The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11. Samuel Johnson
to us, that he who obstructs this bill, will be thought desirous to obstruct the inquiry, to conspire the ruin of his country, and to act in confederacy with publick robbers.
But, my lords, whether the nation is really exasperated to such a degree as is represented, whether it is the general opinion of mankind that the publick affairs have been unfaithfully administered, and whether this bill has been dictated by a desire of publick justice, or of private revenge, I have not thought it necessary to inquire; having long learned to act in consequence of my own conviction, not of the opinions of others, at least, not of those who determine upon questions which they cannot understand, and judge without having ever obtained an opportunity of examining.
Such, my lords, must be the opinions of the people upon questions of policy, opinions not formed by reflection, but adopted from those whom they sometimes, with very little reason, imagine nearer spectators of the government than themselves, and in whom they place an implicit confidence, on account of some casual act of popularity.
I shall not, therefore, think the demands of the people a rule of conduct, nor shall ever fear to incur their resentment in the prosecution of their interest. I shall never flatter their passions to obtain their favour, or gratify their revenge for fear of their contempt. The inconstancy, my lords, of publick applause, all of us have observed, and many of us have experienced; and we know that it is very far from being always the reward of merit. We know that the brightest character may be easily darkened by calumny; that those who are labouring for the welfare of the publick, may be easily represented as traitors and oppressors; and that the people may quickly be persuaded to join in the accusation.
That the people, however deceived, have a right to accuse whomsoever they suspect, and that their accusation ought to be heard, I do not deny; but surely, my lords, the opinion of the people is not such a proof of guilt as will justify a method of prosecution never known before, or give us a right to throw down the barriers of liberty, and punish by power those whom we cannot convict by law.
Let any of your lordships suppose himself by some accident exposed to the temporary malice of the populace, let him imagine his enemies inflaming them to a demand of a prosecution, and then proposing that he should be deprived of the common methods of defence, and that evidence should be hired against him, lest the publick should be disappointed, and he will quickly discover the unreasonableness of this bill.
I suppose no man will deny, that methods of prosecution introduced on one occasion, may be practised on another; and that in the natural rotations of power, the same means may be used for very different ends. Nothing is more probable, my lords, if a bill of this kind should be ever passed, in compliance with the clamours of the people, to punish ministers, and to awe the court, than that it may in time, if a wicked minister should arise, be made a precedent for measures by which the court may intimidate the champions of the people; by which those may be pursued to destruction, who have been guilty of no other crime than that of serving their country in a manner which those who are ignorant of the circumstances of affairs, happen to disapprove.
The measures now proposed, my lords, are, therefore, to be rejected, because it is evident that they will establish a precedent, by which virtue may at any time be oppressed, but which can be very seldom necessary for the detection of wickedness; since there is no probability that it will often happen, that a man really guilty of enormous crimes can secure himself from discovery, or connect others with him in such a manner, that they cannot impeach him without betraying themselves.
But, my lords, whenever virtue is to be persecuted, whenever false accusations are to be promoted, this method is incontestably useful; for no reward can so efficaciously prevail upon men who languish in daily fear of publick justice, as a grant of impunity.
It may be urged, my lords, I own, that all inquiries into futurity are idle speculations; that the expedient proposed is proper on the present occasion, and that no methods of justice are to be allowed, if the possibility of applying them to bad purposes, is a sufficient reason for rejecting them.
But to this, my lords, it may be answered with equal reason, that every process of law is likewise, in some degree, defective; that the complications of circumstances are variable without end, and, therefore, cannot be comprised in any certain rule; and that we must have no established method of justice, if we cannot be content with such as may possibly be sometimes eluded.
And, my lords, it may be observed farther, that scarcely any practice can be conceived, however generally unreasonable and unjust, which may not be sometimes equitable and proper; and that if we are to lay aside all regard to futurity, and act merely with regard to the present exigence, it may be often proper to violate every part of our constitution. This house may sometimes have rejected bills beneficial to the nation; and if this reasoning be allowed, it might have been wise and just in the commons and the emperour to have suspended our authority by force, to have voted us useless on that occasion, and have passed the law without our concurrence.
With regard to the establishment of criminal prosecutions, as well as to our civil rights, we are, my lords, to consider what is, upon the whole, most for the advantage of the publick; we are not to admit practices which may be sometimes useful, but may be often pernicious, and which suppose men better or wiser than they are. We do not grant absolute power to a wise and moderate prince, because his successours may inherit his power without his virtues; we are not to trust or allow new methods of prosecution upon an occasion on which they may seem useful, because they may be employed to purposes very different from those for which they were introduced.
Thus, my lords, I have shown the impropriety of the bill now before us, upon the most favourable supposition that can possibly be made; a supposition of the guilt of the noble person against whom it is contrived. And surely, my lords, what cannot even in that case be approved, must, if we suppose him innocent, be detested.
That he is really innocent, my lords, that he is only blackened by calumny, and pursued by resentment, cannot be more strongly proved than by the necessity to which his enemies are reduced, of using expedients never heard of in this nation before, to procure accusations against him; expedients which they cannot show to have been at any time necessary for the punishment of a man really wicked, and which, by bringing guilt and innocence into the same danger, leave us at liberty to imagine, that he is clear from the crimes imputed to him, even in the opinion of those who pursue him with the fiercest resentment, and the loudest clamours.
It may well be imagined, my lords, that those whom he has so long defeated by his abilities, see themselves now baffled by his innocence; and that they only now persecute his character, to hide the true reason for which they formerly attacked his power.
I hope, my lords, I shall be easily forgiven for observing, that this is a testimony of uncorrupted greatness, more illustrious than any former minister has ever obtained; for when was it known, my lords, that after a continuance of power for twenty years, any man, when his conduct became the subject of publick examination, was without accusers?
I cannot, for my part, but congratulate the noble person upon his triumph over malice; malice assisted by subtilty and experience, by wealth and power, which is at length obliged to confess its impotence, to call upon us to assist it with new laws, to enable it to offer a reward for evidence against him, and throw down the boundaries of natural justice, that he may be harassed, censured, and oppressed, upon whom it cannot be proved that he ever deviated from the law, or employed his power for any other end than the promotion of the publick happiness.
Had the officers of the crown, my lords, when his influence was represented so great, and his dominion so absolute, projected any such measures for his defence; had they proposed to silence his opponents by calling them to a trial, and offered a stated price for accusations against them, how loudly would they have been charged with the most flagrant violation of the laws, and the most open disregard of the rights of nature; with how much vehemence would it have been urged, that they were intoxicated with their success, and that in the full security of power they thought themselves entitled to neglect the great distinctions of right and wrong, and determined to employ the law for the completion of those purposes, in which justice would give them no assistance.
I doubt not that your lordships will easily perceive, that this censure is equally just in either case; that you will not allow any man to be prosecuted by methods which he ought not