is annihilated by the deed. It is not annihilated when one person is granted a certain privilege as to a particular piece of land, and in every other respect the grantee and all his descendants remain unfree92:—he has no freehold, but he has a special covenant to fall back upon. This seems to lie at the root of what Bracton calls privileged villainage by covenant as distinguished from villain socage93.
Legal practice as to conventions.
The reader may well ask whether there are any traces of such an institution in practice, as it is not likely that Bracton would have indulged in mere theoretical disquisitions on such an important point. Now it would be difficult to find very many instances in point; the line between covenant and enfranchisement was so easily passed, and an incautious step would have such unpleasant consequences for landlords, that they kept as clear as possible of any deeds which might indirectly destroy their claims as to the persons of their villains94. On the other hand, even privileged serfs would have a great difficulty in vindicating their rights on the basis of covenant if they remained at the same time under the sway of the lord in general. The difficulties on both sides explain why Fleta and Britton endorse only the chief point of Bracton's doctrine, namely, the implied manumission, and do not put the alternative as to a covenant when heirs are not mentioned. Still I have come across some traces in legal practice95 of contracts in the shape of the one discussed. A very interesting case occurred in Norfolk in 1227, before Martin Pateshull himself. A certain Roger of Sufford gave a piece of land to one of his villains, William Tailor, to hold freely by free services, and when Roger died, his son and heir William of Sufford confirmed the lease. When it pleased the lord afterwards to eject the tenant, this latter actually brought an assize of novel disseisin and recovered possession. Bracton's marginal note to the case runs thus: 'Note, that the son of a villain recovered by an assize of novel disseisin a piece of land which his father had held in villainage, because the lord of the villain by his charter gave it to the son [i.e. to the plaintiff], even without manumission96.' The court went in this case even further than Bracton's treatise would have warranted: the villain was considered as having the freehold, and an assize of novel disseisin was granted; but although such a treatment of the case was perhaps not altogether sound, the chief point on which the contention rested is brought out clearly enough. There was a covenant, and in consequence an action, although there was no manumission; and it is to this point that the marginal note draws special attention97.
Waynage.
Again, we find in the beginning of Bracton's treatise a remark98 which is quite out of keeping with the doctrine that the villain had no property to vindicate against his lord; it is contradicted by other passages in the same book, and deserves to be considered the more carefully on that account. Our author is enumerating the cases in which the serf has an action against his lord. He follows Azo closely, and mentions injury to life or to limb as one cause. Azo goes on to say that a plaint may be originated by intollerabilis injuria, in the sense of corporeal injury. Bracton takes the expression in a very different sense; he thinks that economic ruin is meant, and adds, 'Should the lord go so far as to take away the villain's very waynage, i.e. plough and plough-team, the villain has an action.' It is true that Bracton's text, as printed in existing editions, contains a qualification of this remark; it is said that only serfs on ancient demesne land are possessed of such a right. But the qualification is meaningless; the right of ancient demesne tenants was quite different, as we shall see by-and-by. The qualifying clause turns out to be inserted only in later MSS. of the treatise, is wanting in the better MSS., and altogether presents all the characters of a bad gloss99. When the gloss is removed, we come in sight of the fact that Bracton in the beginning of his treatise admits a distinct case of civil action on the part of a villain against his lord. The remark is in contradiction with the Roman as well as with the established English doctrine, it is not supported by legal practice in the thirteenth century, it is omitted by Bracton when he comes to speak again of the 'persona standi in judicio contra dominum100.' But there it is, and it cannot be explained otherwise than as a survival of a time when some part of the peasantry at least had not been surrendered to the lord's discretion, but was possessed of civil rights and of the power to vindicate them. The notion that the peasant ought to be specially protected in the possession of instruments of agricultural labour comes out, singularly enough, in the passage commented upon, but it is not a singular notion in itself. It occurs, as every one knows, in the clause of the Great Charter, which says that the villain who falls into the king's mercy is to be amerced 'saving his waynage.' We come across it often enough in Plea Rolls in cases against guardians accused of having wasted their ward's property. One of the special points in such cases often is, that a guardian or his steward has been ruining the villains in the ward's manors by destroying their waynage101. Of course, the protection of the peasant's prosperity, guaranteed by the courts in such trials, is wholly due to a consideration of the interests of the ward; and the care taken of villains is exactly parallel to the attention bestowed upon oaks and elms. Still, the notion of waynage is in itself a peculiar and an important one, and whatever its ultimate origin may be, it points to a civil condition which does not quite fall within the lines of feudal law.
