1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. Adam Zamoyski
provinces and sign in my capital any treaty which would only be a truce. The Frenchman is brave, but long privations and a bad climate tire him and discourage him. Our climate, our winter will fight for us. Prodigious victories are only achieved where the Emperor is, and he cannot be everywhere or spend years away from Paris.’23 Alexander had said that he was well aware of Napoleon’s ability to win battles, and would therefore avoid fighting the French where they were under his command. He had also referred to the guerrilla in Spain, and said that the whole Russian nation would resist an invader. But on reflection Napoleon dismissed all this as bravado. He believed Alexander was too weak a character to carry out such a plan, and that Russian society would not accept such sacrifices. He reasoned that the nobles would not want to see their lands ravaged for the sake of Alexander’s honour, while the serfs would as likely revolt against their nobles and their Tsar as fight to the last man for a system of slavery.
When asked his opinion on what should be done, Caulaincourt came up with two alternatives. Napoleon should either give a significant part, if not the whole, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to Alexander, thereby cementing the alliance, or he should go to war with the aim of restoring the Kingdom of Poland. He pointed out that Austria could easily be compensated, and maintained that the cause of Poland was so universally recognised as a just one that even Britain would ultimately approve.24 Asked which course of action he would adopt given the choice, Caulaincourt replied that he would give the Grand Duchy to Alexander, thereby guaranteeing a stable peace. Napoleon countered that he could not have peace without honour, and the abandonment of the Poles would dishonour him. At the same time, such appeasement of Alexander would inevitably lead to further Russian expansion into the heart of Europe.
Alexander’s military ardour had in fact cooled by then. Memories of Austerlitz must have played their part, for, as Czartoryski noted, he was still ‘very afraid’ of Napoleon. His mind was troubled by the uncertainties of his position at home, his heart was bruised by the public rejection of his policies and, at a more personal level, by the successive deaths, in 1808 and 1810, of two baby daughters. But perhaps the main consideration holding him back was that he did not want to be seen as the aggressor. In July 1811 he wrote to his sister that the best course to follow was to let time and circumstances destroy Napoleon. ‘It seems to me more reasonable to hope that this evil will be remedied by time and by its own sheer scale, for it is such that I cannot rid myself of the conviction that this state of affairs cannot last, that the suffering of all classes, both in Germany and in France, is so great that patience must necessarily run out.’25
But it was Napoleon’s patience that had run out. He viewed the Russian abandonment of the Continental System as a betrayal, he saw her troop build-up as a threat and a provocation, and he was convinced that she was using the Polish question and the subject of trade as excuses to break out of the alliance. This seemed to be confirmed by the increased diplomatic activity of the Russians in Vienna, where they were quite openly trying to turn Austria away from France.
Napoleon needed to go and take charge of operations in Spain personally in order to throw out the British and pacify the peninsula, but he could not contemplate such a move with a Russian army hovering on the borders of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and exciting German hopes of revenge. He was convinced that, just as the Austrians had done in 1809, Alexander would stab him in the back the moment he turned it.26
His exasperation erupted on 15 August 1811, his forty-second birthday. At midday he strutted into the throne room at the Tuileries, which was filled with the entire court and all the senior officers in Paris, all perspiring in full ceremonial and parade uniforms on what was an exceptionally hot day. He took his place on the throne to receive the good wishes of the dignitaries and the diplomatic corps. This part of the ceremony over, Napoleon stepped down from the throne and began to circulate among the guests.
When he reached the Russian ambassador Prince Kurakin, he mentioned Russian reports of a recent victory over the Turks at Ruschuk on the Danube, and queried why, if they had indeed won, the Russians had evacuated the town. Kurakin explained that the Tsar had been obliged to withdraw some troops from the Turkish front for financial reasons, and had therefore decided not to hold the town. At this Napoleon exploded, saying that the Russians had not won, they had been beaten by the Turks, and they had been beaten because they had withdrawn troops from the Turkish front not for any financial reasons, but because they were massing their armies on the frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and that all the so-called outrage over Oldenburg was but an excuse for their intention to invade the Grand Duchy in an open act of hostility to him, Napoleon. The unfortunate Kurakin kept opening his mouth to reply, but could not get a word in edgeways and looked like a fish gasping for air, while perspiration poured down his face in the intense heat. Napoleon accused Russia of harbouring hostile intentions, and when Kurakin assured him of the contrary, he turned on the ambassador and asked whether he had powers to negotiate, for if he had, they could conclude a new treaty there and then. The answer was negative, so Napoleon merely walked away, leaving the ambassador in a state of shock.27
Napoleon was back at Saint Cloud late that evening, and on the following morning he locked himself up with the punctilious and hard-working Hugues Maret, Duc de Bassano, who had succeeded Champagny as Foreign Minister. Together they trawled through all the documentation concerning the Russian alliance since Tilsit. According to their analysis, the problems had started in 1809, when the Russians had hung back in the war against Austria instead of marching in loyally and capturing Galicia. Had they done so, they could have been allowed to keep it. As they did not, it was captured by the Poles, who could not be denied some of it. This caused panic in Russia and led the Tsar to demand slices of the Grand Duchy. France could never accede to such a request. Not just for the sake of her honour, but also because if Russia were to receive one piece of the Grand Duchy she would in time expect to get another, and would soon entrench her position on the Vistula if not the Oder. For similar reasons, France could not countenance any further Russian advance against Turkey.
In the memorandum summing up the situation, they stated France’s position as follows: France wanted Russia’s friendship and needed her as an ally in her struggle against Britain, which was the one remaining obstacle to a general peace. She did not want to fight Russia, as there was nothing that she wanted to take from her. Also, she had more pressing business in Spain, which required Napoleon’s personal attention. But France could not go down the road of buying Russia’s friendship through endless cession of Polish or Ottoman lands. France must therefore prepare for war in order to be in a position to dictate a peace. Lauriston was told that he had to make it clear that ‘we want peace, but we are prepared for war’.28
Napoleon’s sense of exasperation at not being able to bring Alexander back into a close alliance is obvious in a personal letter he had written him on 6 April. ‘The effect of my military preparations will make Your Majesty increase his own; and when news of his actions reaches me here, it will force me to raise more troops: and all this over nothing!’ he wrote. They had been drawn into a spiral of mistrust and power politics that made it very difficult to arrive at a negotiated settlement. Napoleon later admitted that they had got themselves ‘into the position of two blustering braggarts who, having no wish to fight each other, seek to frighten each other’.29
* While many assumed that Napoleon’s creation of the Grand Duchy owed much to his infatuation at the time with his mistress Maria Walewska, now many in Russia suspected Alexander’s mistress Maria Antonovna Naryshkina, also a Pole, of exercising a similar influence.
* It is true that some teachers at Russian universities did use German or Latin.
† According