The Camp-fires of Napoleon. Henry Clay Watson
the Austrian army; but, aware of the terror which his daring exploit would strike into the enemy, he scarcely regretted his trifling failure of movement. The line of the Adda was carried; tremendous difficulties had been vanquished with a loss of only two hundred men, and the courage and devotion of the soldiers had been raised to the highest pitch.
The encampment upon the Adda presented a remarkable aspect. Most of the officers had the accommodation of tents, but the troops were destitute of that luxury, and their only resource for rest was to throw themselves upon the ground around their fires. These gallant men, although fatigued with the efforts of the glorious day, were too much excited by their victory to rest without some demonstration. It was a clear, beautiful moonlight night. Although filled in some places with the dead, the Adda danced merrily onward, the ripples sparkling in the moonbeams. All was quiet above; but in camp and town, there was the bustle of men to whom sleep would not come. Bonaparte had retired to his tent to partake of some refreshment, and having soon satisfied his abstemious appetite, he was about to traverse the camp, alone, to observe the spirit of his troops, as well as to ascertain the character and rank of the prisoners. In front of his tent, he was astonished to meet a small deputation of grim-visaged grenadiers, who saluted him with the title of the “Little Corporal.” One of their number then stepped forward, and respectfully communicated the intelligence that they had elected him a corporal, in consideration of his gallant service in the ranks that day, and hoped that they might one day confer still higher honors upon him. Three hearty cheers were then given by the veterans, who appeared to enjoy the joke amazingly; and after they had retired, the young general was saluted in various parts of the camp as the “Little Corporal.” This gaiety was characteristic of the French soldiers. Bonaparte was rather pleased with the singular mode of showing affection for his person, and admiration of his intrepidity.
The general approached a group of Hungarian prisoners without being recognised by them. They were standing near a fire, conversing, and evidently much irritated at the misfortunes of their position. He went among them and mingled in the conversation. An old officer, who spoke to him, appeared to be extremely moody. Bonaparte could not but smile at his language. “Things are going on as ill and irregular as possible,” said this veteran of routine. “The French have got a young general who knows nothing of the regular rules of war; he is sometimes on our front, sometimes on our flank, sometimes on the rear. There is no supporting such a gross violation of rules.” He evidently preferred to be whipped in a regular way. But it is agreed that the object of war is victory, and if rules do not secure that victory, they are of no value. Bonaparte’s system appeared very extraordinary to the Austrian commanders. It was something beyond what they had learned at their German military schools.
After traversing the camp, and receiving many testimonials of the warm devotion of the troops to his person, Bonaparte returned to his tent, where he was soon joined by Berthier, Massena, Augereau, Bessieres, Duroc, Serrurier, Lannes, and others. To each and all he gave a word of compliment; but he was especially fluent in his praise of the indomitable young General Lannes, whose daring courage had attracted his attention in previous engagements as well as at the tremendous charge across the bridge of Lodi. They were, indeed, as gallant a group of officers, as ever a general had at his command—men who could as calmly reason and determine upon manœuvres in the hottest storm of battle, as during the quiet hours of this moonlight night—quick in devising, irresistible in the execution; and yet it was only yonder stripling, with the Roman features and the piercing eyes, who could give a glorious harmony to their action, bring their peculiar faculties into play, and secure their triumph. Great as they undoubtedly were, they failed to achieve great triumphs when beyond the reach of the “Little Corporal’s” controlling mind. The conference was long, for there were difficulties in the arrangement of the plan for moving upon Milan, and some of the officers, particularly Massena, had objections to urge. However, Bonaparte determined according to his own views. The officers observed that there was a remarkable change in his bearing towards them. He had hitherto admitted them to complete familiarity; but they now felt constrained by his lofty manner to keep at a respectful distance. When they retired that night, some of them exchanged glances of significance; they were evidently displeased at the haughty bearing of the young commander-in-chief; yet few of them, perhaps, comprehended the change.
