The 56th Division. Charles Humble Dudley Ward
absolutely bewildering. A guide was a treacherous person to trust, or perhaps we should say he was a broken reed to lean on; for the poor fellow had no treacherous intent in his heart, he was anxious enough to lead troops in the right direction, but nine times out of ten was completely lost a few minutes after he started. And there were, perhaps, more mistakes made in attempting to trace the front line in that great battle than in any other.
Guillemont was held by us; Combles was strongly held by the Germans. Between these two places was Leuze Wood. We held, with more or less certainty, the line of the road between Leuze Wood and Guillemont, and we also held the country between Leuze Wood and Falfemont Farm, and had pushed troops into the wood itself; but the situation in the rest of the square marked 27 was very vague (see map)—the only certain thing was that there were many Germans there. Except for the wood and the line of the road to Guillemont, the Germans held all of squares 20 and 21. We had a nasty, elongated triangle pushed into enemy territory, and it had a wobbly right side to it.
The Kensingtons went into the front line not very far from Falfemont Farm, in the lower left corner of square 27. The London Scottish were supposed to be in support to the Royal Irish Rifles, and got into a two-foot scrape, unworthy of the name of “trench,” about three-quarters of the way through Leuze Wood. The Royal Irish Rifles were imagined to be holding the most southern end of Bouleaux Wood across the road which separated it from Leuze Wood.
The positions were, of course, taken over at night, and the next day the French attacked Combles. In order to help our Allies our guns started a bombardment, but unfortunately most of their shells fell around Leuze Wood. It was one of the unavoidable accidents of war. Close shooting has to be done, and there are many possible causes, from faulty ammunition to wet ground, for guns shooting short. It is none the less annoying to the infantry. Capt. A. H. Macgregor, of “C” Company (London Scottish), made strong remarks in writing, but failed to stop the energetic gunners.
The Irish were having a much worse time than the London Scottish, as they were also being heavily bombarded by the Germans. So they decided to evacuate their trench.
All this led to some confusion, and on top of it the enemy launched a bombing attack, which was probably in support of their counter-attack on the French. The London Scottish reserve companies, which were at Wedge Wood, moved up, and the battalion prepared to defend Leuze Wood, which they imagined would shortly be heavily attacked. But the Irish, although they lost heavily, threw back the German bombers and were relieved by two companies of the London Scottish.
By midnight everything was re-established as it had been before, and, while probing about in the dark, the London Scottish gathered in two enemy officers and fourteen other ranks of the 107th Infantry Regt. as prisoners.
The position they were in was on the south of the road, and it was decided to try and dig a trench on the edge of Bouleaux Wood, that is, on the other side of the road. A platoon was sent forward the following morning to undertake this work. It was successfully carried out, and the covering party managed to inflict a good many casualties on the enemy—Sergt. Smith, of “B” Company, shot eight—and three further prisoners were taken.
This experience of the London Scottish will give some idea of the conditions which ruled what was officially known as “holding the line.” At any moment a post might be wrested from you and have to be fought for again, and all the time you were described as “established” in Leuze Wood.
On the night of the 7th September the Queen Victoria’s Rifles took over this bit of line, and the London Scottish went back to Maltz Horn Farm.
On the night of the 6/7th September, General Hull took over command of the divisional front from the G.O.C. 5th Division. There was a slight readjustment of line the next night, and it was then held by the 169th Brigade on the right and in touch with the 1st French Division, and the 168th Brigade on the left and in touch with the 16th Division on the Combles-Guillemont road.
There was to be a big attack on the 9th, but the position from which the 56th Division had to start was not too satisfactory. A study of the battle of the Somme will show that at some time or other every unit lost direction. It was exceedingly difficult to recognise an objective; even the heaps of ruins which marked the sites of villages were frequently mistaken. It is a rolling, featureless country. But perhaps the chief cause of loss of direction was the shape of the jumping-off line. The German defence was very obstinate and the fighting severe. Troops, having made an advance, had to hang on anywhere, facing the enemy where he opposed them most fiercely. The result was a zigzag line, a crazy front, where troops frequently faced east and west and were told to attack north. On an ordinary practice field-day, a platoon commander can get his men out of a trench and make them wheel in the desired direction, but in action attacking troops will always be drawn towards the nearest firing. Men getting out of a trench and hearing or seeing an enemy in front of them will go towards him, no matter how much orders to the contrary have been dinned into their heads.
Consider the line of the 56th Division. The left along the Guillemont-Leuze Wood road was facing due north; it then curled round the wood and faced south-east; another curl made the extreme right of the line face north-east. The attack on the 9th was to be in a north-easterly direction.
To get a better line and form a strong flank facing Combles, an attempt was made to clear the enemy from the trenches south-east of Leuze Wood.
The London Rifle Brigade had relieved the Kensingtons on the right of the line, and companies were somewhat puzzled by their position, which is described as “most obscure.” On the night of the 8th they made a bombing attack to clear the trenches on the south-east of the wood. At first this met with some success, but in the early morning of the 9th the enemy came at them again in large numbers, and they were driven back to their former position. It was not thought advisable to try to regain the lost ground.
The attack on the 9th September (the battle of Ginchy) was by the whole of the XIV Corps in conjunction with the XV Corps on the left. The XIV Corps held Guillemont; and Delville Wood was held by the XV Corps. The object was to capture Ginchy and bring the line up to point 141·7, and from there down to Leuze Wood. Incidentally it meant clearing the ground to the south-east of the wood, but in following the actions from this date it must be remembered that the Higher Command intended to work round Combles, and so the right of the British Army was always working to form a defensive flank, until the advance reached a point which would enable troops to join hands with the French on the far side of Combles.
The task of the 169th Brigade was the forming of a flank against Combles by capturing the trenches south-east of the wood (the trenches they had failed to take by bombing) and to advance their line a short way through Bouleaux Wood.
The 168th Brigade, who were on the line of the Guillemont-Leuze Wood road, were to pivot on their right (the advance from the northern end of the wood was very slight) and bring their left up to point 141·7. This “right form” was to be done in two stages, the road to Ginchy marking the halfway line.
The artillery were ordered to put up a creeping and stationary barrage. Fifty per cent. of guns were to fire on a known position as a stationary barrage; the other 50 per cent. were to start just ahead of the infantry and creep forward at the rate of fifty yards a minute, until the stationary barrage was reached, when the latter would be jumped forward to the next stationary barrage line.
It will be gathered from the foregoing account of how the 56th Division took over the line that the conditions under which the infantry waited for the resumption of attack were not dissimilar to those at the end, though not the actual termination, of an engagement—when nobody knows within a few hundred yards where any unit really is. And, indeed, that was always the situation during the battle of the Somme. There was perpetual unrest in the line.
The battle on the 9th has always seemed like a wild rush in fast-fading light. It was to open at 4.45 p.m., but on the left of the Corps it seems to have been delayed. Nowhere was it entirely successful in the assault. The situation remained obscure and fighting continued for several days.
The truth of the whole matter was that the enemy defended Combles with desperation. The right of the 56th Division had as hard a task as was ever set for any troops, and on their left was a German strong point bearing the ominous name of “the Quadrilateral,” the strength of which