Villains not to be devised.
Another anomaly is supplied by Britton. After putting the case as strongly as possible against serfs, after treating them as mere chattels to be given and sold, he adds, 'But as bondmen are annexed to the freehold of the lord, they are not devisable by testament, and therefore Holy Church can take no cognisance of them
Bracton, 192 b: 'Si autem dominus ita dederit sine manumissione, servo et heredibus suis tenendum libere, presumi poterit de hoc quod servum voluit esse liberum, cum aliter servus heredes habere non possit nisi cum libertate et ita contra dominum excipientem de villenagio competit ei replicatio.' Cf. 23 b and Britton, i. 247; Fleta, 238; Littleton, secs. 205, 207.
Bracton, 24 b: 'Si autem in charta hoc tantum contineatur, habendum et tenendum tali (cum sit servus) per liberum servitium huiusmodi verba non faciunt servum liberum nec dant ei liberum tenementum … Quia tenementum nichil confert nec detrahit personae, nisi praecedat, ut dictum est, homagium vel manumissio, vel quod tantundem valet de concessione domini, scilicet quod villanus libere teneat et quiete et per liberum servitium,
The freehold would be given and still 'non recuperet per assisam no. diss. quia domino competit assisa et non villano.'
See my article, 'The Text of Bracton,' in the Law Quarterly Review, i. 189, et sqq.; and Maitland, Introduction to the Note-book of Bracton, 26 sqq.
The Cambridge MSS. have been inspected for me by Mr. Maitland.
Comp. Bracton, f. 194 b: 'Quia ex quo mentionem fecit de heredibus praesumitur vehementer, quod dominus voluit servum esse liberum
Bracton, f. 208 b: 'Est etiam villenagium non ita purum, sive concedatur libero homini
The later practice is well known. Any agreement with a bondman led to a forfeiture of the lord's rights. It may be seen at a glance that such could not have been the original doctrine. Otherwise why should the old books lay such stress on the mention of heirs?
Besides the case from the Note-book which I discuss in the text, Bracton, f. 199, is in point: 'Item esto quod villanus teneat per liberum servitium sibi tantum, nulla facta mentione de heredibus, si cum ejectus fuerit proferat assisam, et cum objecta fuerit exceptio villenagii, replicet quod libere teneat et petat assisam, non valebit replicatio, ex quo nulla mentio facta est de heredibus,
Bract. Note-book, pl. 1814: 'Nota quod filius villani recuperat per assisam noue disseisine terram quam pater suus tenuit in villenagio quia dominus villani illam dedit filio suo per cartam suam eciam sine manumissione.'
F.W. Maitland tells me, that Concanen's Report of
Bracton, f. 6: 'Et in hoc legem habent contra dominos, quod stare possunt in judicio contra eos de vita et membris propter saevitiam dominorum, vel propter intollerabilem injuriam, ut si eos destruant, quod salvum non possit eis esse waynagium suum. [Hoc autem verum est de illis servis, qui tenent de antiquo dominico coronae, sed de aliis secus est, quia quandocunque placuerit domino, auferre poterit a villano suo waynagium suum et omnia bona sua.] Expedit enim reipublicae ne quis re sua male utatur.'
See my article in the L.Q.R., i. 195.
Bracton, f. 196-202.
Coram Rege, 15 Edw. I, m. 18: '… licet habeant alia averia per que distringi possent distringit eos per averia de carucis suis quod est contra statutum domini Regis.' (Record Office.)