Dio's Rome, Volume 3. Cassius Dio Cocceianus
two courses open to us. [-39-] One is to say that all these men,—Caesar, I mean, and Brutus, the old soldiers, the legions,—have decided wrongly and ought to submit to punishment, because without our sanction or that of the people they have dared to offer armed resistance to their consul, some having deserted his standard, and others having been gathered against him. The other is to say that Antony by reason of his deeds has in our judgment long since admitted that he is our enemy and by public consent ought to be chastised by us all. No one can be ignorant that the latter decision is not only more just but more expedient for us. The man neither understands how to handle business himself (how or by what means could a person that lives in drunkenness and dicing?) nor has he any companion who is of any account. He loves only such as are like himself and makes them the confidants of all his open and secret undertakings. Also he is most cowardly in extreme dangers and most treacherous even to his intimate friends, neither of which qualities is suited for generalship or war. [-40-] Who can be unaware that this very man caused all our internal troubles and then shared the dangers to the slightest possible degree? He tarried long in Brundusium through cowardice, so that Caesar was isolated and on account of him almost failed: likewise he held aloof from all succeeding wars,—that against the Egyptians, against Pharnaces, the African, and the Spanish. Who is unaware that he won the favor of Clodius, and after using the latter's tribuneship for the most outrageous ends would have killed him with his own hand, if I had accepted this promise from him? Again, in the matter of Caesar, he was first associated with him as quaestor, when Caesar was praetor in Spain, next attached himself to him during the tribuneship, contrary to the liking of us all, and later received from him countless money and excessive honors: in return for this he tried to inspire his patron with a desire for supremacy, which led to talk against him and was more than anything else responsible for Caesar's death.
[-41-] "Yet he once stated that it was I who directed the assassins to their work. He is so senseless as to venture to invent so great praise for me. And I for my part do not affirm that he was the actual slayer of Caesar,—not because he was not willing, but because in this, too, he was timid,—yet by the very course of his actions I say that Caesar perished at his hands. For this is the man who provided a motive, so that there seemed to be some justice in plotting against him, this is he who called him 'king', who gave him the diadem, who previously slandered him actually to his friends. Do I rejoice at the death of Caesar, I, who never enjoyed anything but liberty at his hands, and is Antony grieved, who has rapaciously seized his whole property and committed many injuries on the pretext of his letters, and is finally hastening to succeed to his position of ruler?
[-42-] "But I return to the point that he has none of the qualities of a great general or such as to bring victory, and does not possess many or formidable forces. The majority of the soldiers and the best ones have abandoned him to his fate, and also, by Jupiter, he has been deprived of the elephants. The remainder have perfected themselves rather in outraging and pillaging the possessions of the allies than in waging war, A proof of the sort of spirit that animates them lies in the fact that they still adhere to him, and of their lack of fortitude in that they have not taken Mutina, though they have now been besieging it for so long a time. Such is the condition of Antony and of his followers found to be. But Caesar and Brutus and those arrayed with them are firmly intrenched without outside aid; Caesar, in fact, has won over many of his rival's soldiers, and Brutus is keeping the same usurper out of Gaul: and if you come to their assistance, first by approving what they have done of their own motion, next by ratifying their acts, at the same time giving them legal authority for the future, and next by sending out both the consuls to take charge of the war, it is not possible that any of his present associates will continue to aid him. However, even if they should cling to him most tenaciously, they would not he able to resist all the rest at once, but he will either lay down his arms voluntarily, as soon as he ascertains that you have passed this vote, and place himself in your hands, or he will be captured involuntarily as the result of one battle.
"I give you this advice, and, if it had been my lot to be consul, I should have certainly carried it out, as I did in former days when I defended you against Catiline and Lentulus (a relative of this very man), who had formed a conspiracy. [-43-] Perhaps some one of you regards these statements as well put, but thinks we ought first to despatch envoys to him, then, after learning his decision, in case he will voluntarily give up his arms and submit himself to you, to take no action, but if he sticks to the same principles, then to declare war upon him: this is the advice which I hear some persons wish to give you. This policy is very attractive in theory, but in fact it is disgraceful and dangerous to the city. Is it not disgraceful that you should employ heralds and embassies to citizens? With foreign nations it is proper and necessary to treat by heralds in advance, but upon citizens who are at all guilty you should inflict punishment straightway, by trying them in court if you can get them under the power of your votes, and by warring against them if you find them in arms. All such are slaves of you and of the people and of the laws, whether they wish it or not; and it is not fitting either to coddle them or to put them on an equal footing with the highest class of free persons, but to pursue and chastise them like runaway servants, with a feeling of your own superiority. [-44-] Is it not a disgrace that he should not delay to wrong us, but we delay to defend ourselves? Or again, that he should for a long time, weapons in hand, have been carrying on the entire practice of war, while we waste time in decrees and embassies, and that we should retaliate only with letters and phrases upon the man whom we have long since discovered by his deeds to be a wrongdoer? What do we expect? That he will some day render us obedience and pay us respect? How can this prove true of a man who has come into such a condition that he would not be able, even should he wish it, to be an ordinary citizen with you under a democratic government? If he were willing to conduct his life on fair and equitable principles, he would never have entered in the first place upon such a career as his: and if he had done it under the influence of folly or recklessness, he would certainly have given it up speedily of his own accord. As the case stands, since he has once overstepped the limits imposed by the laws and the government and has acquired some power and authority by this action, it is not conceivable that he would change of his own free will or heed any one of our resolutions, but it is absolutely requisite that such a man should be chastised with those very weapons with which he has dared to wrong us. [-45-] And I beg you now to remember particularly a sentence which this man himself once uttered, that it is impossible for you to be saved, unless you conquer. Hence those who bid you send envoys are doing nothing else than planning how you may be dilatory and the body of your allies become as a consequence more feeble and dispirited; while he, on the other hand, will be doing whatever he pleases, will destroy Decimus, storm Mutina, and capture all of Gaul: the result will be that we can no longer find means to deal with him, but shall be under the necessity of trembling before him, paying court to him, worshiping him. This one thing more about the embassy and I am done:—that Antony also gave you no account of what business he had in hand, because he intended that you should do this.
"I, therefore, for these and all other reasons advise you not to delay nor to lose time, but to make war upon him as quickly as possible. You must reflect that the majority of enterprises owe their success rather to an opportune occasion than to their strength; and you should by all means feel perfectly sure that I would never give up peace if it were really peace, in the midst of which I have most influence and have acquired wealth and reputation, nor have urged you to make war, did I not think it to your advantage.
[-46-] And I advise you, Calenus, and the rest who are of the same mind as you, to be quiet and allow the senate to vote the requisite measures and not for the sake of your private good-will toward Antony recklessly betray the common interests of all of us. Indeed, I am of the opinion, Conscript Fathers, that if you heed my counsel I may enjoy in your company and with thorough satisfaction freedom and preservation, but that if you vote anything different, I shall choose to die rather than to live. I have, in general, never been afraid of death as a consequence of my outspokenness, and now I fear it least of all. That accounts, indeed, for my overwhelming success, the proof of which lies in the fact that you decreed a sacrifice and festival in memory of the deeds done in my consulship,—an honor which had never before been granted to any one, even to one who had achieved some great end in war. Death, if it befell me, would not be at all unseasonable, especially when you consider that my consulship was so many years ago; yet remember that in that very consulship I uttered the same sentiment, to make you feel that in any and all business