A Collection of Essays and Fugitiv Writings. Noah Webster
that our language has suffered more injurious changes in America, since the British army landed on our shores, than it had suffered before, in the period of three centuries. The bucks and bloods tell us that there is no proper standard in language; that it is all arbitrary. The assertion, however, serves but to show their ignorance. There are, in the language itself, decisive reasons for preferring one pronunciation to another; and men of science should be acquainted with these reasons. But if there were none, and every thing rested on practice, we should never change a general practice without substantial reasons: No change should be introduced, which is not an obvious improvement.
But our leading characters seem to pay no regard to rules, or their former practice. To know and embrace every change made in Great Britain, whether right or wrong, is the extent of their inquiries, and the height of their ambition. It is to this deference we may ascribe the long catalogue of errors in pronunciation and of false idioms which disfigure the language of our mighty fine speakers. And should this imitation continue, we shall be hurried down the stream of corruption, with older nations, and our language, with theirs, be lost in an ocean of perpetual changes. The only hope we can entertain is, that America, driven by the shock of a revolution, from the rapidity of the current, may glide along near the margin with a gentler stream, and sometimes be wafted back by an eddy.
The foregoing remarks suggest some of the causes which operate to defeat the true end of the revolution. Every man sees and feels our political embarrassments; the foes of the revolution ascribe them all to that event, and the friends charge them upon the enmity and resentment of our parent country. Both are wrong. The revolution is, and will ultimately prove, a happy event for us and for the world. The English, as a nation, are wise and respectable: As citizens of the world, we should esteem them: As a commercial people, we should cultivate a friendly intercourse with them; but as a foreign nation, whose political circumstances are very different from ours, we should not make them, in all cases, our standard. I repeat the declaration I before made: The independence of this country is incomplete: There has been a total change in government, with little or no change in the principles which give energy to the operations of government.
In the preceding remarks, I have endeavored to shew in what respect the revolution of America is yet incomplete, and that an independence of manners and opinion is necessary to give full effect to an independence of government. I propose now to make some remarks on government, to state the effects of the revolution on the morals of people, and the influence of money on mens' sense of justice and moral obligation.
It is perhaps a fundamental principle of government, that men are influenced more by habit, than by any abstract ideas of right and wrong. Few people examin into the propriety of particular usages or laws; or if they examin, few indeed are capable of comprehending their propriety. But every man knows what is a law or general practice, and he conforms to it, not because it is right or best, but because it has been the practice. It is for this reason that habits of obedience should not be disturbed. There are perhaps in every government, some laws and customs, which, when examined on theoretical principles, will be found unjust and even impolitic. But if the people acquiesce in those laws and customs, if they are attached to them by habit, it is wrong in the Legislature to attempt an innovation which shall alarm their apprehensions. There are multitudes of absurdities practised in society, in which people are evidently happy. Arraign those absurdities before the tribunal of examination; people may be convinced of their impropriety; they may even be convinced that better schemes may be projected; and yet it might be impossible to unite their opinions so as to establish different maxims. On the other hand, there are many good institutions, in which, however, there may be theoretical faults, which, if called into public view, and artfully represented, might shake the best government on earth.
Speculativ philosophers and historians have often described, and sometimes ridiculed the warmth with which nations have defended errors in religion and government. With the most profound deference for wise and respectable men, I must think they are guilty of a mistake; and that the errors which nations fight to defend, exist only in the heads of these theorists. Whatever speculation may tell us, experience and the peace of society, require us to consider every thing as right, which a nation believes to be so. Every institution, every custom, may be deemed just and proper, which does not produce inconveniencies that the bulk of mankind may see and feel. The tranquillity of society therefore should never be disturbed for a philosophical distinction.
It will perhaps be objected, that these doctrines, if practised, would prevent all improvements, in science, religion and government. By no means; but they point out the method in which all improvements should be made, when opinion and fixed habits are to be overthrown, or changed. They show that all reformation should be left to the natural progress of society, or to the conviction of the mind. They show the hazard and impracticability of making changes, before the minds of the body of the people are prepared for the innovation. I speak not of despotic governments, where the will of the prince is enforced by an army; and yet even absolute tyrants have been assassinated for not attending to the spirit and habits of their subjects.
In vain do rulers oppose the general opinion of the people. By such opposition, Philip IId, of Spain, kept one part of his subjects, for half a century, butchering the other, and in the end, lost one third of his dominions. By not regarding the change of habits in the nation, Charles Ist, of England, lost his head. By carrying his changes too far, Cromwell began to oppose the spirit of the nation, and had he lived to prosecute his system, that spirit would, in a few years, have brought his neck to the block. The general spirit of the nation restored to the throne, the son of the prince, whom that spirit had but a few years before arraigned and condemned. By opposing that spirit, James was obliged to leave his kingdom, and the sense of the nation still excludes the family which, by their own law of succession, has the best title to the throne. But there is no prescription against general opinion; no right that can enter the list against the sense of a nation; that sense, which after all our reasoning, will forever determin what is best.
The truth of these remarks is proved by examples in this country. An immense revenue might have been drawn from America without resistance, in almost any method but that which the British parliament adopted. But their first attempts were made upon articles of common necessity; the attempts were too visible; the people felt and resisted. Their apprehensions were alarmed; their fears, whether well founded or imaginary, were multiplied and confirmed by newspaper rhapsodies, and finally produced a combined opposition to all British taxation. Then Great Britain should have compounded; she did not; she opposed the general sense of three millions of her subjects, and lost the whole.
A dispute existed between Connecticut and Pensylvania, respecting a tract of land; a federal court decided the jurisdiction, or State claim, in favor of Pensylvania; five thousand inhabitants, seated on the lands, acknowlege the jurisdiction, but contend that their original purchase, and subsequent labor, entitle them to the lands. Notwithstanding the invalidity of their State claim, the settlers determin to maintain their lands. The question of right is at once suspended, and the only inquiry is, which is the best policy, to indemnify a few individuals by a pecuniary composition, or sacrifice five thousand subjects. This question, left to the commonwealth, would be decided by a great majority, in favor of the settlers, and against the very principles of right on which the State holds the jurisdiction.
I am not competent to judge of the merits of the dispute between New York and Vermont; but if the usurpation of Vermont were a conceded fact, and that usurpation to be defended by arms, and the question of granting them independence were left to the State of New York, I am confident that nine tenths of the people would decide for the independence of Vermont against their own rights.
Thus it often happens, that a general opinion, grounded on rational expediency, will, and ought to decide political questions, contrary to the strict principles of justice and equity.
I would, by no means, be understood to defend, by such doctrines, the insurrections of a neighboring State. I reprobate every thing that wears the least appearance of opposition to lawful authority. It is evident however, that the Legislature of Massachusetts were too inattentive to the general spirit of the State. The murmurs of the people were heard long before they broke out into rebellion, and were treated with too much neglect. They were a proof at least that something was wrong. This the Legislature acknowleged in their late acts, and the complaints of the populace might once have been silenced