The fact was that the victory of Lodi had a great influence upon Napoleon’s mind. He afterwards acknowledged, that neither the quelling of the sections at Paris, nor the victory of Monte Notte made him regard himself as any thing superior, but that after Lodi, for the first time, the idea dawned upon him, that he should one day be “a decisive actor,” on the stage of the political world. It was Lodi which gave birth to the 18th Brumaire.
THE CAMP-FIRE AT CASTIGLIONE
It was at Castiglione and in its vicinity that the wonderful spirit and rapidity of Napoleon’s movements were more fully displayed than at any other of his scenes of victory in Italy. The aged Beaulieu had been superseded in the command of the Austrian army, by General Wurmser, a commander of high reputation. His army was greatly superior in numbers to that of Bonaparte. It descended from the Tyrol during the last days of July, in three divisions, commanded by Davidowich, Quasdanowitch, and Wurmser himself.
Wurmser, confident in his numbers, and calculating upon the absorption of the energies of the French army, by its endeavors to subdue Mantua, disposed his forces in the most admirable way to improve a victory; never reflecting that he might happen to be defeated. Untaught by all the previous disasters of Beaulieu, he committed the error of dividing his army, in order to cover an extent of country. His right wing was detached, with orders to occupy Brescia, and cut off the retreat of the French in the direction of Milan: his left wing was to descend the Adige, and manœuvre on Verona; while the centre, under his own command, advanced to raise the siege of Mantua. During the two first days of his approach, the French generals, after resisting to the utmost, yielded up successively, Rivoli, Brescia, and Salo; but these two days were sufficient to make Napoleon master of the plan on which Wurmser proposed to carry on the campaign, and he instantly disconcerted the whole of it, by a movement so unlike that of any ordinary general, as to defy all calculation.
In one night, (31st July,) he raised the siege of Mantua; sacrificing the whole of his artillery. The men were employed to destroy as much as the time would allow. They spiked the guns, burnt the carriages, threw the powder into the lake, and buried the balls. Augereau and Massena were stationed to defend the line of the Mincio as long as possible. Before morning the whole French army had disappeared from Mantua, and Napoleon was hurrying forward to attack the right wing of the Austrian army, before it could effect a junction with the central body of Wurmser.
The Austrian right wing was advancing in three divisions. Napoleon defeated one division at Salo, and another at Lonato. At the same time, Augereau and Massena, leaving a sufficient number of men at their posts to maintain a defence, or at least to impede the enemy, marched upon the third division at Brescia; but it had already fled in disorder towards the Tyrol. The French generals instantly countermarched to the support of their rear-guards, which had been forced by the Austrians.
Wurmser reached Mantua and was astonished to find what he believed to be a precipitate flight. He entered the city in triumph—but he was completely deceived. (August 2nd.)
Bonaparte did not halt for a moment. His troops had been constantly on the march, he had himself been all the time on horseback; he resolved to make them fight the very next morning. He had before him Bayalitsch at Lonato, and Liptai at Castiglione, presenting to both of them a front of twenty-five thousand men. He had to attack them before Wurmser should return from Mantua. Sauret had for the second time abandoned Salo; Bonaparte sent Guyeux again thither to recover the position, and to keep back Quasdanowitch. After these precautions on his left and on his rear, he resolved to march forward to Lonato with Massena, and to throw Augereau upon the heights of Castiglione, which had been abandoned on the preceding day by General Vallette. He broke that general at the head of his army, in order to make his lieutenants do their duty without flinching. On the following day, the 16th (August 3rd,) the whole army was in motion; Guyeux re-entered Salo, and this rendered any communication between Quasandowitch and the Austrian army still more impracticable. Bonaparte advanced upon Lonato; but his advanced guard was beaten back, some pieces of cannon were taken, and General Pigeon was made prisoner. Bayalitsch, proud of this success advanced with confidence,